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Post- Socialist Urban Infrastructures
Post- Socialist Urban Infrastructures critically elaborates on often forgotten, but some 
of the most essential, aspects of contemporary urban life, namely infrastructures, and 
links them to a discussion of post- socialist transformation.
As the skeletons of cities, infrastructures capture the ways in which urban environ-
ments are assembled and urban lives unfold. Focusing on post- socialist cities, marked 
by neoliberalisation, polarisation and hybridity, this book offers new and enriching 
perspectives on urban infrastructures by centering on the often marginalised aspects 
of urban research – transport, green spaces, and water and heating provision.
Featuring cases from West and East alike, the book covers examples from 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Germany, Russia, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Tajikistan, and India. It provides original insights into the 
infrastructural back end of post- socialist cities for scholars, planners, and activists 
interested in urban geography, cultural and social anthropology, and urban studies.
Tauri Tuvikene is an urban geographer at Tallinn University. His research deals 
with comparative urbanism in relation to post- socialist cities. He has published on 
conceptualizations of post- socialism, garage areas in (post- ) Soviet urban spaces and 
urban (transport) infrastructures, including the politics of parking and walking in an 
urban environment.
Wladimir Sgibnev defended his PhD degree at Humboldt University’s Central Asian 
studies department addressing the social production of space in urban Tajikistan. 
Currently, he is Senior Researcher at the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography 
(Leipzig), working on urban processes in post- Soviet countries, particularly urban 
development and mobility in peripheralised locations.
Carola S. Neugebauer studied landscape architecture and urban design in Germany 
and France. She is Associate Professor at the RWTH Aachen University. Taking up 
an interdisciplinary and comparative stance on cities, her research has been focused 
on urban transformations, planning, and cultural heritage in Central Eastern Europe 
and the post- Soviet space.
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1  Introduction
Linking post- socialist and urban 
infrastructures
Tauri Tuvikene, Wladimir Sgibnev and 
Carola S. Neugebauer
Infrastructural vignettes
As in many microrayons of the Soviet Union, a large- diameter pipe coming 
from the district heating plant, whose large exhaust chimney is visible from 
afar, meanders between the five- storey blocks of the ‘Sadriddin Ayni’ housing 
estate at the northern gates of Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan. High- rise 
residential buildings form the mainstay of Soviet- era housing provision in 
Taijkistan and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union (FSU), as well as in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Today, they are still the backbone of the 
housing stock. Yet, in this housing estate, the district heating has not been 
working since the years of the civil war (1992– 1997). Electricity is scarce and 
expensive, so residents have resorted to do- it- yourself solutions, installing 
their own wood- fired stoves with pipes peeking out of the windows. In 
wintertime, many families seal off all rooms but the living room and spend 
their days around the stove. This shift from a centralized infrastructural 
regime to an individualized and fragmented system has led to a definite loss 
of trust in the state, in Dushanbe as elsewhere in the formerly socialist bloc.
Several minibuses wait for passengers at the ‘Vodonasos’ terminal stop by 
the ‘Sadriddin Ayni’ housing estate. These minibuses, known as marshrutkas, 
were never thought of as means of mass transportation in Soviet urban 
planning, yet were particularly suited for the ‘wild 1990s’ in various parts 
of the post- socialist realm. New needs and possibilities, a new legal frame-
work and new struggles for livelihood drastically transformed urban trans-
port. Municipal operators were unable to meet the basic mobility needs 
of the population and an ever- growing fleet of marshrutkas filled the gap. 
At the same time, defunct industrial plants released thousands of people 
into unemployment, many of whom became absorbed by the marshrutka 
sector. The emergence of privately run transport options and the soaring 
increase in private car use signalled an individualization of mobility. Today, 
marshrutkas are banned on Dushanbe’s main thoroughfare:  the adminis-
tration considers them not to be presentable enough. Dushanbe, like many 
other cities, is looking for more modern and ‘world city’ alternatives, and 
aims to ban marshrutkas from its streets altogether.
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2
Ambition and scope
The topic of these  vignettes  – collapse and deficiency, as well as ways of 
overcoming them – formed the primary common ground for infrastructure- 
related publications after the fall of communism. Indeed, the ‘continuing 
flow within the pipes […] literally and metaphorically [constitutes] the body 
politic’ (Alexander et  al., 2007, p. 23). Consequently, the people affected 
may see the end of infrastructure provision as a sign of societal disintegra-
tion. Unsurprisingly, unstable utilities has become the most important single 
factor in a prevailing admiration of the Soviet forms of infrastructural gov-
ernance, and also a source of numerous contentions. The academic interest 
of this present volume thus builds upon the societal salience of the topic.
Most publications on the topic, however, did not emerge from aca-
demia but from major international donors such as the World Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Asian 
Development Bank, and their (Western) consultants involved in project imple-
mentation. In these publications, the transitological paradigm prevailed, 
addressing infrastructure development as a tool for fostering competitive-
ness and enabling access to markets (see also Kaminski, 2000; Shepherd 
and Wilson, 2006). For many cities and regions, this literature provides the 
sole source of statistics and analyses of infrastructures so far. Regarding 
public transport, several studies have delved into major cities of European 
Union (EU) accession countries such as Poland (Pucher, 1995), the Czech 
Republic (Pucher, 1999) and Hungary (Hook, 1999). For the FSU, country- 
and city- specific studies exist, among others, on Uzbekistan (Gwilliam 
et  al., 1999), Kazakhstan (Finn, 2008; Gwilliam, 2000; Gwilliam, 2001) 
and Georgia (Finn, 2008), as well as some comparative overview papers 
(Kominek, 2005). Several authors have delved into the utilities sector – from 
digital infrastructures (Clarke, 2001) to water, electricity and heating, both 
with an urban focus (Kennedy, 1999; Lampietti and Meyer, 2002; World 
Bank, 2010) and dealing with regional water and energy conflicts, particu-
larly in Central Asia (International Crisis Group, 2007; International Crisis 
Group, 2014) or ‘transition economies’ in general terms (Zhang, 2013). 
These publications are also a valuable source for understanding why urban 
infrastructures in our region of concern look as they do today – both in posi-
tive and negative terms. Yet the bulk of these publications are either based 
on policy reviews or on data provided by national statistical agencies. Their 
data quality is often doubtful and rarely detailed. Moreover, such studies 
are not interested in theoretical and conceptual debates, nor do they pay 
attention to the everyday experience of infrastructures.
This book, Post- Socialist Urban Infrastructures, takes a different path. 
Over the past decade, many scientists in geography, urban studies and 
planning, and more recently in anthropology, have made infrastructures a 
central part of their research – empirically but also conceptually. This ‘infra-
structural turn’ (Graham, 2010) has investigated infrastructures as linking 
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technologies and socio- material means with products of urban and societal 
change, which in turn shape the daily lives of individuals and societies. The 
‘infrastructural turn’ has also drawn attention to ‘infrastructural lives’ – that 
is, the ways in which infrastructures are used and made usable in everyday 
practice (Graham and McFarlane, 2014). Infrastructures in this sense con-
stitute a valuable conceptual lens for critical social research, particularly in 
urban contexts where infrastructures are dense and prominently visible, for 
example when they collapse in unstable institutional settings.
Infrastructure scholars have paid attention to the different ways in which 
infrastructures and their relations with cities have developed in the global 
North and South. The post- socialist context has remained largely excluded 
from the global North mainstream, but also from critical perspectives eman-
ating from the global South (Tuvikene, 2016). The differences between 
materialities, practices, institutions and normative discourses should not 
be seen as definite:  there are different accents brought forward through 
different assemblages of infrastructures. While the global North stresses the 
smooth operation and invisibility of infrastructures, the global South has 
highlighted the struggle for and lack of infrastructures, also highlighting 
colonial divides (Coutard and Rutherford, 2016). Departing from the global 
North and South, ‘post- socialism’ brings the hybridization of different infra-
structural regimes to the fore. The legacies of socialist regimes are still pre-
sent in aspects both material (such as housing stock, pipes and tramlines) 
and non- material (such as governing bodies and public discourses), now 
embedded in diversified paths of neoliberalism or paternalism. Thus, the 
adaptation of infrastructures to shrinking cities, downsized industries and 
shifted residential patterns has constituted a major post- socialist challenge, 
on top of challenges linked to the enormous concentration and growth of 
capital cities. This occurred simultaneously with different processes of dem-
ocratization, as well as (new) exclusions, nation- building and dependencies, 
new modernization agendas and infrastructural setbacks. Post- socialism 
thus manifests a hybridity that constitutes an interesting field for critical 
reflection and mutual scholarly exchange between both the global North 
and global South, combining concerns from the infrastructural turn with 
emerging post- colonial theory- inspired comparative urbanism literature 
(e.g. Jacobs, 2012; Robinson, 2006, 2011; Tuvikene, 2016).
Henceforth, taking up the practical and theoretical value of infra-
structural research, and the current ignorance of the interplay between 
infrastructure and post- socialist urban change, this volume positions post- 
socialism alongside the existing North and South literatures on infrastruc-
ture, drawing from previous studies and elaborating on how this literature 
informs what happens in contexts usually characterized as post- socialist, 
and how such contexts might help to reveal the production and consump-
tion of infrastructures more generally, as well as to provide conceptual and 
practical insights. Therefore, the three terms in the book’s title constitute the 
starting points of discussion:
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 1) How do urban features shape infrastructures, and how do infrastructures 
constitute urbanity?
 2) How may we grasp the interrelation between research on infrastructures 
and post- socialist urban change?
 3) Which lessons should we draw from post- socialism about urban 
infrastructures, and how do infrastructures help to understand post- 
socialist urban change?
Conceptualizing urban infrastructures
Over the past decade or so, infrastructures have gained a central position 
for research in social sciences, no longer subsumed under other processes 
(Rao, 2014). Inspired by the idea of studying the unstudied (Star, 1999), a 
number of researchers have focused on infrastructures, leading to declar-
ations of an ‘infrastructural turn’ (Graham, 2010). We can thus observe the 
emergence of ‘a new genre of thinking that narrates the social life of a city 
through its material infrastructure’ (Amin, 2014, p. 137). A change of per-
spective from assuming infrastructures to be in the background to shifting 
them to the fore of thinking about cities and societies is on the way (Amin 
and Thrift, 2017; Coutard and Rutherford, 2016; Guy et al., 2001, 2011). 
According to Latham and Wood (2015), there are at least three reasons for 
such a rise in interest in infrastructures: first, new infrastructural elements 
(such as bicycle infrastructure and new public transit systems) have become 
important in contemporary cities. Second, cities and states have changed 
the ways in which they deal with established infrastructures (such as privat-
ization and financialization). Third, infrastructures are seen as not purely 
technical phenomena, as they tended to be understood previously, but as 
incorporated into social practices. Additionally, a recent upsurge in assem-
blage studies, actor- network theory and science, and technology studies in 
urban studies and beyond (Farías and Bender, 2010; Graham and Marvin, 
2001) has changed the focus of social research: it has become much more 
attentive to technical aspects that were previously considered to be merely 
the concerns of engineers. This emerging set of literature, as will be discussed 
later, has shown how urban infrastructures are linking technologies:  they 
highlight ways in which cities and societies are socio- material, and how 
infrastructures are entangled within symbolic meanings.
Urban infrastructures as linking technologies
Infrastructures link processes on various scales (Furlong, 2010): while they 
always involve specific locations, being thus local, they also link political 
and economic processes, including authorities on various scales (McFarlane 
and Rutherford, 2008). Airports, ports and motorways are all in different 
ways localized, but their functions involve far more than their immediate 
locality. Discussing a pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan via Tbilisi, Barry (2013) 
shows how the international project is rooted in local power structures and 
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struggles for political recognition. Similarly, human bodies and the urban 
level meet at the scale of the home. While in modern cities infrastructures 
tend to be hidden from the residents’ eyes  – as the often unnoticed and 
taken for granted access to water in modern homes vividly shows (Kaika, 
2004)  – they do the work of linking citizens to one another and to the 
state. Infrastructures connect society more tightly than does, for instance, 
the process of voting (Tonkiss, 2013). Infrastructures are thus arteries of 
cities (Joyce, 2003; Tonkiss, 2013) as well as of societies in general. They 
are socio- technologies that link objects and technologies, and enable other 
objects – human and non- human – to operate (Larkin, 2013).
While the key characteristic of infrastructures is their capacity to link, 
hence not being scalar, the ‘urban’ aspect of infrastructures brings about 
some specificities. Of course, cities are not isolated entities. But while cities 
rely on a high concentration of technical networks extending far from the 
dense urban cores (Brenner, 2014; Graham, 2010), they are, at the same 
time, interlinked with various presences of ‘natural’ features including green 
spaces, parks, urban agriculture, rivers, lakes and wastelands. Combined 
with cities’ particular exposure to vulnerabilities, the complex concentrations 
of the technical and the ‘natural’, and the human and non- human (Amin 
and Thrift, 2017), cities pose particular challenges for understanding 
and coping with infrastructures. Many of these challenges are related to 
how infrastructures can and should be developed in order to balance the 
conflicting interests of life quality, economic attractiveness, ecological sus-
tainability and political representation: interests and developments can also 
mean the displacement of some social groups in order to provide space for 
others (Rao, 2014). Moreover, while associated with dynamics and future 
progress, infrastructures often make cities obdurate in terms of material 
stability: once they are built, they are resource heavy, time- consuming and 
expensive to change (Hommels, 2005).
Finally, there are various types of infrastructural hardware concentrated 
and interlinked in cities, among them transport infrastructures, green 
infrastructures and housing infrastructures. As characteristic and relatively 
well- researched urban features, they are key for the cities’ economic, social, 
ecological and cultural well- being.
‘Transport infrastructure’ refers to nodes and networks that facilitate 
flows of people, goods and ideas between and within places (Alff et al., 2014; 
Kreutzmann, 1991; Reeves, 2011). But money laundering and diseases also 
travel the world via the same routes and nodes (Curtis and Riva, 2010). 
Transport infrastructures resonate with modernity, globalization and eco-
nomic development, and have produced a vast and expanding literature. 
It ranges from studies noting the impressive character of transport hubs 
and networks forming part of the cultural heritage of cities and societies 
(Merriman, 2007) to studies concerned with sustainable transport systems 
designed for growing metropolitan regions (Banister, 2008). A further set of 
literature is inspired by the ‘mobility turn’ and focuses on the ‘constructed 
fact of moving’ (Cresswell, 2011, p. 550), the everyday practices of mobility, 
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and the ways in which transport infrastructures are inhabited, lived with 
and reproduced (Latham and Wood, 2015; Merriman, 2016).
‘Green infrastructures’ might be understood in a narrow way as gar-
dens, cemeteries, pocket parks, green roofs and green walls in cities, but 
can also be seen as all kinds of green and blue spaces in urban regions, 
including forests, lakes and wetlands, parks, rural areas and brownfield 
sites. Indeed, the concept of green infrastructure has recently experienced a 
revival (Benedict and McMahon, 2006; Czechowski et al., 2015). For more 
than a century, this has constituted a key element of urban development and 
planning in industrialized societies in the global North (e.g. Benedict and 
McMahon, 2006; Hennebo and Schmidt, 1976; Howard, 1944) with the 
purpose of protecting ‘open spaces for recreation, reflection and relaxation’ 
(Benedict and McMahon, 2006, p. xiii), as well as providing economic sub-
sistence and health care. Scholars and practitioners test the potential and 
implementation of green infrastructures for ecological, social and economic 
sustainability in increasingly polarized urban contexts, namely in shrinking 
cities (Rößler, 2010) – of particular relevance for cities in the post-socialist 
realm – as well as in growing urban regions (Momm- Schult et al., 2013). 
Moreover, these strands are linked to current debates on urban public space 
in general (Madanipour, 2003; Madanipour et al., 2014) and to forms of 
bottom- up appropriation such as urban gardening or temporary uses (see 
also Zupan and Büdenbender, this issue).
‘Housing as infrastructure’ refers to two aspects:  first, to the tech-
nical equipment of housing with utilities involving energy, heating, water, 
sewage and telecommunication, and, second, to the wider residential area, 
including parking lots, playgrounds and waste management (Edwards and 
Turrent, 2000). Indeed, housing issues have received wide scholarly attention 
regarding the technical, institutional and financial challenges and solutions 
for modernizing and adapting various types of housing stocks, for example in 
terms of energy efficiency (Högberg et al., 2009) but also social and political 
aspects of retrofitting (Bouzarovski, 2015). Increasingly linked to questions 
of socio- spatial segregation (Bouzarovski et al., 2012, dealing with energy 
poverty and housing in the UK and Europe; Healy and Clinch, 2004), these 
approaches are discussed and tested in polarizing urban contexts, involving 
questions of infrastructural retreat (Moss, 2008) or the needs of growing 
urban regions (Libbe et al., 2010). Housing has been a prominent theme in 
cities in the post-socialist realm but the ways in which shifts in infrastructures 
have been interlinked with shifts in housing planning and governing deserves 
more attention (as elaborated in various chapters in this collection).
Infrastructures as socio- material: the force of the technical and  
its social production
The emphasis on the socio- material constructedness of infrastructure points 
out that materiality is not passive: hardware has manifold effects on the 
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individuals and institutions associated with it. Infrastructural obduracy is 
not simply ‘there’, but is achieved via practices (Geels, 2002) of repair and 
maintenance (Graham and Thrift, 2007) taking place in specific institu-
tional settings. The persistence of, and change in, infrastructures may occur 
through many ‘small- scale, localised, or incremental processes’ (Latham 
and Wood, 2015, p.  303). Infrastructures are relational, in process and 
emerging in interactions (Cass et al., 2018, Coutard and Rutherford, 2016). 
At the same time, infrastructures are also produced, changed or maintained 
via strategically planned, complex interventions of state authorities and/ or 
private enterprises, being the opposite of incremental, localized practices 
and having high potential for symbolism and normative settings. These 
practices are linked to institutions, in particular to legislative and execu-
tive public and political bodies and instruments. Lacking institutional 
structure, stability and effectiveness, however, may lead infrastructures 
to collapse. While institutional settings may foster the invisibility and 
obduracy of infrastructures (Furlong, 2010), given that universal access 
may be considered a civic entitlement, a lack of welfare- oriented institu-
tional effectiveness might lead to the vulnerability of infrastructures, as has 
happened in many post- socialist cases.
So, one of the effects of infrastructures and related practices and 
institutions is their divisive character: infrastructures not only connect but 
also divide, both in planned and unplanned ways (Coutard and Rutherford, 
2016; Högselius et al., 2013). While infrastructures become invisible (as Star, 
1999 argues) to the better- off, they become painfully visible to those excluded 
from such urban amenities (Broto and Bulkeley, 2015). Infrastructures are 
always marred by inequalities in terms of access or proximity to harmful 
utilities for those with less money or political power (Tonkiss, 2013). These 
inequalities are increased by the fragmentation of infrastructural systems 
into premium services for some and regular services for the masses (Graham 
and Marvin, 2001). Infrastructures can be polarizing, between states and 
regions, within urban regions, and even globally between better- connected 
places and sidelined ones, particularly in the global South.
The building of socialism was in many ways a technological endeavour – 
demonstrated famously by Lenin’s dictum that Communism is Soviet power 
plus the electrification of the whole country. Technological potentials and 
limits deeply structured the Soviet society. Urban heating systems served 
workplaces and homes, and housing estates were built and connected 
by investment- heavy electric public transport lines  – bearing significant 
consequences and causing new inequalities once the system collapsed.
Normative- symbolic significance of infrastructures
Apart from linking and socio- material effects, further social significance of 
infrastructures lies in their symbolic and normative importance. Not only 
are the material forms of infrastructures ideological  – such as the grand 
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design of train stations in the heyday of rail travel – they also involve a wider 
set of ideas regarding society and the role of infrastructures within them. 
Modernization stands out as a process of infrastructural development, such 
as the provision of water utilities from the mid- 19th century onwards. Besides 
providing running water, the aim was to develop clean and modern citizen-
ship (Joyce, 2003). Today, as Dalakoglou and Harvey (2012) and Harvey 
and Knox (2015) show, such symbolic, ideological aspects of infrastructures 
prominently feature in road constructions. The powerful dream of tapping 
into Peru’s tropical forests or connecting oceans by cross- continental roads 
were about new technological innovations and the capacities of government 
rather than technical questions of engineering (Harvey and Knox, 2015). 
Also in post- socialism, modernization and Europeanization have been 
conflated with road building, railway development and other large infra-
structural projects (see also Plyushteva, this issue).
As one consequence, researchers have been interested in ‘the affective 
and aesthetic qualities of the urban infrastructure’ (Amin, 2014, p. 138) 
wherein ‘public sentiments of progress, modernity and well- being’ might 
become linked with buildings even if their functionality or material impact 
is not that important. Following Larkin, we can note ‘the senses of awe 
and fascination’ that infrastructures emanate, leading to various polit-
ical effects. Instead of being ‘merely functional’, infrastructures are also 
enchanted (Harvey and Knox, 2012; see also Jovanović, this issue). We 
thus can apprehend the normative- symbolic significance of planned yet 
unbuilt infrastructures. They can have important effects on contemporary 
and future cities and their inhabitants. Motorways or railway projects 
may create new visions of cities and open up potential growth areas even 
before infrastructures physically appear (Thomas, 2013). Sometimes, infra-
structure development is not about the technical aspects but about other 
spheres connected with government, such as companies acquiring access to 
political networks (Mbembe, 2001, cited in Larkin, 2013). Larkin claims 
that infrastructures are not merely ‘infrastructures’, but also ‘as if…’ they 
are infrastructures:  ‘material form’ does not merely exist in itself but is 
‘transposed from a hollow tube to digits on a budget and words on a page’ 
(Larkin, 2013, p. 335).
Consequently, infrastructures are not just things but reverberate in 
various other spheres of society. Infrastructure is thus a valuable concep-
tual lens for critical social research, in particular in urban contexts, because 
infrastructures are produced by and shape social practices and institutions, 
norms and discourses, and so reveal immaterial as well as material cleavages 
that emerge in societal transformations (Moss, 2014). Infrastructures are not 
background but formative, particularly so in the socio- spatial settings where 
they are most dense – that is, in cities (Amin and Thrift, 2017). Considering 
the interlinkages between continuity and changes in CEE and the FSU, post- 
socialism is a particularly prescient empirical and conceptual ground for 
thinking about urban infrastructures.
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Urban infrastructures and (post- socialist) urban transformations
Changing infrastructures in changing cities across the globe
While the literature from both the global North and global South highlight 
influences of neoliberal ideology on governing practices, studies drawing 
on the global North underline the continuous and contingent nature of 
infrastructures, invisible to many urban actors. Materiality (e.g. state of 
repair, distribution or access), practices and discourses may seem unprob-
lematic in terms of normative ideas such as social and ecological sustain-
ability and economic competitiveness – although with evident and growing 
inequalities, e.g. in terms of post- crisis energy disparities (Bouzarovski, 
2014; Thomson and Snell, 2013).
Literature based on urban contexts of the global South draws inspir-
ation from post- colonial literature, stressing long- term divides, disparities 
and polarizations, and thus questions ‘Northern’ notions of infrastruc-
ture as easily manageable socio- technical phenomena. Infrastructure in the 
South is painfully visible to many because of their exclusion from access and 
use (Morales, 2016). ‘Southern’ infrastructures may have primarily served 
elites  – initially the colonial ones, while nowadays well- off upper classes 
(Silver, 2015; Speer, 2016). Such a differentiated infrastructural model, 
which Graham and Marvin (2001) have termed ‘splintering urbanism’, 
exists globally, although different in scale and history.
The post- socialist context shares various forms of splintering urbanism 
with those two forms of infrastructural development (Hirt, 2012). Yet 
the lingering presence of socialist forms of infrastructure built for and by 
a paternalistic socio- economic regime brings about a somewhat different 
dimension. Currently, post- socialism tends to be conceptually excluded from 
the mainstream of both the global North and the global South, and thus 
is rarely included in the discussion of infrastructures. Yet, by attending to 
infrastructures in a post- socialist context, we can highlight the intersections 
between socialist and capitalist urban processes and their modes of 
governing. Nevertheless, we need to go further than merely studying the 
post- socialist context by engaging in discussions with theories emerging 
from empirical settings that also have value outside the post- socialist realm. 
This desire to find alternative logics of urban development beyond what 
has been established in usual centres of theorization and urban thinking 
has become a major topic in comparative urbanist literature (Jacobs, 2012; 
Robinson, 2006). These voices challenge common narratives and tools of 
urban studies, encouraging new ways of thinking more conceptually and 
based on insights from often understudied contexts.
Yet, the question remains:  what are the key characteristics that post- 
socialist urban contexts and infrastructures provide? And which empir-
ical findings and conceptual ideas does research on post- socialist urban 
infrastructures offer?
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Legacies of (post- )socialism in urban infrastructures and their  
hybridization with changes
Believing in the value of a post- socialist perspective on urban infrastructures 
for critical research, in the following we approach the potential specificities 
and commonalities relative to their global North and South counterparts. 
The features of post- socialist infrastructure and urban change may link up to 
both socialist legacies and early post- socialist experiences, characterized by 
the depth and abruptness of societal change, and steered by neoliberalization 
and nation- building ideologies.
One peculiarity of the post- socialist urban context involves aspects of 
normative discourses and concepts in general, and regarding infrastruc-
ture in particular. For Soviet authorities, ‘the policy of a concerted regu-
lation of space was the key to domination and re- creation of the social 
body’ (Gestwa, 2004, p.  43). Thus, Soviet discourses on the domestica-
tion of nature and the creation of the Socialist Man through labour were 
implemented through great construction sites beginning in the early 1920s, 
such as hydroelectric dams, canals and railway projects. Both forced labour 
and voluntary- compulsory activism played major roles in infrastructure con-
struction and maintenance (regarding Albania, see also Dalakoglou, 2017). 
However, in the urban context, infrastructure remained auxiliary to indus-
trialization rather than a value in itself. Electric plants, roads and railways 
served industrial needs and urban transport networks connected housing 
estates to mines and factories, providing access to workers, while social 
and consumer service infrastructures were often the last to be provided, 
with rural areas remaining underserved in all aspects (Gentile and Sjöberg, 
2006). Yet, combined with mass housing construction, literacy campaigns 
and health care expansion, major sectors of the population profited from 
Soviet infrastructure investments. Based on the socialist ideology of equality, 
these included an exclusively state- sponsored provision of services and par-
ticular cost- calculation regimes. This led to less polarized spatial coverage 
of services, and relatively equal access to diverse forms of infrastructure 
such as transport, housing- related infrastructures and urban greenery. This 
went beyond the immediate functions of material objects. Larkin (2013), 
for instance, refers to Todorov, who claimed that Soviet symbolic produc-
tion (e.g. in infrastructures, was more effective than economic construction 
(Todorov, 1994). Thus, the socialist system’s care for the masses left material 
and immaterial traces.
The collapse of the socialist system brought about new normative 
narratives of neoliberalization linked to privatization and deregulation, 
cost- effectiveness, decentralization and democratization, as well as new 
nation- building projects and, in some cases, Europeanization. Consequences 
included the closure of state enterprises and new legislation that trans-
ferred the financial burdens of infrastructural maintenance to municipal-
ities. But, while being granted new rights and responsibilities, local bodies 
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lacked money for reform and implementation, sometimes resulting in infra-
structural hardship or even collapse. In this vein, Golubchikov et al. (2014, 
p. 617) argue that ‘the socialist legacy, rather than being an independent car-
rier of history, has been alienated from its history to become an infrastruc-
ture of neoliberalization, conducive to capitalist process’. State provision has 
increasingly been replaced with user- pay schemes and the privatization of 
services (in the transport sector, for instance, see also Akimov and Banister, 
2011; Gwilliam et al., 1999), which has resulted in a growing inequality in 
access and levels of service (Vozyanov, 2014). While some inhabitants still 
may feel attached to the socialist ideal of universal, equal and free provision, 
others may have adopted differentiated practices with regard to repair, main-
tenance, planning and governance, and civil and economic uses. At the same 
time, post- socialist authorities continue the tradition of using infrastructures 
for state production, whether as large- scale building projects, for example in 
Tbilisi (Salukvadze and Golubchikov, 2016) and Astana, or projects funded 
by EU infrastructure grants in recent member states. We may also detect 
post- socialist legacies in public institutions and social practices. These leg-
acies are the reason why the promotion of (new) normative ideas of dem-
ocracy, transparency and competitiveness do not always suit new realities. 
Narratives of legacies are also contested, raising questions regarding how 
to conceptualize municipal or state ownership of infrastructures vis- à- 
vis similar forms in history (Beveridge and Naumann, 2016). This hybrid 
normativity of post- socialist infrastructures combines elements of socialist 
ideology with new and/ or domesticated post- 1990 sets of norms.
Normative discourses, however, are always intertwined with materiality – 
that is, urban topographies and physical conditions of infrastructures. In 
this respect, the relatively equal spatial distribution of infrastructure in the 
Soviet era contrasts with ongoing spatial polarization (Lang et al., 2015) 
at all levels, due to urban shrinkage or growth, modernization or neglect. 
Most problematic, inherited and/ or newly produced spatial inequalities in 
infrastructural provision are considered to be the hardest to change (Sykora 
and Bouzarovski, 2012). In this regard, Bouzarovski et al. (2015) point out 
the ‘infrastructural difficulties’ in building a physically unified European gas 
market, since pipelines follow the Cold War geographies of the era of their 
construction. Other examples of inherited infrastructural inequalities include 
different railway gauges that divide Eastern, Western and Southern Europe, 
or the electricity networks that still strongly connect Estonia to the Soviet 
energy grid (Barry, 2001; Högselius et al., 2013). Moreover, Collier (2011) 
highlighted how the legacy of the socialist heating infrastructure limited 
the implementation of neoliberal economic reforms. Because apartments 
were still attached to the factory via heating pipes and the factory’s boiler 
functioned as the central heating source for the town, no textbook neo-
liberal reform could be carried out. Post- socialist experiences also pro-
vide important examples of newly produced infrastructural polarization, 
like when neglected or abandoned housing in shrinking, peripheral cities 
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contrasts with efforts towards energy- efficient retrofitting in metropolitan 
areas, or when orbital motorways and bike- sharing systems are installed in 
metropolitan cores but not in smaller cities. Infrastructures in post- socialist 
cities are typically in poor physical condition due to a general backlog in 
maintenance inherited from socialist times, as well as a lack of funding and 
deferred maintenance after 1990. After the demise of the socialist bloc, its 
populations experienced a severe backlash involving urban infrastructures 
at all scales (e.g. International Crisis Group, 2011). With severe funding 
cuts, mismanaged privatization, inadequate maintenance and widespread 
depopulation, transport, water, heating, electricity and gas infrastructures 
failed throughout the 1990s revealing a new – and in many ways weaker – 
relationship between the state and citizens (Alexander et  al., 2007). As a 
consequence, the materiality of infrastructure has a power that both enables 
and constrains economic and social urban processes.
The growing inequality is reflected in diminished livelihoods, practices 
of ‘informal’ access to infrastructure (Humphrey, 2005; Neugebauer 
and Rekhviashvili, 2015; Sgibnev and Vozyanov, 2016) and practices of 
performing ‘remont’ as a mode of maintenance and mode of life (Gerasimova 
and Čujkina, 2004; Sgibnev, 2015). These practices may reflect socialist 
as well as pre- socialist intangible legacies. Without directly referring to it, 
these studies recall the notion of ‘people as infrastructure’, which emerged 
from global South literature (Simone, 2004). However, coping practices 
show steps toward successful infrastructural modernization, particu-
larly in Central- Eastern European EU member states that benefit from EU 
funding and governance arrangements. Infrastructural realities and related 
practices become strongly dependent on increasingly diversified institutional 
settings (e.g. legislation and public financing), governance arrangements and 
power relations that exhibit a wide range of local varieties of neoliberalism 
or capitalism. These may recede from previous regulatory regimes and 
normativities, and display different speeds and intensities of post- socialist 
change (Neugebauer et  al., 2014; Neugebauer and Kovacs, 2015; Sykora 
and Bouzarovski, 2012).
But while authors describe the diversified institutional settings of cities in 
the post-socialist realm, and local practices of incremental changes to urban 
space receive increasing attention, the concept of (urban) infrastructure as 
related to post- socialism still remains marginal. The same is true for the 
ways in which socialist legacies affect current practices of infrastructural 
use and planning.
Contributions of this book: the hybridity of post- socialist  
urban infrastructures
Taking these discussions on board, the empirical chapters of this book elab-
orate on the hybridity of post- socialist urban infrastructures. Through a 
variety of cases from (East) Germany to Tajikistan and from Bulgaria to 
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Russia, and with a step into India, the book illustrates and analyses post- 
socialist urban infrastructures. Material and normative legacies of pater-
nalist regimes meet new hybrid normativities with consequent tensions and 
inequalities, but also with new hopes and imaginations. The chapters are 
loosely grouped into three clusters dealing with infrastructures of housing, 
greenery and transport, respectively. They discuss issues ranging from the 
basic need for warmth to questions of transport infrastructures and the 
ways in which a state is enacted through infrastructure projects to post- 
socialism beyond the usual ‘post- socialist context’.
Bouzarovski and Tirado Herrero take an internationally comparative 
perspective within the EU to outline socio- political and economic effects in 
terms of energy poverty, drawing out an energy core- periphery divide with 
Western and Northern Europe on the one side and Southern and Eastern 
Europe on the other, where the post- socialist continuities play an important 
role for the latter. Taking a more micro- scale approach, Jovanović examines 
the various mundane day- to- day engagements with the modernization and 
privatization of the Yugoslavian- era district heating system in Bor (Serbia) 
and Rijeka (Croatia), showing the thermodynamics of social contract as 
an interrelation between heat and the physical and social aspects of heat 
provision. Even when becoming conscious consumers from subjects of 
state delivery, residents expect the socialist ideal of universal, equal pro-
vision, even under the conditions of privatization of services. Turning to 
housing as an infrastructure phenomenon, Roth contrasts the Soviet and 
post- Soviet state processes of modernization through infrastructure in Baku 
(Azerbaijan). In so doing, he enriches the argument of Jovanović’s case study 
by emphasizing informal practices of gaining access to infrastructure as a 
common element of both Soviet and post- Soviet housing practices. Building 
on this conceptualization, Salukvadze and Sichinava compare Tbilisi 
(Georgia) and Yerevan (Armenia) in the south Caucasus through a broad 
understanding of housing as infrastructured by studying the link between a 
complex set of technical utilities, social and environmental services within 
individual houses and their close surroundings, and social inequality – that 
is, the differentiated access to resources based on class and/ or other social 
markers. In the following chapter, Liubimau discusses rescaled sovereignty 
and shifting understandings of what constitutes urban life, taking up the 
example of the rise and fall of nuclear power in Visaginas (Lithuania). Being 
a new town built in the 1970s to service the nearby Ignalina nuclear power 
plant, the town lost much of its economic and symbolic power when the 
plant closed down following imposition of EU requirements, but the closure 
itself is an industrial project still providing jobs for many residents.
The next chapters focus specifically on the topic of green infrastructures. 
The contribution of Haase et al. discusses the development of green urban 
infrastructures, their current state, transformations and future prospects, 
governance and ambiguous implementation under post- socialist conditions, 
including everyday practices, by discussing case studies from Leipzig 
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(Germany), Łódź (Poland) and Arkhangelsk (Russia). Enriching the broad 
approach of Haase et al. with an in- depth case study in Moscow, Zupan 
and Büdenbender focus on the ways in which green infrastructures have 
become a fundamental trope among urban planners and within market- 
driven urbanism and neo- authoritarian politics (‘hipster Stalinism’). Their 
chapter highlights the normativity of Moscow’s green infrastructure rebal-
ancing the post- socialist prevalence of neoliberalism in Moscow with the 
idea of a ‘socially just’ city. Finally, Mukhopadhyay and Tuvikene, in their 
turn, address post- socialism outside the usual context by using the case of 
the Bengaluru (India) water sector to analyse the intersection of formal 
and informal water supply in relation to the ways in which post- socialism 
has been defined. Discussing post- socialism in a context that has never 
experienced state socialism, they offer a valuable perspective for discus-
sion on the concept of post- socialism in general, and highlight the inter-
section of post- socialism and infrastructure. Post- socialism highlights the 
post- collective nature of infrastructure governance in privatized, unequal 
circumstances, but also the hybridity and different ways of overcoming 
collapse of infrastructural systems.
The following set of chapters unites issues of mobility, transport infra-
structure and urban transformation. Mulíček and Seidenglanz concentrate on 
changing time- space relations in Brno (Czech Republic) and their implications 
for the socio- material phenomenon of public transport infrastructure. After 
the formerly tight link between urban- spatial functions of housing and eco-
nomic production dissolved and was reconfigured after the collapse of state 
socialism, the city faced a conflict between new daily mobility necessities and 
the material obduracy of socialist transport infrastructures. Plyushteva, how-
ever, describes the immaterial obduracy of planned infrastructural projects 
through the case of the Sofia Metro project, which originated in the 1960s 
but was implemented only in the late 1990s. The Sofia Metro is characterized 
by both disruptions and continuities of everyday life in a post- 1989 city 
in terms of predictability and propinquity as they evolved in relation to 
automobility. The last chapter on the topic of transport infrastructures by 
Weicker and Sgibnev takes on the phenomenon of informal public transport 
solutions (marshrutkas) known internationally primarily from the global 
South, bringing together empirical material from Tajikistan and southern 
Russia, and arguing for a ‘fluidities’- based re- conceptualization of mobility 
infrastructures instead of static and dichotomous approaches.
The concluding chapter revisits the case studies and highlights how using 
the infrastructural lens helps to sharpen our understanding of post- socialist 
urban transformation, thanks to the juxtaposition of current infrastructural 
literature from the global North and South with empirical findings and lit-
erature from the FSU and CEE, and well beyond the often ‘encapsulated’ 
conceptual post- socialist context. The lessons that emerge from post- socialist 
developments relate not only to material obduracy, which indeed is one of 
the most significant aspects of post- socialist infrastructures, but also the rele-
vance and persistence of normative concepts and practices. The concluding 
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chapter also draws links between post- socialist infrastructural discussions 
and those of transition, highlighting that there is much to learn between 
those two sets of thinking and practice, and suggesting conceptualizations of 
transition as one way to globalize thinking on post- socialism.
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2  Energy poverty in Central and 
Eastern Europe
Understanding the European Union’s 
core- periphery divide1
Stefan Bouzarovski and Sergio Tirado Herrero
Introduction
The inability of many European households to access or afford an adequate 
level of energy services in the home is gaining increasing academic and policy 
attention across the continent as demonstrated by the rapidly growing body 
of relevant academic and grey literature on these issues in the European 
Union (EU) and its member states. This condition, described as either energy 
or fuel poverty – and widely predicated upon the interplay between housing 
conditions, infrastructural supply patterns and energy end- use practices 
(Boardman, 2009; Bouzarovski et al., 2012; Li et al., 2014) – is now being 
identified as a policy priority by a number of EU institutions, including the 
Energy Union framework. In particular, there has been growing integra-
tion of energy poverty analysis and policy in the activities of the European 
Commission in the recent period (Bouzarovski and Petrova, 2015; Pye et al., 
2015; Rademaekers et al., 2016).
Efforts to study the dynamics of energy poverty at the scale of the EU 
have been making an important contribution to such debates (Bouzarovski, 
2014; Braubach and Ferrand, 2013; Healy, 2004; Healy and Clinch, 2004; 
Thomson and Snell, 2013). Work in this vein has identified a number of 
household- level factors that influence the likelihood of experiencing domestic 
energy deprivation, including income, socio- demographic characteristics, 
dwelling typology and age, tenure status and rural versus urban location.
These are all vulnerability factors relevant from an urban perspective that 
create the possibility to see energy poverty through an urban lens. This way, 
city dwellers often have access to more and better paid jobs but they are also 
subject to higher prices for housing and other goods and services, which in 
turn are connected to global trends of capital accumulation in the urban 
real estate sector. The energy performance of urban buildings tends also 
to be higher thanks to favourable volume- to- surface ratios in multi- family 
buildings, where on the other hand interventions to improve the quality of 
building fabric is more difficult given the need to reach consensus among 
more numerous co- residents. Cities are also command and control centres, 
and consequently spaces for resistance, solidarity and protests (Nicholls, 
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2008; Uitermark et al., 2012) – also around domestic energy affordability 
and deprivation. This said, it must be noted that cities are not the main focus 
of this chapter, which primarily looks at the national scale, even if the evi-
dence and findings presented potentially enable subsequent explorations of 
energy poverty ‘in the grain of the city’ (Bouzarovski and Thomson, 2017).
Policy debates and scientific research on energy poverty have indicated 
that CEE states generally report a higher incidence of energy poverty as 
compared to North- Western EU member states. This points to the existence 
of a social and geographical ‘energy divide’ across the EU, thanks to which a 
greater proportion of households in less- developed member states are unable 
to meet their basic energy needs. They are particularly penalized by high and 
increasing energy costs due to a combination of rising prices and energy- 
inefficient properties (Bouzarovski, 2015; National Energy Action, 2014).
Energy poverty research has been enabled by the Eurostat agency’s com-
pilation of a rich body of statistics on poverty and social exclusion, including 
data on the inability to keep one’s home adequately warm, arrears in utility 
bills and other objective housing indicators of domestic energy deprivation. 
Data gathering in this domain began in 1994 with the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP), and has been developed further since 2003 via 
the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU- SILC).
This chapter explores the relationship between spatial and temporal 
variations in the incidence of energy poverty across the EU, while empha-
sizing the vulnerabilities faced by CEE countries in this context. We argue 
that European energy transitions  – understood as processes of systemic 
change in the energy sector (Bridge et al., 2013) – have deepened existing 
regional inequalities at the macro- scale because they relate to energy pov-
erty and similar forms of deprivation through the embeddedness of such 
processes in incumbent spatial and institutional systems.
In this chapter, we explore macro- regional differences across the EU 
as they relate to existing regional inequalities. The chapter formulates an 
‘energy poverty index’ that incorporates various dimensions of material 
deprivation. These are subsequently cross- referenced with monetary depriv-
ation measures. Then the chapter examines the relationship between the 
evolution of domestic energy prices on the one hand, and income and energy 
poverty rates on the other, with the aim of shedding light on the impact 
of the post- 2008 economic crisis on households’ well- being from the per-
spective of domestic energy deprivation, while investigating some of the 
complexities that underpin the expansion of inadequate residential energy 
services in Southern and Eastern European states in particular.
In doing so, the chapter addresses the need for understanding how macro- 
scale spatial patterns of energy poverty relate to wider economic dispar-
ities within the European realm (Petrakos et al., 2011), and carries out an 
exploration of the traditional notion of a core- periphery distinction (Amin, 
1974; Copus, 2001) in Europe for the case of domestic energy deprivation. 
A main contribution of the chapter is therefore the concept of an energy 
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core- periphery divide that is expanded from its original, predominantly 
socially orientated meaning (as described in National Energy Action, 2014) 
to encapsulate existing inequalities in access to infrastructure services at the 
scale of cities, regions and countries in the EU.
Additionally, a key conceptual linchpin lies in theorizations of post- 
socialist infrastructural change as a driver of parallel processes of socio- 
technical transformation in the energy sector, on the one hand, and a rising 
incidence of household- level vulnerability on the other (Bouzarovski et al., 
2017). Energy poverty in CEE has a special significance in this context because 
it is primarily a post- socialist phenomenon, attributable to a combination 
of circumstances arising after 1990 – particularly structural reforms in the 
energy sector, and changes in the regulation and use of socio- technical infra-
structure more widely. In this chapter, therefore, post- socialism provides a 
binding agent for understanding how some commonalities continue to exist 
in the CEE region despite the economic and political divergence of its con-
stituent states; in a broader sense, we argue that the post- socialist heuristic 
holds continued relevance in the context of infrastructural transformations 
(Bouzarovski et al., 2016a).
The evidence presented in the text that follows is based on a compre-
hensive review of Eurostat datasets. We undertook the work in order to 
produce a descriptive statistical analysis of the spatial disparities and tem-
poral patterns of indicators that have conventionally been seen as indicators 
of energy poverty, including domestic energy prices, welfare, and deprivation 
in monetary and material terms. Descriptive statistics were complemented 
with a bivariate analysis aimed at identifying factors that exhibit a linear 
correlation with incidence rates of energy poverty across the EU.
A few weaknesses in this data source need to be taken into consideration. 
Unlike other similar studies that have relied on household- level microdata 
for the quantification of energy poverty levels in the EU (Thomson and Snell, 
2013), our descriptive and correlation analyses have been conducted using 
individual member states as a sampling unit, and thus the maximum yearly 
sample size is 28. This approach is nevertheless consistent with the scale of 
our analysis, which is aimed at establishing patterns across member states 
as a whole. Also, the EU- SILC consensual energy poverty indicators rely on 
households’ self- reported assessments of their domestic energy affordability 
strain, which has received some criticism (Healy, 2004; Petrova et al., 2013; 
Thomson and Snell, 2013).
At the same time, our analysis is limited to electricity and gas prices 
because Eurostat statistical information is not widely available with respect 
to less conventional energy carriers such as district heating, firewood or 
coal. Nevertheless, gas and electricity were jointly responsible for more than 
two thirds of household energy consumption in the EU- 28 as measured by 
the weights that constituted the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP) in 2012 (European Commission, 2014). With the exception of 
Greece, Lithuania and Latvia, electricity and gas accounted for more than 
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half of the HICP in all EU countries (ibid.). And even though our analysis 
is limited by the availability of data, we do not ignore the specific energy 
poverty dynamics linked to other energy carriers, such as the lock- in effects 
documented for urban district heating networks in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Bouzarovski et al., 2016a; Tirado Herrero and Ürge- Vorsatz, 2010).
Energy poverty ‘regions’ in the European Union
In the relevant literature, it is now widely accepted that energy poverty is 
not merely a subset of general income poverty. As a form of material depriv-
ation, it extends beyond issues of affordability and earnings to encompass 
the state of the housing stock as well as energy- related practices and policy 
regulation. This is because the manner in which energy flows through the 
boundaries of the home and is used by its occupants has a crucial influence 
on the ability of households to access adequate levels of domestic energy 
services. For example, if the building fabric is energy inefficient, or does 
not allow for switching to a cheaper or more convenient heating or cooling 
system for technical or legal reasons, this will push its occupants into a more 
precarious position (Buzar, 2007; Petrova, 2017).
Empirically grounded research has established significant differences in 
the incidence and characteristics of energy poverty across the EU. CEE states 
have recorded Europe’s highest energy poverty levels. The vulnerability 
of citizens in countries such as Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria can 
be attributed to the legacies of the centrally planned economy, such as the 
poor thermal insulation properties of the housing stock, the presence of 
historically low energy prices and the predominance of an unsustainable 
supply mix (Bouzarovski et al., 2016b). The transition to a market economy 
in the 1990s added to these issues by bringing about the upward rebalan-
cing of energy tariffs without the development of adequate social welfare 
and energy efficiency mechanisms. Institutional inertia exacerbated ante-
cedent difficulties, alongside the dependence on Russian energy imports and 
associated infrastructural lock- ins (Bouzarovski, 2010, 2014; Hiteva, 2013; 
Kovačević, 2004; Ürge- Vorsatz et al., 2006).
Higher levels of self- reported indoor thermal discomfort were also found 
for Southern member states in the 1990s (Healy, 2004) and the 2000s 
(Thomson and Snell, 2013) as a result of the poor efficiency and lack of 
adequate heating systems in the housing stock of these countries. Later work 
has confirmed the paradox involving EU members in the Mediterranean 
basin:  even though winters are milder in countries like Portugal (Simoes 
et  al., 2016), Spain, Italy (Miniaci et  al., 2014), Malta (Formosa, 2015), 
Greece (Dagoumas and Kitsios, 2014) and Cyprus (Pye et al., 2015), these 
countries recurrently report high percentages of people who are unable 
to keep their home warm. Such states have consistently found themselves 
above the EU average of key domestic energy deprivation indicators. The 
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euro crisis, with its attendant rapid increase in unemployment and income 
inequality, has further exacerbated this situation.
Energy poverty is also present in Western and Northern European member 
states – in Ireland, the UK, France, Belgium, Germany and Austria – as well 
as (to a much lesser extent) in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland. In such countries, the issue tends to be restricted to 
specific demographic groups or types of housing. It is thus principally linked 
to the inability to purchase ‘affordable warmth’ (Boardman, 2010) among 
low- income households living in energy- inefficient homes. While energy 
poverty rates have been shown to be significant in the UK, Ireland, France 
and Belgium, the problem is less pervasive in other countries within this 
geographic grouping.
Existing knowledge thus suggests a macro- regionalization of the EU in 
three clusters of countries with different energy poverty levels and dynamics. 
In order to explore the consistency of this categorization with respect to the 
correlation analysis presented in the previous section, we plotted the average 
value of Eurostat’s monetary deprivation indicator, the ‘at- risk- of- poverty’ 
rate (percentage of the population with an income below 60 per cent of the 
national median, after social transfers), against an ad hoc composite energy 
poverty index for each member state. The energy poverty index took into 
account the EU- SILC population percentages of people who have reported 
i) being unable to keep their homes adequately warm (inability); ii) having 
arrears in utility bills (arrears); and iii) living in a home with a leaking roof 
or the presence of dampness and rot (housing faults):
Energy poverty index =  (0.5 × % inability + 0.25 × % arrears + 0.25 × 
% housing faults) × 100
In the index, the indicator inability receives a higher weight in order to 
reflect the greater importance that our assessment gives to self- reported 
thermal discomfort levels in comparison with the indicator arrears, which 
keeps track of late payment levels in energy and other utility bills. At the 
same time, housing faults is closely related to, but not necessarily a direct 
indicator of, energy poverty. Our weighted values approach is based on pre-
viously developed energy poverty indices and weight values (Healy, 2004; 
Thomson and Snell, 2013).2 It is based on the premise that consensual 
measures (such as the self- reported inability to keep warm) are insufficient 
to capture the complex economic and material underpinnings of energy pov-
erty, and should be combined with indicators describing the housing and 
financial conditions of the population in order to obtain a fuller picture 
(Bouzarovski, 2014; Dubois, 2012).
The results of the bivariate comparison (Table 2.1) show a low degree of 
positive linear correlation between the energy poverty index and the at- risk- 
of- poverty rate, even though relatively high levels of positive and statistic-
ally significant linear correlations exist on an indicator- by- indicator basis. In 
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terms of the three regions identified for the spatial analysis of energy poverty 
trends in the EU (Figure  2.1), Western and Northern countries (noted in 
black diamonds) belong to a compact cluster reporting low energy poverty 
levels in relation to the at- risk- of- poverty rate. At the same time, Southern 
(crosses) and CEE member states (circles) form a more heterogeneous 
group. They are characterized by energy poverty index values that are higher 
in relation to their at- risk- of- poverty- rates. With respect to the measure-
ment of poverty and social exclusion, these results highlight the importance 
Table 2.1  Correlation matrix: Pearson’s r coefficients of linear correlation between 
the Survey on Income and Living Conditions energy poverty indicators 
and index (columns) and the at- risk- of- poverty rate (rows), calculated 
upon average values of the 28 European Union member states for the 
period 2003– 2013 (own calculations based on Eurostat data)
Inability Arrears Housing 
faults
Energy poverty 
index
At- risk- of- poverty 
rate (after social 
transfers)
.523** .574** .480** .264
** p <0.01; * p <0.05 level
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of material and housing deprivation dimensions, such as the inability to 
keep the home adequately warm. They emphasize the need to move beyond 
purely monetary indicators, such as the at- risk- of- poverty rate.
Thus, it can be argued that a core versus periphery distribution is a better 
descriptor of the spatial disparities in energy poverty rates across the EU 
than the traditional ‘three- region’ model. Western and Northern member 
states have generally fared far better than CEE and Southern member states 
in terms of domestic energy deprivation. This can principally be attributed 
to the higher macro- economic performance and income levels among the 
former group of states, as well as their higher- quality housing stock and more 
effective targeting of vulnerable groups. Overall, the principal differences 
between core and periphery countries are reflected in the degree of public 
recognition received by energy poverty, its socio- demographic extent, and 
the structural drivers of the condition (see Table 2.2).
At this point, it should be emphasized that the core- periphery distinc-
tion should not be seen in binary terms:  substantial differences can be 
found among individual member states of the periphery, suggesting that 
national, regional and local conditions are more consequential in this more 
disadvantaged cluster of EU countries. In CEE, it has been shown that par-
ticular urban socio- technical typologies exhibit increased levels of vulner-
ability to energy poverty, often connected to the legacies of district heating 
and new patterns of social segregation, as well as to under- investment in 
particular types of housing (Bouzarovski, 2009; Bouzarovski and Thomson, 
2017); Bouzarovski et al., 2017).
Domestic energy prices: drivers and descriptors of energy poverty
Increases in domestic energy prices have long been regarded as the crucial 
underpinning of energy poverty. Because the EU is a world region highly 
dependent on imports of primary energy sources and, as such, has been sub-
ject to wider trends in global and regional commodity markets, increasing 
energy prices are an issue of significant concern among EU institutions. 
The far- reaching impact of energy tariffs on household well- being and 
the competitiveness of EU economies is now widely recognized (European 
Commission, 2014).
From the perspective of final residential energy users, evidence indicates 
that the price of domestic energy in the EU has consistently increased at 
faster- than- inflation rates since at least the mid- 1990s, progressively redu-
cing the purchasing power of households unless compensated by deflation 
in other domestic consumption categories. The observed evolution of energy 
prices needs to be seen not only as a consequence of international com-
modity market trends and national conditions but also within the context of 
multiple reconfigurations in the energy sector.
The first of such processes is the transformation of the energy sector, a 
process that started in the 1990s and has consisted of the privatization of 
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publicly owned utility companies, and the ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ unbund-
ling or vertical disintegration of network activities, as well as the liberaliza-
tion and opening of markets for competition (Florio, 2013). Even though 
these measures were meant to deliver increased levels of competition and a 
reduction in end- use prices, evidence suggests that regulatory reforms have 
not always achieved the desired results, especially when it comes to domestic 
energy tariffs, consumer welfare and satisfaction levels, and households’ 
ability to pay bills on time (Fiorio and Florio, 2008; Poggi and Florio, 2010; 
Pollitt, 2012).
In the CEE, ambitious policy packages based on the privatization of util-
ities were introduced in the 1990s by international financial institutions. 
Such steps were put in motion with the declarative aim of preventing the 
Table 2.2  A typology of energy poverty factors and implications as they vary along 
the core- periphery axis in the European Union
Macro region Core countries in Western 
and Northern Europe
Periphery in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean
Public 
recognition
Well- established in the 
United Kingdom and 
Ireland, officially and 
widely acknowledged in 
France. Less visibility in 
other countries.
Historically limited public 
recognition, recently rising 
to the top of the social 
agenda in austerity- hit 
countries.
Principal drivers Low incomes, high energy 
prices, inefficient homes, 
disproportionately high 
energy needs.
Variable by country. Largely 
same as core countries but 
also involving questions 
of housing tenure and 
infrastructural access to 
adequate energy sources.
Socio- 
demographic 
extent
Typically concentrated 
within a limited section 
of the population with 
energy affordability 
problems.
A systemic condition, 
affecting both low- and 
middle- income strata.
Relationship 
with energy 
transitions
Energy poor households 
have been adversely 
affected by price 
increases associated 
with low- carbon energy 
transitions, but are 
benefiting from energy 
efficiency improvements 
associated with the 
process.
Dynamics of crisis- induced 
austerity and post- 
communist transformation 
are adding new levels of 
complexity to the energy 
poverty implications of 
low- carbon transitions, 
which are themselves less 
pronounced in this region.
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collapse of the energy supply infrastructure following the downfall of cen-
tral economic planning, and addressing the structural inefficiencies inherited 
from the previous system. Failures in the successful execution of this pro-
cess have been attributed to the emergence of substantial legal and policy 
obstacles, as well as fierce resistance from consumers facing rising energy 
costs and rapidly declining incomes (Lampietti et al., 2007; Ruggeri Laderchi 
et al., 2013).
A second relevant trend is the decarbonization of energy systems  – 
a large- scale policy effort driven, inter alia, by EU institutions. The pro-
cess has been motivated not only by environmental concerns and climate 
commitments but also by the substantial energy import dependency levels of 
many member states. However, low- carbon policies have not been neutral in 
energy poverty terms, mainly because they have entailed the development of 
mechanisms for internalizing the social costs of carbon emissions.
With carbon prices generated via the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) being passed onto final consumers (Aatola et  al., 2013; Kim 
et al., 2010), such policy mechanisms are affecting not only the price of 
domestic energy but also influencing a range of other goods and services 
for which energy is a production input. Low- carbon policies in the EU are 
also resulting in substantial investment in the renewable energy sector, espe-
cially in solar and wind electricity (European Commission, 2014). The costs 
of these undertakings have also been borne by final consumers through 
energy bills.
In macro- regional terms, energy prices in the CEE space generally lie 
below the EU average, and below the values recorded for Northern, Western 
and Mediterranean Europe (European Commission, 2014). However, euro 
energy prices fail to incorporate the differences between member states’ price 
levels and ‘real’ household incomes. Eurostat addresses this shortcoming 
by expressing prices in purchasing power units (PPS), an artificial refer-
ence currency that eliminates price- income differences by correcting prices 
denominated in national currencies through a purchasing power parity 
(PPP) factor, calculated on the basis of the price of a hypothetical basket of 
goods and services that is deemed representative of consumption patterns in 
individual member states (European Communities, 2009; Eurostat, 2013). 
Such an approach offers a more realistic picture of the efforts that average 
households in different member states need to make in order to pay for each 
unit of energy used at home. Prices in PPS are plotted against the percentage 
of people at risk of poverty (Figures 2.2 and 2.3) in order to explore the spa-
tial variation in the exposure to these two different energy poverty factors.
The picture that arises when household prices are expressed in PPS radically 
alters the initial perception of cheap energy prices in worse- off, peripheral 
countries. Thus, states with higher domestic energy prices (in PPS) are mainly 
located in CEE, where poverty rates are also well above the EU average in 
most cases (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). This imbalance is particularly visible in 
the case of Poland, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania and Croatia, all countries 
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with above- average domestic energy prices and at- risk- of- poverty rates for 
the period between 2007 and 2013.
Having identified a general upward trend in domestic energy prices in the 
EU, we also assessed the evolution of household energy prices across the EU 
by directly estimating the rates of increase (in percentage points) in natural 
gas and electricity prices that occurred between the second semester of 2007 
and the second semester of 2013. These figures were calculated on the basis of 
real prices denominated in national currencies, in order to avoid fluctuations 
associated with exchange rates. In the case of member states that adopted the 
euro between 2007 and 2013 (Malta, Slovakia, Cyprus and Estonia), a cur-
rency conversion was necessary prior to calculating rates of increase.
The percentages of increase (see Figure 2.4) indicate that natural gas prices in 
the EU rose faster (20 per cent on average) than electricity prices (12 per cent) 
during the assessed period. This result is relevant from an energy poverty per-
spective, given the central role of natural gas in fuelling domestic energy services 
relevant to human health and well- being in many European countries (Fouquet, 
2011). It also further highlights the distinction between an energy poverty core 
Figure 2.4  Change in household natural gas prices versus change in household 
electricity prices (accumulated percentage, calculated on real prices 
denominated in national currency) of member states between the years 
2007 and 2013
Notes:  1) No household natural gas prices data available for Greece, Finland, Malta 
and Cyprus. For comparative purposes, they have are displayed distinctly 
along the line representing the average natural gas price of the European 
Union. 2) The diagonal line indicates a theoretical line along which natural 
gas and electricity prices increase at the same rate
Source: Bouzarovski and Tirado Herrero, 2017
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and periphery in the EU: the citizens of CEE member states were forced to put 
up with increases in domestic energy prices that were above the EU average 
(with the notable exceptions of Slovakia and Hungary, owing to local energy 
and price policies). Particularly steep was the rise in the three Baltic republics as 
well as in the South- Eastern European states (Croatia and Slovenia).
We also assessed the evolution of domestic energy prices in PPS terms. 
Natural gas and electricity prices in PPS were plotted separately against 
the at- risk- of- poverty rate. For the purpose of this analysis, we selected 
the eight EU countries with the largest aggregated variation (in absolute 
value, calculated on the percentage of change) of both energy price and 
poverty rates between 2007 and 2013 (see also Bouzarovski and Tirado 
Herrero, 2017). Such comparisons allow for a synchronous visualization 
of the increases in energy prices and poverty levels that have occurred, in 
part, as a result of the euro crisis. The outcomes of our analyses for the case 
of domestic electricity indicate that member states in Southern Europe and 
the CEE region have been the most adversely affected, while Northern and 
Western EU members have even benefited from the transformations seen 
between 2007 and 2013 (see also Bouzarovski and Tirado Herrero, 2017).
Within the eight member states selected for the purposes of the analysis, 
the citizens of Croatia, Greece and Spain are among the most vulnerable: as 
of 2013, over 20 per cent of the population in these countries were at risk of 
poverty, and had seen a substantial rise in electricity prices during the pre-
vious six years. In the case of natural gas, the former socialist states of CEE 
have recorded the biggest changes in both the price of this domestic fuel and 
the monetary deprivation rate. But unlike electricity prices, the adjustment 
is not unidirectional: for example, Romania has reported a significant drop 
in the poverty rate and in the price of natural gas alike.
The predominance of ‘periphery’ countries within the correlation between 
energy price changes and at- risk- of- poverty rates indicates that the systemic 
forces that drive energy poverty need to be seen within the context of deeper 
regional disparities within the EU – many of which are connected to the 
continued legacies of post- socialism and the experience of post- socialist 
infrastructural reforms. While such an analysis cannot in itself demonstrate 
a causal link between increases in energy prices and monetary poverty levels, 
there is a clear clustering of countries at the nexus of these two dimensions. 
The disproportionately high presence of domestic energy deprivation in per-
ipheral member states is also underpinned by wider technical and infra-
structural factors. Systemically embedded economic and spatial inequalities 
are interacting with the diverse dynamics of energy transition to produce 
regionally specific inequalities.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a comprehensive assessment of the relationship 
between domestic energy prices and monetary deprivation rates over time 
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and space so as to establish i) degrees of national- scale geographic vari-
ation in energy poverty rates, and ii) the role of gas and electricity prices in 
shaping the temporal and spatial distribution of monetary deprivation and 
energy poverty.
A series analysis of Eurostat data, spanning countries and time, showed 
that there are substantial regional disparities in the exposure of various 
countries to the drivers of energy poverty. Our results thus challenge the 
findings of previous studies by suggesting that the traditional division of 
EU states into three clusters is increasingly replaced by a relatively well- off 
‘core’ group of countries in Northern and Western Europe, and a hetero-
geneous ‘energy poverty periphery’ in the South and East. In the former, 
domestic energy deprivation is limited to specific demographic and housing 
groups, while the latter exhibits a more pervasive presence of the problem 
across a range of social strata.
The energy poverty ‘periphery’ itself is highly heterogeneous as a result of 
the various underlying factors involved in driving the condition – particularly 
when it comes to the inflationary character of domestic energy prices. The 
post- socialist member states of CEE often report above- average at- risk- of- 
poverty rates. These have resulted in the expansion of energy poverty to a con-
siderable degree in most countries in the region, with the notable exceptions 
of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Estonia. These findings show the possi-
bility of a biunivocal relationship between post- socialist conditions and high 
rates of energy poverty even if broad spatial trends are well established. If 
anything, the reviewed data may suggest that low energy prices (as in the case 
of Estonia) and monetary poverty rates (Slovakia) could be reducing rates of 
incidence of energy poverty in individual post- socialist countries.
Developing our exploration of the drivers of energy poverty across 
Europe – and in relation to the second aim of the  chapter – we can con-
clude that domestic energy prices have consistently increased at faster- than- 
inflation rates for the EU as a whole since the mid- 1990s. This pattern can be 
found throughout individual member states because domestic energy prices 
have outpaced inflation throughout the EU since 2004. Thus, state- level gas 
and electricity tariffs are acting on top of a more systemic piece of the energy 
poverty puzzle: monetary deprivation measured as the at- risk- of- poverty rate.
Paradoxically, countries in the CEE cluster have the EU’s lowest nominal 
energy prices (in euro terms) but are characterized by higher- than- average 
energy prices when measured in PPS. Even though their real energy tariffs 
have not increased faster than those in the rest of Europe, such states are 
more exposed to the price factor because households spend relatively more on 
domestic energy than in the rest of the EU. The CEE region contains several 
worst- case scenarios (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia and Romania) where 
conditions are significantly more difficult than in the rest of the EU in terms 
of the two driving factors of energy poverty assessed in this chapter: high and 
increasing poverty rates, and high and increasing domestic gas and electricity 
prices. However, it is also acknowledged that significant driving forces absent 
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in this analysis exist and operate at national scales (e.g. domestic energy con-
sumption mix, governance of the energy sector, and national and sub- national 
policies). And while evidence on the extent and characteristics of domestic 
energy deprivation in EU countries is growing, a systematic investigation of 
explanatory factors across individual member states is still missing.
Overall, these findings evidence the diverse geography of energy pov-
erty in the EU, which is characterized by substantial differences among the 
analysed countries in terms of their exposure to the two factors analysed in 
the chapter (monetary deprivation rates and energy prices) and their evolu-
tion. While our results do not indicate that the energy transition is leading to 
a radical reconfiguration of existing regional inequalities, there is evidence 
to suggest that the EU at large has experienced an increase in the levels of 
energy poverty as measured by EU- SILC since 2007.
As a whole, we would argue in favour of further consideration – among 
research and policy communities alike – of the differential impact that the 
post- 2008 financial crisis is exerting on welfare levels and deprivation rates 
across the EU. Energy operations in countries affected by austerity and 
fiscal consolidation measures are of particular relevance here. There is also 
a necessity for analysing the price and energy poverty risks posed by wider 
energy transition processes: the liberalization and privatization of the energy 
sector, and the long- term transition to a low- carbon future. In terms of the 
former, the post- socialist heuristic holds continued conceptual relevance – 
and the lessons learned from the social impacts of large- scale infrastructural 
configurations also hold relevance for the latter.
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Notes
 1 This chapter is a modified version of the following earlier article by Bouzarovski 
and Tirado Herrero (2017) ‘The energy divide:  integrating energy transitions, 
regional inequalities and poverty trends in the European Union’, European Urban 
and Regional Studies, 24, 69– 86.
 2 This bivariate comparison was not conducted for Eurostat’s central measure of 
monetary and material deprivation (‘people at risk of poverty or social exclusion’) 
given that this complex metric is based, among other elements, on the indicators 
inability and arrears, and thus issues of collinearity between variables would have 
arisen in the correlation analysis.
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3  The thermodynamics of  
the social contract
Making infrastructures visible in  
the case of district heating in two 
towns in Serbia and Croatia
Deana Jovanović
Introduction
During my ethnographic research in two different post- Yugoslav towns – in 
the copper- processing town of Bor in Serbia and in the coastal industrial 
town of Rijeka in Croatia, the provision of district heating was an unavoid-
able topic of conversation that provoked a lot of affective reactions. For 
instance, my landlord in Rijeka, Marta,1 was a woman in her fifties with two 
children who worked part- time serving food in a kindergarten after losing 
her job for a railway. She lived in the same skyscraper where I rented her 
mother’s flat. The morning we met, she looked at a bill I had received that day 
and put on her glasses to better explain to me the complicated and opaque 
calculations of the heating costs that neither she nor I could decipher. Then 
she threw the bill on the table and said: ‘My darling, don’t get into this…
these are all muljavine i pizdarije (dodgy dealings and annoying things). We 
used to live well before, and now it’s all just an ugly mess. Don’t turn your 
radiator on if you do not have to.’
Unlike in Rijeka where there was an (unsuccessful) attempt to individu-
alize district heating costs, in Bor there was still a flat- rate provision of dis-
trict heating. Milica was in her seventies and had worked in the kitchen of 
a socially owned company in Bor. Her late husband had obtained their flat 
through his work during socialism. She used to tell me that the ‘normal’ level 
of heating during winter was when you could walk in your T- shirt in the flat 
and have to open the windows to cool off the room. For her, the abundant 
heating was a measure of a good neighbourhood, solidly built flats, and a 
specificity of the urban character of her town. She continued: ‘But, neverthe-
less, budalaštine (“non- senses”) are happening to us…the state is cheating 
us now. We are not being treated fairly. They are just stealing from us.’
While provision of centralized district heating, constructed during the 
socialist urbanization of Yugoslavia, was relatively similar in both towns 
during the socialist past, today heating has developed on diverging paths. 
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Yet despite different policy decisions – one towards individual metering of 
the heating consumption in Rijeka, and the other keeping the general flat 
rate provision in Bor – I found that a strikingly similar sense of disenchant-
ment with the promise of heating could be gleaned from both Marta’s and 
Milica’s experiences with district provision, and that this was shared with 
their fellow citizens. More precisely, the promise of modern and comfort-
able lives, welfare, and care that the Yugoslav state had assured (in the past) 
Marta and Milica (and their co- citizens) it would deliver in the future were 
brought into question in both towns. This chapter argues that although the 
infrastructure has not broken down materially, a sense of post- Yugoslav 
infrastructural failure emerged through people’s experience of a breakdown 
of the social contract – between the state and the people – that delivered 
its promises through heating. The encounter with district heating is here 
studied as a site through which post- Yugoslav transformations of the social 
contract between citizens and their states are discussed.
The chapter ethnographically illustrates the thermodynamics of the 
social contract by showing the ways in which infrastructural forms and 
the provision of heat configured dynamic relations between the states and 
their citizens. Thus, I  show how the interrelation between heat and the 
political, technological (including material limits of infrastructure and its 
potentialities), and social aspects formed around the provision of heating 
were involved in the transformation of the social contract. By illustrating 
a specific condition upon which visibility of infrastructure was mobilized 
in everyday life, the chapter joins the anthropological efforts to capture 
visibility of urban infrastructures (Sneath, 2009), necessary to persistently 
renew the political effects (Anand, 2017). Unlike the widespread assertion 
that infrastructures are usually ‘taken for granted’ (Humphrey, 2003, p. 93), 
are inflexible and invisible (Furlong, 2010), and that they only become vis-
ible upon their physical breakdown (Star, 1999) or when they are repaired 
and maintained (Graham and Thrift, 2007), the chapter shows how visi-
bility of infrastructures was achieved through the experience of a break-
down of the social contract and people’s attempt to make it anew.
So far, infrastructures in this region have been understudied in anthro-
pology, with the exception of Johnson’s studies of Belgrade district heating 
(2016) and housing (2018). Although studies of Yugoslav urban planning 
are emerging (see also Normand, 2014 for Belgrade; Djurašovic, 2016 
for Mostar), there remains a lack of data ‘from below’. This chapter also 
contributes to post- socialist studies by entering into a long overdue dialogue 
between post- socialist and post- Yugoslav studies (see Gilbert et al., 2008).2
My data stem from ethnographic fieldwork and participant observation 
that I conducted in Bor for 14 months (from August 2012 until September 
2013)  for the purposes of my PhD research, and in Rijeka for 5 months 
during my post- doctoral fieldwork (from October 2016 until March 2017). 
In both locations I used informal and semi- structured interviews, followed 
the local media, and analysed relevant documents. The daily routines of 
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living in rented apartments in Bor and Rijeka provided insights into the 
neighbourhoods, and helped me to share in the common experience of 
heating provision. In Bor, I  spent time in the municipality office (mesna 
zajednica) where I met and established a rapport with Katarina. In Rijeka, 
I befriended people who self- organized themselves against the local heating 
provider. Even though I had conversations with many other citizens, in this 
chapter I  will use these examples as paradigmatic because they illustrate 
shared experiences of the residents of both towns. By taking an anthropo-
logical perspective on district heating, ethnography provided in this text is 
not (and has never been) a mere description; rather, its explanatory use is a 
theoretical and analytical endeavour (Nader, 2011).
I will first provide a historical account on district heating in Yugoslavia 
and a brief depiction of the current state in two towns. Then, I will focus on 
two ethnographic examples from both towns, and end by discussing trans-
formations of the social contract and its relationship with the provision of 
district heating today.
District heating in Yugoslavia
During the 1960s and 1970s, Bor and Rijeka went through mass housing 
development projects that included developing district heating networks. 
The urbanized infrastructure came as a result of rapid industrial expansion, 
urbanization, and modernization, conjointly promoted by the socialist self- 
managed system. District heating in both towns consisted of a system of 
pipes connected to one main source (the heating plant), which then brought 
heat into homes through radiators. The heating was technically constructed 
in such a way that the pipes ran vertically through the apartments, linking 
them successively, rather than in loops (Johnson, 2013), making it almost 
impossible to provide an individual supply in both towns. Residents could 
not control the amount of heat brought into their flat, and they could not 
turn it off whenever they wanted. Heating bills were equal throughout the 
year, owing to cost distribution, and charges were calculated by square metre.
The municipal heating service in Yugoslavia was provided on the basis 
of the universal rationale of uniform coverage by a single provider and a 
network that was part of what Graham and Marvin (2001, p. 43) defined 
as the ‘modern infrastructural ideal’ of integrated planning of unitary 
networked cities with social, economic, and political coherence, visible in 
the modern urban planning of Yugoslav cities. Being the basis of modernist 
European planning that tried to unify and homogenize urban space and 
promote cohesive city building, Graham and Marvin (2001) argue that such 
provision of public services became the foundation upon which European 
welfare states were constructed and sustained. This ‘modern infrastructural 
ideal’ regulated by the state was simultaneously integrated into the Yugoslav 
socialist idea of the provision of a living standard for the workers. Within 
such arrangements, the workers (and my interlocutors) were allocated, 
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though not entirely equally (Archer, 2016), the rights to use socially owned 
flats plugged into a centralized heating provision.
It is necessary to emphasize that socialism in Yugoslavia was different 
from socialism in other East European countries. As ‘the third way’ 
between the capitalist United States and communist Soviet Union, it was 
characterized by a unique mixture of socialist and market- economic 
principles, self- management, a liberal socialist system of government, and 
‘openness’, including borders open to goods, people and ideas from across 
the world (Greenberg, 2011, p.  88). The heating system was built in a 
different manner from the centralized provision in the Soviet Union, and the 
workers themselves were involved in building the city infrastructure through 
self- management funds, among others.
More than 25  years after the break- up of Yugoslavia, the process of 
neoliberalization has taken different paths in both countries. Croatia’s 
accession to the European Union (EU) in 2013 brought increased neo-
liberal reforms in comparison to Serbia. Such reforms also reflected the 
greater degree to which the heating system in Croatia has been transformed 
compared with that in Serbia. Today in Croatia, different actors pursue pol-
icies for individualization of heating costs, while environmental and energy 
efficiency agendas are affected by the local government and, more crucially, 
EU initiatives and funds. Serbia recently faced such attempts, but the town 
of Bor in particular was not on the agenda. In both countries, public pol-
icies and political and infrastructural transformations are mostly carried 
out without public involvement. More recently, however, certain activities 
against the local heating providers emerged both in Croatia and in Serbia.
At the time I spent in the field, the heating infrastructure in Bor and Rijeka 
was still a ‘bundle’, or a partial bundle, because both heating providers were 
still owned by the municipalities and controlled by the state. The transform-
ations of district heating in both towns were not fully carried out owing to 
material conditions (e.g. inflexible pipes) and the difficulty of privatizing 
indebted providers. In Rijeka, there was an attempt to individualize heating 
costs that was introduced only partially, and in Bor such an attempt was on 
the horizon. Both providers, controlled by the state, tried to ‘responsibilize’ 
(Collier, 2011, p.8) the users by asking them to demonstrate a particular 
solidarity with each other through which they would make their (often vola-
tile) provisions work. In Bor, it seemed that the utility provider had still 
not made up its mind on whether or not its services were a commodity. 
According to them, the citizens ought to be responsible for making regular 
payments for utilities; otherwise, the delivery of heating would destabilize. 
In Rijeka, according to pamphlets distributed by the provider, citizens were 
encouraged to keep their radiators set to an average temperature, hence 
to ‘behave equally’ (and not independently) in order to attain ‘optimal’ 
spending and achieve efficient heating. Further in this text, I will show how 
this particular context in both towns played out in people’s day- to- day 
engagements with district heating, and how it reflected on my interlocutors’ 
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apprehensions of the breakdown of the social contract and its promises 
delivered through heating.
A desire to disconnect in Bor (Serbia): Katarina’s disenchantment
The town of Bor, located in eastern Serbia (350 km south- east from the cap-
ital), is a middle- sized town, characterized by a mono- structural economy. 
The local copper- processing company (RTB)3 has historically been, and 
still is, substantially anchored within the town’s social and political life, 
prosperity, and development. After a prosperous period during Yugoslav 
socialism, there was an economic, social, and symbolic decline of the com-
pany, followed by decay of the town and of industry during the 1990s. After 
2009, the state made an investment in the so- called mutual revival of the 
run- down industry and the town. In Bor, RTB played an important role in 
building the district heating system because it developed from RTB’s power 
plant. The heating network began expanding in 1973, with the rapid urban 
development of the town, and finished in the 1990s. Compared with other 
cities in Serbia, Bor has the highest number of households connected to a 
single plant.4 This is why one should not be surprised to find radiators even 
in barns in some villages near the town.
The heating company split with RTB in 2002 and emerged as an inde-
pendent public utility company, Toplana Bor (Heating Power Plant Bor), 
run by the municipality. Because of its technical, bureaucratic, and material 
inflexibility, the centralized system did not provide any possibility for 
disconnecting from it. In this way, urban infrastructure assembled both social 
and political life (Collier, 2011) while forming tight connections between 
the company, the municipality, and the citizens. This kind of assemblage 
was maintained as the party- political responsibilities of the municipality and 
the company overlapped, affecting everyday life, including the quality of 
heating. This assemblage will be further depicted through Katarina’s story, 
where the sense of a breakdown of the social contract made the infrastruc-
ture and its provision visible.
Katarina was upset when I came to see her in her flat. Yet again, she had 
received a letter from the public utility company, a final notice before a 
summons to pay a debt of nearly €1,700. We sat down in the living room 
of her flat, which her father had obtained through his work in the factory 
in the late 1980s (this used to be a part of RTB and was privatized under 
suspicious circumstances, leaving her father without the support he was 
entitled to). Katarina showed me a list of alleged debts beginning in 1996, 
including periods in 2002, 2003, 2008, and so on. She was trying to find the 
receipts for bills that had already been paid, which her father kept in a pile 
of unsorted documents. She claimed that the debt seemed to be much larger 
than what the household actually owed, and that she knew that it should be 
around €1,150. On a piece of paper, she ticked off the bills that her father 
had already paid. Katarina was 31, born and raised in Bor, in her final year 
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of law studies, and unemployed. At that time her parents were living in a 
village, trying to survive after both losing their jobs in a privatized factory, 
leaving Katarina to deal with the family debts.
The public utility company was threatening to press charges against 
Katarina’s family. The utility company had introduced a measure to allow 
citizens to set up a payment plan, which was supposed to allow Katarina 
to pay the debt with interest in instalments. Should Katarina not accept this 
offer that accompanied the final warning, her father’s pension would be 
suspended for a while. He would be summoned to court, their belongings 
could be repossessed, and the whole family could be left without any steady 
income.
Katarina claimed that the state always found something that one had 
already paid for and sent a bill for it anyway, relying on the possibility that 
one would not find a receipt for the first payment, or that nobody would 
check the second bill. ‘This only exists in this country!’ she said. She claimed 
that such ‘extortion’ and quasi- legal theft existed to generate extra money 
that went straight into the budget of the political parties in charge of the 
public utility companies and to financing their own political activities. She 
said:  ‘These people, politicians in the municipality, only argue over who 
should become a general director of some public company, while the people 
are being robbed and they do not even want to know how we live.’ She 
spoke about the state as a ‘usury state’. And, because of that, she was forced 
to go around to various public institutions and queue at the counters. Every 
time she went there, she became stressed ‘just by entering the room’. ‘I’m 
sick of it!’ she said.
District heating was also a source of stress for Katarina because of the 
involved paperwork and bureaucratic procedures. Much checking needed 
to be done in order to avoid being defrauded. This required time, nerves, 
collecting and storing old receipts for years, and then finding them when 
needed, understanding the bills and final notices, consulting a lawyer, 
arguing, knowing the ways in which institutions worked (preferably through 
knowing a person who could help and do favours internally), writing appeals, 
archiving them in the proper way (by making sure they were legitimized by 
an institution by being notarized), and so on.
Another paper was pulled from the pile. It was Katarina’s father’s docu-
mentation on substandard heating delivery services and his request to 
disconnect his flat from the district heating system. ‘Argh, I’m so looking 
forward to disconnecting from them!’ Katarina commented on the letter 
that I had started reading. ‘Can you really?’ I asked. As far as I knew, one 
could not easily disconnect from district heating. She insisted that it was a 
service, and argued that they should offer and sell good services. Because 
the service was poor and unreliable, she hoped to have a chance to discon-
nect from it. She did not pay attention to the inherent material limits of the 
heating system, however, and her expectations did not match the infrastruc-
tural possibilities at that point.
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I looked at the letter again, stamped in the right corner with ‘9 October, 
2012’, the date of dispatch. The letter was written in a bureaucratic way, 
well-explained and bullet-pointed. Two reasons were stated for the family’s 
request to disconnect. The first was the provision of ‘inadequate heating’, 
and the second was their ‘difficult financial situation on the verge of pov-
erty’. The problems with the inadequate heating, according to the letter, 
dated back to the moment the family moved into the flat during the 1980s. 
The temperature of the flat never rose above 16°C during winter, although 
the company was required to guarantee 20(± 2)°C by law. This had been 
confirmed many times by the workers from the Heating Power Plant who 
came to measure the temperature in the flat. Because of this, Katarina’s 
father argued in the letter, the family was forced to heat the flat by using 
other sources of energy, such as electricity, which resulted in extra costs. 
The letter also elaborated on the financial conditions of the household. 
Four household members, it said, lived off the father’s pension of 28,000 
dinars (€231) only, which equated to 7,000 dinars (€57) per person per 
month. Until 2009, the father had been able to pay for the heating services 
even though they were inadequate. But because he and his wife, along with 
other workers, had been ‘thrown onto the streets’ after the lay- offs in the 
privatized factory, further payment for district heating would lead the family 
into a greater ‘depression’. The letter ended in a poetic tone:
By respecting the old saying, ‘The wise person is not the one who 
distinguishes good from evil, but the one who chooses between the 
lesser of two evils,’ I judged that the lesser evil for my family would be 
to disconnect from the district heating system rather than to become 
evicted from my flat due to enormous debts.
For Katarina, the consequence of not paying her bills was more a moral 
dilemma between two bad choices that demanded a difficult compromise. 
The principle of the lesser of two evils was a product of a situation of being 
a captive (dependent) customer of the centralized provision. In fact, Katarina 
and her father became morally righteous citizens on the basis of knowing 
how to distinguish between, and navigate scales of, what they considered to 
be ‘evils’. Because the family could not be disconnected from the system at 
that point, the debt became so high that heating began to seem like a ‘bad’ 
connection that Katarina and her parents had to navigate. Now, let us stop for 
a moment with Katarina’s story and go to Rijeka where, similarly to Katarina’s 
case, a good connection turned into a physically and morally bad one.
The quest for a fair formula: hot bills and cold radiators  
in Rijeka (Croatia)
Rijeka is the principal seaport and third largest city in Croatia located on 
Kvarner Bay, an inlet of the Adriatic Sea, 131 km south- west of the capital 
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Zagreb. During the mid- 1960s, urbanization in Rijeka intensified when 
modern buildings, including skyscrapers, were connected to the centralized 
heating provision. The main socially owned company that provided heating 
was nationalized to become the state company Energo in 1989. Today, this 
company is in the town’s majority ownership. Between 2011 and 2013, 
the Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency Fund (EU funds) and 
the city of Rijeka introduced a new ecological measure regarding district 
heating. The idea was to introduce a method of control over energy spending 
by which energy efficiency would improve. The state officials and the energy 
providers appealed to the citizens by using a basic market environmentalist 
argument: they pitched electronic heat cost allocators (which measured con-
sumption of heat calculated by impulses) as the first technological condi-
tion for individualization of billing for heat consumption, and as a basic 
piece of technical equipment for energy efficiency. Energo advertised that 
30 per cent of individual consumption would be saved. The new law on 
thermal energy market envisaged that everyone who lived in a building that 
had more than 70 flats should have heat cost allocators by 2016, and it 
prescribed them as obligatory.5 The citizens could buy the cost allocators 
themselves from two private companies, and they paid for the refurbishment 
of their buildings’ façades (which was a big expense). The company initially 
guaranteed smaller bills, so the people who installed the devices (like my 
interlocutors) no longer paid the flat rate calculated by the square metre 
throughout the year.
Protests were organized in Rijeka in 2015 after the attempt to individu-
alize the calculations, as a reaction to a sudden increase in prices. People 
demanded ‘normal prices of heating’, complaining that the value of their 
flats had suddenly decreased due to expensive heating. The people I spent 
time with were active in their own self- organized initiatives against the com-
pany and against the ‘formula’ the company used to calculate individual 
costs. They actively had meetings with ministries, Energo and municipal 
bodies. This action was also initiated on the national level, because the cap-
ital of Zagreb and other towns in Croatia had similar problems.
My interlocutors explained that the problem was that the formula Energo 
used to calculate the costs did not reflect the actual consumption – rather, 
it made their bills higher. According to them, the formula was not precise 
and it did not take into account the position of specific flats, heating quality 
in the neighbouring flats, badly kept buildings, the exact amount of heat 
that the joint vertical pipes produced, and so on. For those who had cost 
allocators installed, 50 per cent of heating provision was charged based 
on square metres, and 50 per cent by actual consumption and through a 
korektivni faktor (multiplier), which depended on the overall consumption 
of the heat of the whole building. If the flat did not have a cost allocator, 
the price was even higher. Some of my interlocutors longed for a formula 
that provided a fair and transparent price for individual consumption; some 
of them thought there was no fair formula at all. Moreover, a lot of people 
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I had conversations with had their own suggestions for what a ‘fair’ formula 
could and should look like, but they all emphasized that it was not their job 
to invent it. Often, their critique was not so much directed towards indi-
vidualizing and measuring as such (although there were some individuals 
who fundamentally opposed this), but more towards the technicalities of 
measuring and counting. Thus, the (thermo)dynamic between the states and 
the citizens did not only relate to the political and economic transformations 
but also to relations with the heat and the existing material conditions of 
the network, including the expectations and entitlements formed around the 
provision of heating.
One day I met my interlocutors in a local pub. Mišo was a man in his 
fifties, active in a workers’ union and a public servant in the municipality 
office. He lived with his wife and two children in a skyscraper. Ivana was 
in her mid- fifties. She lived with her mother and worked in the local high 
school as a teacher. As soon as we had ordered coffee, Mišo and Ivana 
started to complain:
People started not to heat any more! We, who do not turn on our 
radiators, still pay 50 per cent for heat per square metre, and we did not 
consume anything. My vertical pipe has a volume of xy, and it is enough 
to heat one square metre, so they can’t charge me for 40 square metres. 
You cannot…because I have cost allocators that are imposed onto me. 
Why should I pay 50 square metres for three pipes, if they cannot heat 
more than three square metres?! Count per volume, and I’ll pay…I just 
want to have a choice! I don’t want to pay a flat rate, and I want to pay 
as much as I consume! So reduce the flat rate…[…].
(Mišo)
Ivana added to this:
The problem with the heat cost allocators is that you cannot control 
your consumption. You cannot know its value. So let’s say you’ve got 
five impulses. But, what if that is the only impulse spent in the whole 
building?! You don’t know if your neighbours are heating or not. The 
value of an impulse depends on the whole building, that’s how the 
formula they use works. As everybody closes their radiators, because 
it’s expensive, you pay 50 per cent of the overall consumption of the 
building…But one should not pay for everything. They call it a ‘solidary 
method’, ha! [laughs] People do not use their radiators, and this is why 
we get high bills. The heat cost allocators are a complete deceit.
Furthermore, they both claimed that the calculations were unjust and 
socially insensitive. Like Katarina from Bor, they yearned for the calculations 
of the heating costs to take into account the social and financial situation of 
the users, and they also wanted to ensure fair charges for consumption. In 
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addition, my interlocutors claimed that everything about the heating system 
was a fraud and that the new laws were copied from other EU countries. 
Allegedly, the private companies that were selling the heat cost allocators 
were part of muljavine i pizdarije (to use my landlord’s expression), whereby 
they made deals with the government to become the official state providers 
and the subsequent bills became completely non- transparent.
Mišo and Ivana also told me that people had found ways to cheat Energo. 
For instance, people would take off their radiators with the permission of 
the head of the building, who was usually bribed. According to Mišo and 
Ivana, these people no longer paid for heating but still got some heat from 
the neighbouring flats. Or they would even reinstall the radiators, making 
the overall building consumption higher, but still pay nothing. ‘Why would 
I pay his heating?’ Ivana asked me. She continued:
And why am I paying per square metre on account of joint building con-
sumption, if people around me do not heat themselves?! For achieving 
the temperature of a bad fridge?! It is not a lot for heating, it’s true…
but for refrigeration on account of solidarity during temperatures below 
zero…I think it’s too much!
The breakdown of the social contract and making it anew: 
making infrastructures visible
As we can see from the ethnography above, the heating system provoked 
anxieties among residents both in Rijeka and in Bor. Their concerns were 
especially over what role and responsibilities the state towards the citizens 
should have in both a moral and practical sense. In fact, from its intro-
duction until today, district heating brought my interlocutors into specific 
relations with the Yugoslav state (and, later, the successive independent 
states), their towns (the municipalities6 that provide the heat) and between 
each other. This ‘social contract’, as a set of relations, was imbued with 
liabilities, obligations, and responsibilities. Even though my interlocutors 
did not speak about this set of relations as a social contract, as we could see, 
it did leave significant material and immaterial effects in my interlocutors’ 
everyday lives.
I use the notion of the social contract in a different context from that in 
which Catherine Alexander (2007) or Caroline Humphrey (2007) used it to 
mark the relationship between citizens and the Soviet state that was redefined 
after the end of the Soviet Union. They both showed how post- socialist pri-
vatization of utility provisions changed the meaning of infrastructures, and 
how people saw their roles in the new economy. What the examples from 
Bor and Rijeka show, where privatization had not yet (fully) occurred, is 
that despite the differences the residents have started to perceive themselves 
as consumers, like they did in Ulan- Ude (Humphrey, 2007) or in Almaty 
(Alexander, 2007). Yet, in order to fully understand my interlocutors’ moral 
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entitlements as consumers and how they emerged, I will first address the 
socialist past that initially brought my interlocutors into the social contract 
through heating and entitled them to promises for the future. I argue that 
the apprehension surrounding the breakdown of the social contract, which 
promised to provide care and welfare, contributed to their attempts to make 
it anew through their emphasis on becoming moral citizens: the consumers. 
This argument will help us to understand how the thermodynamics of the 
social contract rendered infrastructures visible.
During socialism in Yugoslavia, district heating (as with other infra-
structural services) was never provided as a consumer good in a way in 
which other goods, services, and experiences were available and consumed.7 
Socially owned flats, allocated to the citizens, were not commercial commod-
ities either. Johnson (2013) argues in her study of Belgrade’s district heating 
that the flats with all the modern conveniences (such as district heating) were 
offered as the reward for citizens who were ‘contributing to the socialist 
pursuit of modernity’ (Johnson 2013, p.  146). She further contends that 
‘district heating was a system that helped construct such privileged comfort’ 
(Johnson, 2013, pp. 146– 147). Even though ‘district heating brought a vision 
of Yugoslav consumerism into the home and made it material’ (Johnson, 
2013, p. 147), it was also linked to the moral project of the Yugoslav state 
as urban planning echoed the aspirations of socio- economic development 
(such as social ownership, equal access to jobs and housing, and a satis-
fying minimum living standard) (Djurašovic, 2016, pp. 107– 108). By using 
their flats, my interlocutors entered into a social contract with the Yugoslav 
state that ought to provide heat (and welfare and care), and which further 
contributed to ‘the social and economic relationships that would make the 
system work’ (Johnson, 2016, p. 99).
After the decline of socialism, and as ownership transformed, the inde-
pendent states remained the providers of heating, unable to entirely offer 
the promises of becoming fully fledged heating consumers (as in the case of 
flats, which were turned into commodities). This was impossible partly due 
to the pre- neoliberal material specificity of the heating system, which some-
what constrained the reforms (Collier, 2011). In Rijeka, the reforms were 
carried out to a larger extent than in Serbia, but, as I showed, the formula 
used to calculate individual heating consumption was contested by Mišo 
and Ivana, and many other residents of Rijeka, as (morally) unfair. Yet 
physical connections tied them to the previous social contract. As neither 
state could offer the old relationship and provide heating as a social good, 
and when my interlocutors could not physically disconnect (easily), they 
found themselves in an ambivalent relationship with their states, yearning 
for both the (welfare) state, which ought to provide, and for a ‘proper’ 
capitalist state.
As they contemplated their expectations of the state and its failure to pro-
vide, the contemporary states were seen as corrupted, fraudulent entities that 
‘extorted’ money through heating. My interlocutors’ mundane encounters 
 
 
 
Thermodynamics of the social contract 49
   49
with district heating were therefore also their mundane encounters ‘with a 
fragmented state’ (Harvey and Knox, 2012, p. 530). Because of apprehensions 
over the state as a provider and a fraudulent entity from which one needed 
to protect oneself, they developed different strategies for mitigating what 
they found ‘harmful’ in their relationship with the state:  they tried to 
monitor it by carefully gathering their bills, interpreting them, studying new 
formulas for calculations, monitoring their debts, informing themselves on 
legal issues, filing complaints, inspecting room temperatures, and so on. By 
doing so, they developed a particular ‘expert’ knowledge around the provi-
sion of district heating, whether in its legal, political, economic, or technical 
domain.
As particular hopes and senses of entitlement were formed around the 
provision of district heating through the social contract, my interlocutors 
experienced and expressed disenchantment with such promises. The 
betrayals of expectations of the social contract and disenchantment with 
the aspirations of socio- economic development, inscribed in the district 
heating, were visible in the case of Katarina’s parents being ‘thrown onto 
the streets’ after (illegally) losing their jobs and in Rijeka, where transform-
ation of heating charges contributed to a decrease in the prices of flats. It 
was also visible in lowering the living standard, which all my interlocutors 
experienced. The expectations and subsequent disenchantment came pre-
cisely from the enchantment experienced by the generation of Mišo, Ivana, 
and my landlord, or the generation of Katarina’s parents, when there was 
investment that structured such expectations. In Katarina’s case, however, 
there is also a sense of transgenerational consequences of such enchantment. 
As these enchantments from the past failed to live up to the expectations of 
the new generations, it became the task of my interlocutors to modify their 
relationship with the same pipes that my interlocutors or their parents had 
built through their own work (and the work of their co- citizens).
The thermodynamics of the social contract and its transformation also 
suggest that my interlocutors’ encounters with district heating, regarded in 
the past as an ‘ordinary’ provision for the ‘ordinary’ people (the workers), 
not only rendered moral reasoning and ‘ordinary’ ethics (Lambek, 2010) 
visible: they also indicated that the ‘ordinary’ provision became less access-
ible and more unequal, and showed a transformation from, to some extent, 
a stable social contract to a far more fluid scenario in which the relation-
ship between the people and their states had to be made anew. Mišo’s 
affective exclamation, ‘I just want to have a choice!’ is paradigmatic for all 
my interlocutors:  the ways with which they attempted to make the social 
contract anew were precisely to insist on a more liberal doctrine of indi-
vidual choice. Hence, paying for services guaranteed delineated responsi-
bilities of the social contract: customers were paying the municipality for 
services, and such payment should have guaranteed the certain, stable, satis-
factory, and constant delivery of heating. Therefore, unlike during socialism 
when socialist morality was inextricably linked to ideologies of labour, and 
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when the moral (‘ordinary’) citizen was considered to be the producer, my 
interlocutors constructed the moral citizen as a consumer. Their entitlements 
as consumers could further bring a sense of a more individual capacity for 
decision making, which was seen as a moral entitlement, and which could 
further offer them a sense of justice. In order to become consumers, whose 
rights would be guaranteed by the market, they initially needed to become 
citizens, whose rights would be guaranteed by the state (Simić, 2017, p. 25). 
Hence, my interlocutors invested their hopes in the framework of the state 
and not outside it (Jansen, 2015; Simić, 2017).
In both towns, these moral citizens expected a solid, constant service 
which, if and when it was paid for, was meant to provide value for money 
using fair calculations of the amount of heat delivered. By reiterating such 
logic of the individual rational choice, hopes for ‘unbundling’ seemed to be 
working to produce a feeling of liberation from being a captive client of 
the state while simultaneously, in practice, my interlocutors remained even 
more indebted to or dependent on state provision. Furthermore, they asked 
to be recognized as consumers and to be fully granted such rights by the 
state even though the neoliberal reforms of the heating system were not 
‘fully there’. In other words, the inflexible materialities stayed (mostly) the 
same and the state provision remained nearly similar but the individuals 
have changed. Their ‘expert’ knowledge of district heating and the process 
of individualization, as well as the emphasis on becoming moral citizens as 
consumers, all demonstrate a specific neoliberal governmentality in a situ-
ation in which infrastructure was still to some extent a ‘bundle’. To be more 
precise, it demonstrates an emergence of what Nikolas Rose has referred 
to as ‘advanced liberal’ political subjectivity within the cultivation of self- 
management techniques (Fennell, 2011; Rose, 1999). Hence the neoliberal, 
‘free to govern’ individuals have almost surpassed the full realization of neo-
liberal policies, impeded by the given inflexible material qualities of heating 
infrastructure, among others.
Finally, the thermodynamics of the social contract I have described here 
also suggest that the visibility of the infrastructure did not occur through its 
physical breakdown, as a large number of studies on infrastructures have 
suggested (Furlong, 2010; Graham and Thrift, 2007; Humphrey, 2003; 
Star, 1999), but through a reordering of relations between the states and 
their citizens where the conditions of physical continuities played a sig-
nificant role. The vertical pipes with differing volumes, the radiators, the 
valves, the heat cost allocators, and even the material properties of heat, 
became prominently visible and played an important role in the transform-
ation of the social contract. The old heating pipes not only constructed and 
reproduced ambivalent attachments to the states but they also contributed 
to an experience of broken promises. Day- to- day engagements with district 
heating in Bor and Rijeka therefore show how the infrastructure became 
visible through a shared sense of the broken promises of the social contract, 
including its promises of (and for) the future (modern and comfortable lives, 
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and welfare and care), and what the state ought to provide. Moreover, the 
infrastructure became significantly more visible through people’s attempts 
to make the social contract anew through their desire for even more indi-
vidual decision- making capacity and for becoming consumers. It is exactly 
through such practices, as well as through affects and the ambivalent rela-
tionship with post- socialist states, that the visibility of heating infrastructure 
and its provision became considerably mobilized in everyday life.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I illustrated how people in two different post- Yugoslav towns 
encountered district heating and how the socio- materiality of infrastructures 
and their endurance and visibility was achieved through a sense of a break-
down of the social contract, established through heating. The common 
material post- Yugoslav infrastructural legacy, which became  the root of 
my interlocutors’ frustrations precisely because it relied on the material 
continuity of infrastructures, proved to be a fruitful window to explore the 
weight of the common Yugoslav historical and material legacy, which had 
an impact on social transformations in these two towns. Although there 
were significant differences, such as policy decisions that affected infrastruc-
tural provisions, the cross- Yugoslav ethnography in this chapter illustrated 
specific commonalities, such as the residents’ ambivalent relationships with 
their states, common cross- generational concerns, and how infrastructure 
became a space for moral ruminations and a place for (re)definition of 
post- Yugoslav citizenship. Moreover, it showed that the infrastructure was 
still a determinant in people’s everyday lives (Humphrey, 2005), not as a 
part of their integral development like during socialism (Krstić, 1982), but 
of their deprivation, and a site for the production of inequalities where the 
‘ordinary’ turned into a ‘privilege’. Having these local concerns in mind, 
the infrastructures seem to be a potential site for broader political actions 
across the post- Yugoslav region, which remain to be explored in the future.
Acknowledgements
I thank Stef Jansen, Madeleine Reeves, Frances Pine, Penelope Harvey, 
Jasminka Beba Jovanović, Sanja Milutinović Bojanić, Sarah Czerny, the 
participants in the seminars at the Centre for Advanced Studies – Southeast 
Europe (University of Rijeka), at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast 
European Studies in Regensburg, at the ‘Post- socialist infrastructures’ work-
shop at Tallinn University, the editors of this volume, and the anonymous 
reviewers for their constructive comments. The Fellowships granted by the 
Centre for Advanced Studies – Southeast Europe (CAS SEE, University of 
Rijeka) and the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies 
(IOS, Regensburg) Visiting Fellowship helped writing this chapter.
 
 
 
 
52 D. Jovanović
52
Notes
 1 All interlocutors’ names have been changed.
 2 On many occasions, studies from the former Yugoslavia were not included in 
attempts to address post- socialism (see edited ‘post- socialist’ collections:  e.g. 
Mandel and Humphrey 2002; Burawoy and Verdery, 1999).
 3 The ‘Mining and Smelter Basin Bor’ (Rudarsko topioničarski basen Bor, ‘RTB 
Bor’; hereafter referred to as ‘the company’ or ‘RTB’.
 4 Out of a total of 14,200 households in the whole town, the district heating covers 
11,000 flats and around 1,400 houses.
 5 Seventy per cent of the citizens of Rijeka had the heat cost allocators installed by 
2016. In April 2017, a new study carried out by the Institute of Economics in Zagreb 
proved the economic ineffectiveness of the heat cost allocators (M.B.O., 2017).
 6 In Croatia and Serbia, many people consider the local government as serving the 
state’s interests, and see it as equivalent to the state. This is partly due to municipal 
institutions for utility services being run by head directors chosen from the polit-
ical parties, which are in power both on the local and the state level.
 7 Freedom to travel and consumerism in everyday life resembled the ‘Western’ 
nature of Yugoslav socialism (see also Duda, 2010).
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4  Ideologies and informality in  
urban infrastructure
The case of housing in Soviet  
and post- Soviet Baku
Sascha Roth
Introduction
Since the early 2000s, the Azerbaijani state has made enormous efforts to 
turn its capital Baku into a showcase of modernization in urban infrastruc-
ture, housing and architecture. The authoritarian government of the oil- rich 
country has forged large infrastructural projects, such as renovating the old 
city, the seaside boulevard, parks and metro stations, as well as constructing 
luxurious hotels and elite housing estates in the context of Baku hosting 
international mega events like the ‘Eurovision Song Contest’ (2012), the 
‘European Olympic Games’ (2015) or the ‘Formula One Grand Prix of 
Europe’ (2016). Preparations for these events were accompanied by large- 
scale demolition of pre- Soviet neighbourhoods, which is often legitimized 
by their deficient infrastructure. Many such neighbourhoods were replaced 
by new infrastructural model sites such as the Flame Towers1 or park areas 
in the central districts. In this context, infrastructure constitutes a key con-
cept in public discourse as being emphasized by Azerbaijan’s President Ilham 
Aliyev:
Over the recent years, Azerbaijan has managed to assert itself globally 
as a dynamic, modern and strong country. […] The city infrastructure is 
being modernized. Baku is one of the most beautiful cities in the world 
today. It is noted for its beauty, historical appearance and modernity. 
Additional measures will be taken to develop the urban infrastructure. 
We will continue to develop Baku to make it even more beautiful.
(President of the Republic of Azerbaijan – Ilham Aliyev, 2013)
Such glorifying promotion of a simultaneously past- and future- oriented 
nation is primarily addressed to its own citizens. The local government is 
applying a policy of concealment of the increasing socio- spatial inequality 
of urban development and those spaces that do not match with the state’s 
envisaged promotion of the nation. These tensions constitute the wider 
framework for this chapter, which highlights some contrasts between the 
official representations of infrastructural development and the daily struggles 
of those citizens who live backstage of the public scenery.
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Generally, I  approach infrastructure as a fluid and dynamic concept 
characterized by its ‘ubiquity in public and scholarly discourse’ (Carse, 
2017, p. 34). However, the (post)socialist urban infrastructure in Azerbaijan, 
its official conceptualization and shifting notions in the everyday lives of 
citizens have remained scarcely represented in research. One of my aims, 
therefore, is to contribute to the comparative knowledge ‘about how people 
produce, live with, contest, and are subjugated to or facilitated by infrastruc-
ture’ (Graham and McFarlane, 2015, p. 2).
My material draws predominantly on neighbourhoods in Baku’s Yasamal 
district (October district in Soviet times), which still contains a relatively 
high amount of “traditional” low- storey courtyard houses (Azerbaijani, 
hәyәt evlәri) built in pre- socialist times and having been mostly inhabited 
by ethnic Azeris (Figure 4.1). In official discourse, such neighbourhoods 
have always constituted a material and social contrast to the once- Soviet 
‘cosmopolitan city’ (Grant, 2010). My focus on the Yasamal district is 
of special interest because of its central location, its high number of pre- 
socialist neighbourhoods that occupy a significant amount of valuable 
urban space for potential new constructions, and for its ranking among 
the most densely populated districts in Baku. Most importantly, historical 
and archival documents, as well as personal accounts of local inhabitants 
on the Soviet2 past, point to peculiar levels of informality in the domain 
of housing applied by citizens and local state representatives (e.g. regis-
tration practices, the manipulation of waiting lists, illegal construction 
of dwellings, rooms, or the diversion of construction materials). In the 
following, I aim to relate the official politics of infrastructural representa-
tion in Baku with those infrastructural dynamics in ‘the urban backstage’ 
(Amin, 2014, p.  139). My ethnographic data are based on qualitative 
methods. I applied participant observation, which meant spending as much 
time as possible with informants, neighbours, friends and acquaintances 
from various socio- economic backgrounds in order to learn about their 
biographies, everyday life, challenges and perceptions of present and 
past urban developments. I conducted 87 structured and semi- structured 
interviews with architects, lawyers, non- governmental organization 
workers, real estate agents, scholars, shopkeepers, current and former state 
representatives, as well as with residents from the neighbourhoods under 
focus. Archival documents from the Baku branch of the ‘State Archive of 
the Azerbaijan Republic’ (SAARBB) on characteristics of Soviet housing, 
allocation practices, obstacles, informalities, complaint letters and news-
paper articles provided historical sources on housing administrations, bur-
eaucracies and the relations between citizens and state representatives.
All too often it seems that housing and (housing) infrastructure mark 
two complementary aspects, with the latter term referring to the supply of 
the former with electricity, water, gas, heating, etc. Instead, I  advocate a 
more inclusive notion, which approaches housing as infrastructure being 
embedded in distinct social, political and historical contexts. For instance, 
the recent housing crisis in the USA triggered public debates on the necessity 
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of classifying (affordable) housing as infrastructure. In order to increase 
public and private investment for housing and coming to grips with existing 
housing shortage, it ‘should rank among America’s priorities around 
improved roads, bridges, tunnels, railways, shipping channels, pipelines, 
power grids, and airports’ (McManus, 2016; see also Kushner, 2010). In 
Figure 4.1  Map of Baku depicting the location of neighbourhoods in Yasamal and 
adjacent districts, consisting predominantly of one- and two- storey 
courtyard houses which have been constructed before and during the 
socialist era. Most buildings were being built and extended informally by 
the dwellers on private initiatives
Source: Map by Jutta Turner using openstreetmap.org
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post- socialist contexts, however, where the provision of urban housing 
alongside other public and social infrastructures has previously been under 
the responsibility of a socialist state, one must apply an integrated approach 
to housing as infrastructure. And although most services of the socialist wel-
fare system have disappeared in the context of neoliberalism, the experiences 
and nostalgic memories of the past still provide a template for many citizens 
for perceiving and evaluating present livelihoods and state– citizen relations 
on the basis of available infrastructure – predominantly housing.
While housing in the Soviet context constituted a legal right for citizens,3 
its socio- cultural importance has received little attention thus far. Housing 
constitutes an ‘intimate infrastructure’, if not the most intimate one, because 
it provides the material, social and symbolic base for family life, marriage, 
social reproduction and home- making. In Azerbaijan, as in other Caucasian 
and Central Asian societies with a patrilineal bias, the ownership of a house 
or an apartment for young males is normatively regarded as a prerequisite for 
marriage and founding a family (although in practice young married couples 
often continue living with parents until they can afford a separate home). In 
rural Azerbaijan, it has always been the bridegroom’s and his family’s duty 
to provide housing and the necessary infrastructure after marriage. This bias 
hardly weakened during socialism, when it was not ownership but gaining 
permanent and inheritable usage rights of urban dwellings. Such moral rele-
vance of the housing question in the domain of family life and kin support is 
expressed by the efforts of families and kin groups to increase the resource of 
housing (Roth, 2016). With regard to the peculiarities of the Soviet housing 
regime, it must be noted that, although having been a legal right for Soviet 
citizens, in practice, housing within the socialist system of ‘bureaucratic allo-
cation’ (Verdery, 1991) was always perceived and represented as being a 
scarce resource. As such, it constituted a collective resource of kin groups 
that was being hoarded for the long term (Morton, 1980, p. 242).4 Informal 
practices and the relevance of social networks were key components in the 
socialist ‘economy of favours’ (Ledeneva, 1998). In the case of Azerbaijan, 
many recent works well describe the prevalence, local characteristics and 
embeddedness of informality in the social, economic, political and everyday 
life of citizens (Aliyev, 2017; Safiyev, 2015; Sayfutdinova, 2015). But espe-
cially in the little discussed sphere of housing, informal practices by citizens 
and bureaucrats alike have played a major role in shaping both the Soviet 
and post- Soviet housing regime.
The case of Baku will point to wider dynamics in other former Soviet 
republics regarding the material and immaterial legacies of the socialist 
infrastructure regime, and how they accompany and relate to current ‘neo-
liberal’ developments. Hence, I follow authors who emphasize the legacies 
of Soviet politics, ideologies and practices on contemporary urban trans-
formations in post- Soviet contexts, while those very same states simultan-
eously seek to distance themselves from their socialist past (Grant, 2014). 
I  shall exemplify how subtle continuities of socialist politics and people’s 
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past experiences with infrastructure still have a significant impact on 
people’s everyday lives. I further argue that, despite the resilience of Soviet 
approaches towards infrastructure as a representation of progress and mod-
ernization, it is the very meaning and content of progress and modernity 
themselves that have changed, mostly through abandoning the aspects of 
social welfare: whereas in the Soviet narrative the socialist utopia promised 
a future without shortages in housing but rather with benefits for its citizens, 
today’s emphasis in public discourse lies in the beauty, prosperity and luxury 
of Baku as the ‘pearl of the Caspian’. Especially after the end of socialism, 
housing and other infrastructures transformed from a former legal right of 
Soviet citizens provided by the state into one of the most important venues 
for accelerated social exclusion and spatial inequalities. This argument 
resembles what the geographers Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin have 
called ‘splintering urbanism’, with which they argue that ‘a parallel set of 
processes are under way within which infrastructure networks are being 
“unbundled” in ways that help sustain the fragmentation of the social and 
material fabric of cities’ (Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 33). According to 
the authors, formerly ‘bundled’ and integrated notions of infrastructure as 
connecting and unifying urban places and inhabitants become ‘unbundled’ 
and segmented, thus contributing to the process of ‘splintering urbanism’. 
However, while the authors did not include housing in their notion of infra-
structure, I suggest that, especially in post- socialist contexts, one must con-
ceptualize housing as infrastructure because long- term legal access to cities 
and urban infrastructures in Soviet times was granted on the basis of a resi-
dence permit and, thus, housing. Such past experiences still matter a great 
deal in people’s perception of and interaction with the state.
Infrastructural ideologies: Soviet legacies in the present context
The meaning of infrastructure goes far beyond its technical functioning 
because it conveys powerful images of civilizational progress. Speaking 
about the ‘politics and poetics of infrastructure’, anthropologist Brian Larkin 
argues for an analysis of infrastructures ‘as concrete semiotic and aesthetic 
vehicles oriented to addressees. They emerge out of and store within them 
forms of desire and fantasy and can take on fetish- like aspects that some-
times can be wholly autonomous from their technical function’ (Larkin, 
2013, p. 329). Post- war notions of infrastructure became crucial tools for 
‘world- making’ because the term gained new meanings through global 
processes of supra- national military coordination and economic develop-
ment (Carse, 2017, p. 31). Such notions of infrastructure became especially 
salient in the context of the Cold War during which, both in the East and 
West, infrastructure became the arena of world- system competition.
Despite the conventional definition of what infrastructure is, the Bol’shaia 
Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia (BSE; 1969– 1978) devoted most space to an ideo-
logical critique of the political economy of infrastructure in the capitalist 
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West, where ‘infrastructure became the object of inter- imperialist competi-
tion’ and private capital owns enterprises and generates surplus value while 
the state is entrusted with the financing and developing of infrastructure 
that in turn increases the profit of the former. Such relations are taken as 
evidence of ‘the aggressive nature of imperialism’. Whereas social problems 
with infrastructure are said to characterize merely the capitalist mode of 
production, under socialism the only remnants are technical and economic 
challenges being solved by scientific planning. The entry closes with an opti-
mistic stance towards the Ninth Five- Year Plan, which envisaged accelerated 
development of infrastructure ‘in order to meet the needs of the national 
economy and to increase the welfare of the working people’.
Hence, infrastructure also constituted an important internal narrative as 
being the material base for the forging of Soviet society and economy. Here, 
it was especially architecture, which, in the Soviet imagination, became the 
key arena of ideology (Humphrey, 2005; see also Buchli, 2007). Although 
such relations between infrastructure, architecture and ideology are far from 
being restricted to the Soviet Union, ‘the Soviet example requires us to think 
about […] the particular situation where there is a definite pronounced 
intention of the state to make use of the materiality of dwelling to produce 
new social forms and moral values’ (Humphrey, 2005, pp. 39– 40). Beyond 
the materiality of dwelling, it was also infrastructural architecture at large 
that contributed to crafting the image of Soviet civilization and a socialist 
utopia, for example through factories and industrial cities, metro stations, 
educational institutions, ministries or television towers (see also Collier, 
2011; Kotkin, 1995; Lebow, 2013; Lodder, 2013). However, while the effi-
ciency of material output in Soviet factories was limited, a similar or even 
more important characteristic in social and political terms was the ‘over-
production of symbolic meanings’ (Todorov, 1995, p. 10; see also Larkin, 
2013, p. 335). The current processes of Baku’s urban transformation and 
its above illustrated role as material evidence of national progress push us 
to be more aware of the impact of Soviet techniques and rhetoric on pre-
sent infrastructural dynamics across the former Soviet Union. Allow me 
to exemplify some specific continuities of Soviet- style approaches towards 
infrastructural representation of urban development from my fieldwork: in 
today’s Baku, fences around construction sites and public banners depict 
digitally embellished, futurist renderings of areas under (re)construction. 
Such examples of ‘paper architecture’ (Grant, 2014) are characteristic of 
Baku in the present day, but were already excessively used by the Soviet state 
to craft people’s imaginations of the future. The term refers to ‘chronicles of 
the built and unbuilt that circulate in ways separate from actually existing 
structures’ (ibid., p. 507). It visualizes an idealized future that constantly 
lags behind its own promises. In 1972, the newspaper Baku printed a pic-
ture of the hotel ‘New Inturist’ (later Hotel Azerbaijan) under construc-
tion. The caption advertised the project as follows:  ‘No, not only in the 
mikroraions, not only there, where new housing estates arise, are high- rises 
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growing. But also in the very centre of our city. By changing the appearance 
of our streets, they give them a modern face’ (Baku, 1972, p. 3). Another 
newspaper article from 1986 praises Baku’s new master development plan 
until the year 2005. Entitled ‘A look into the future’, it shows drawings and 
miniatures of planned model sites, high- rises and residential estates. The 
visual impressions are complemented by phrases such as ‘a maximum of 
comfort for Bakuvians’, or ‘fast, convenient and comfortable transporta-
tion’. Furthermore, the whole city infrastructure is claimed to be further 
developed with ‘water, heating, light, canalization’, and, owing to ‘243,000 
convenient apartments’ being built, by the year 2000 every family will 
finally have obtained its own separate apartment (Baku, 1986). Here, paper 
architecture of planned developments acts as a mediator for what others 
have called ‘the enchantments of infrastructure’ (Harvey and Knox, 2012) – 
namely the capacity of infrastructure to generate ‘powerful affects of social 
promise’ (ibid., p. 525).
Hence, housing in the Soviet context constituted an essential part of the 
‘infrastructural whole’. Its public representation was actively promoted by 
constant references to future developments and utopian visions of society 
embedded in socialist ideology. The Soviet techniques of promoting modernity 
by applying infrastructural ideologies still have a great impact on contem-
porary politics of representation, thus marking a continuity that is important 
for understanding present urban dynamics in the region. Apart from such 
Soviet legacy in form, we can observe changes in the content of ideology and 
public meaning of ‘modernity’ and the future. As became clear in the BSE 
entry, socialist approaches to infrastructure were promoted as being funda-
mentally distinct from capitalist ones, mainly by the absence of public goods 
serving the interests of private enterprise, as well as by setting emphasis 
on its social motivation to provide equal access to infrastructure for urban 
inhabitants. Today, on the contrary, infrastructural developments are attached 
to local images of modernity that aim to construct a closeness to Western 
countries by a simultaneous distancing from the Soviet past. This marks a 
shift from inclusive to exclusive notions of infrastructure, contributing to fur-
ther socio- economic fragmentation and splintering of the urban fabric.
However, tensions between ideologically promoted official narratives 
and the everyday challenges experienced by many citizens were, to shifting 
degrees, also characteristic of the socialist period. Such ambiguities found 
expression in a widespread set of informal practices by families and kin 
groups in the housing sector, which will be discussed in the next section.
Experiencing infrastructure: housing, unequal infrastructure  
and informality
In different urban regions, most dwellers inhabit differing types of housing 
that are evaluated and hierarchized according to their quality, sanitary infra-
structure and access to infrastructural facilities. Housing to a large degree 
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expressed one’s socio- economic standing in Soviet society because it became 
strongly linked to certain occupational groups, organizations and enterprises, 
and represented their unequal access to urban infrastructure (Andrusz, 1984; 
Szelényi, 1983). This observation has led some sociologists to apply the con-
cept of ‘housing classes’ to the analysis and description of socialist housing 
systems in order to highlight the link between housing types and social strati-
fication (Hegedüs and Tosics, 1983). However, this static model suggests 
fixed social boundaries between professions without sufficiently considering 
hierarchical differences within them. More important for the present argu-
ment is that the concept neglects the more dynamic aspects of cooperation 
and social support for housing, especially the practice of hoarding by which 
extended families (whose individual members could be of different class 
background and occupation), to varying degrees, established kin or house 
networks extending across the city. Successful hoarding practices among kin 
groups, predominantly among brothers and their families, allowed for flex-
ible use of living space by means of mutual support. Moral expectations 
towards kin support with housing have continued after socialism (also 
leading to internal family conflicts if expectations are not met). The following 
example from the 1980s and 1990s is exemplary for similar mechanisms in 
Soviet times: Tofiq, his elder brother and parents were living in a two- room 
Khrushchevka apartment in Baku’s fourth mikroraion during the 1980s. In 
1994, Tofiq’s father, by then employed in a higher state position and later a 
professor of economy, was allocated an apartment in the city centre in a resi-
dential building constructed by the government for high state officials. There 
the family lived together with Tofiq’s uncle (Azerbaijani, әmi, i.e. father’s 
brother) who, because the family was originally from the countryside, was 
in need of accommodation in the capital. In the early 2000s, Tofiq’s uncle 
became a successful businessman, earning good money and employing many 
relatives from his extended family. He bought a plot of land in a prestigious 
Baku neighbourhood and built a three- storey house, which he committed 
to Tofiq’s father and his family. After the wedding of Tofiq’s elder brother 
in 2014, he and his wife moved into the downtown apartment where he 
had once lived together with the uncle. This example suggests linking the 
static concept of housing classes with the more dynamic notion of housing 
mobility. Compared with Soviet times, when the kind of officially allocated 
housing was primarily connected to professional status and workplace, this 
link between housing quality and occupational groups has weakened. But 
what has not weakened are people’s classifications of housing types and 
their different quality.
Regarding housing inequalities in the early Soviet period, scholars have 
pointed towards the ranking of urban dwellings ‘from the unheated wooden 
shack, through the barracks, the hostel, the shared flat in an old house, to the 
separate flat in an apartment block’ (Humphrey, 2005, p. 45). And still today, 
a further elaborate hierarchization of housing types among my interlocutors 
continues to shape the symbolic but also material value of different dwellings, 
 
 
 
 
62 S. Roth
62
because both dimensions are reflected in Baku’s contemporary housing 
market and the monetary value of different apartment types.5
Today’s heritage of Soviet mass housing consists of a variety of types 
colloquially known as Stalinka, Khrushchevka, Leningradskii- , Minskii- , 
Kievskii proekt and others.6 For instance, the solid stone walls, high ceilings, 
convenient layout and usually central location in contemporary Baku simi-
larly contribute to the high standing of the Stalinkas, as does the fact that 
such apartments were typically allocated to the political and intellectual elite 
of Soviet society. Khrushchevkas, in contrast, occupy the negative extreme 
in the housing hierarchy – an association that was quite different during the 
Khrushchev era itself, when such new housing projects provided many fam-
ilies with a separate apartment for the first time in their family history. Today, 
they are associated with low ceilings, small kitchens, small bathrooms, an 
inconvenient passage room and thin walls, all of which could be rapidly 
assembled from industrially produced panels of concrete.
In addition to their types, the contemporary market value of houses has 
also become dependent on the condition and quality of renovation (remont), 
which are advertised by a whole set of terms indicating a clear hierarchy in 
comfort and infrastructural quality, ranging from pod maiak (only carcass/ 
shell structure), khoroshii remont and superremont to otlichnyi remont and 
evroremont.7 If the apartment is located in a novostroika (new building), 
sometimes it says kupcha var! – meaning ‘with ownership documents’ and 
hence indicating that the object is registered and has obtained proper docu-
mentation. This is an important fact because many new high- rises lack such 
documentation for several reasons (see below). Finally, I want to emphasize 
that the older, badly maintained courtyard houses like those in the Yasamal 
district enjoy the poorest reputation among Baku’s population because of 
their dilapidated physical condition, the small size of the dwellings and their 
chaotic appearance (Figure 4.2).8
Hence, such neighbourhoods provide plenty of evidence for kin groups’ 
informal strategies to obtain a separate apartment or otherwise to increase 
their housing resources. In Soviet times, the Yasamal district was characterized 
by a high level of housing- related informal practices by citizens and muni-
cipal representatives alike, with the latter sometimes being inhabitants and 
part of the neighbourhood community themselves. Irregularities included the 
formation of waiting lists and the allocation of housing, false registrations, 
squatting, informal construction or preferential treatment by kin members 
employed in the local state’s housing administration (Ivanov and Sukhov, 
1971). Further challenges to the district’s housing system were linked to the 
relatively high level of privately owned dwellings in poor condition, which 
often lacked state support for maintenance and thus encouraged practices 
of informally obtaining construction materials or jumping the waiting lists 
for a separate apartment.
An internal enquiry by the Executive Power into the district’s infrastruc-
tural challenges from 1977 stated that there were more than 3,000 privately 
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owned single- and two- storey houses from ‘pre- revolutionary’9 times with 
deficient infrastructure, which housed 89,444 inhabitants (SAARBB, 1977). 
This accounted for about 30 inhabitants per house and points to the distorted 
character of official statistics compared with actual living conditions. 
Because several rooms and dwellings within the yard were predominantly 
inhabited by patrilineal extended families, this necessarily contributed to 
higher numbers. A further reason, though, was the widespread strategy of 
registering relatives who, de facto, were not living in the household (see 
also Morton, 1980, p. 242). Such phantom registrations were made in order 
to gain the residence permit (propiska), which was necessary for obtaining 
access to the district’s housing lists, social infrastructure and other services 
(for details on the Soviet propiska regime, see also Höjdestrand, 2009, 
pp. 20– 45; Matthews, 1993; Morton, 1980, pp. 237– 239). Soviet citizens 
frequently made informal registrations that were facilitated by the ‘grey 
area’ of Soviet housing law. The following quote by a former university pro-
fessor exemplifies this general practice applied by many citizens across the 
Soviet Union:
After the birth of my two daughters, five people were registered in our 
dwelling. When my elder daughter married and moved to her husband’s, 
Figure 4.2  First floor in a small courtyard in the Yasamal district with several 
partitioned rooms. The dwelling has been continuously extended and 
transformed and is inhabited by members of one extended family
Source: Sascha Roth
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I did not sign her off in order to increase my chances for receiving a 
bigger apartment. At the raiispolkom10 I explained that in our family we 
are five people and that the current three- room apartment is too small. 
I applied for a bigger one – that’s how we got it. This was common prac-
tice everywhere; Russian families acted like this as did the Azerbaijanis – 
everyone did it.
(Interview on 11 December 2013)
In the Yasamal district, the inflationary use of citizens’ informal propiska 
was well- known and often tolerated among housing officials. In one case, a 
family of 19 people (main tenant, father, mother, two brothers, a sister, two 
daughters- in- law, ten nephews and a son- in- law) were officially living in a 
single room of 10 square metres (SAARBB, 1978). In practice, though, it 
was apparent that these were phantom numbers. Another issue was illegal 
construction and acquisition of construction materials usually because of 
changes in household size. As one inhabitant explains:
When it was time for one of your sons to marry, you simply built 
another room within the courtyard where he could live with his wife. 
This continued in the next generation. And when there was no more 
space to add supplementary rooms this way, people just continued 
building a second floor on top. It happened only occasionally that there 
were problems with the housing authorities. Most issues could be solved 
with bribes to make authorities turn a blind eye to it.
(Interview on 28 August 2014)
In January 1971, the Bakgorispolkom started an initiative on the ‘prevention 
of unauthorized construction […] of living rooms, kitchens, shower rooms, 
garages, etc.’ – activities that ‘intensify with every year’ and because of which 
the district Soviets were instructed to investigate the issue. In 1973 alone, the 
local administration demolished 80 unauthorized houses, 39 garages and 80 
glazed balconies. Furthermore, ten drivers who were illegally transporting 
construction material were arrested, and so on (SAARBB, 1976).
In today’s Baku, we encounter similar obstacles in terms of proper docu-
mentation, informality and infrastructural provision (Valiyev, 2013). For 
instance, despite their illegal status, most informal dwellings in the city’s 
suburban settlements are well connected to transport, water or electri-
city. State and private companies rarely check the legal status of properties 
carefully, instead delivering the requested infrastructure, usually involving 
bribes. Things are further complicated because ‘In many cases, construction 
has some document issued by municipalities for a fee (very often bribes). 
However, subsequent elected municipality members very often do not 
recognize these documents as legal’ (Valiyev, 2014, p.  S49). As a lawyer 
dealing with property issues explained to me, there are even cases in which 
ownership documents have become subject to fraud by organized circles 
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of criminal businessmen, often real estate agents with close ties to district 
authorities. The lawyer described one case where an owner of an empty 
land plot in the urban periphery living abroad discovered a house being 
built and inhabited on that very plot. The buyer and alternative owner had 
himself ‘legally’ obtained the land from a real estate agency with all ‘proper’ 
documentation, a fact that created a complicated legal conflict about the 
property in question.
Other examples of informality in housing concern the ownership of 
apartments in newly built mass housing estates. Here, informal practices are 
often linked to the apartments’ connection to gas infrastructure and how it 
relates to the legal status of the property: only after a building’s gasification 
can ownership documents be applied for. For many citizens, it is desirable 
to buy an apartment without kupcha (see earlier), usually classified as pod 
maiak – consisting only of the building’s carcass and mains connections for 
water, gas and electricity – because they can save up to one third of the normal 
purchasing price. On the other hand, this involves a high level of risk because 
the completion of the building is often a matter of uncertainty. Buyers, who 
often have purchased the apartment before finalization of the construction 
process, will then carry out all the necessary work on the interior at their own 
risk. Many people then live in fully furnished and equipped apartments (or 
rent them out to others) but provide themselves with gas from a bottle. At the 
same time, the building’s entry, staircases and empty apartments demonstrate 
its unfinished character. The gasification of a novostroika is the last step in the 
construction process, upon which the State Agency for Control over the Safety 
of Construction within the Ministry of Emergency Situations determines 
that the construction complies with safety standards and may be inhabited. 
According to one of my interviewees, buildings only become gasified if at 
least 60 per cent of the apartments are inhabited. And getting the Ministry to 
approve the building’s safety standards often requires the payment of bribes.
Finally, it is worth returning to the still widespread informal sphere of resi-
dential registrations. Whereas people in Soviet times usually registered more 
people than actually inhabiting a dwelling, for reasons illustrated earlier, 
today the opposite seems to be the case. Many of my interlocutors are still 
registered at their previous address despite inhabiting another dwelling for 
more than a decade now. This is partly explained by the fact that people 
can save taxes and other expenditures for infrastructural provision that are 
calculated on the basis of the number of inhabitants in a dwelling. Hence, in 
contrast to Soviet times, the fewer people registered today, the more benefits 
there are for the dwellers.
Conclusion
My aim in this chapter was to examine the tensions between state politics 
of representation by means of infrastructure and ideology, and some of the 
challenges and informal strategies that people in the urban backstage have 
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been experiencing and applying in Soviet and post- Soviet Baku. Contrary to 
the majority of existing works on infrastructure, I advocate an approach that 
conceptualizes housing in post- socialist contexts as infrastructure and places 
it at the centre of enquiry. Additionally, from the viewpoint of citizens, I con-
sider housing an intimate infrastructure because it shapes a variety of social 
processes in the private lives and moral expectations of Azerbaijani citizens.
A great deal of this chapter discussed the impact of Soviet legacies on 
contemporary ideologies of representation and dynamics in housing. 
Whereas other authors have pointed to socialist legacies in the present 
urban boosterism (Koch and Valiyev, 2015), administrative structures and 
the problem of their diffuse responsibilities (Valiyev, 2013, p. 636), histor-
ical and ethnographic data on housing strategies from the viewpoint of 
citizens have been scarce. I have shown that, although many of the ideo-
logical underpinnings, official promotion of modernization and infrastruc-
tural developments in current Azerbaijan follow logics of Soviet governance, 
their very content demonstrate a significant shift owing to a different image 
of modernity for the independent Azerbaijani nation. The ‘paper architec-
ture’ of the past carried the meaning of modernization and infrastructure 
as a collective good for Bakuvians. In the paper architecture of the present, 
both spheres represent a modernity based on national pride, prosperity and 
autonomy by forging exclusive mega projects and housing estates that are 
increasingly disconnected from urban life as it unfolds behind the façades 
of privileged model sites. And we might add that, contrary to Soviet mass 
housing that was built for masses of people, the emphasis of ‘new mass 
housing’ being built in the city within the past decade refers to masses of 
buildings but not to masses of residents (which becomes evident when 
observing the high proportion of uninhabited residential buildings in Baku).
The second section of this chapter highlighted specific continuities in the 
way families engaged in the informal sector in order to improve their housing 
situation. On a structural level, I  have critically discussed the concept of 
housing classes in order to describe continuities in socio- spatial inequal-
ities, while at the same time emphasizing a more dynamic understanding of 
the concept by describing the practice of hoarding – kin groups’ collective 
engagement in increasing and utilizing their collective dwelling stock. Still, 
it is largely the type of housing obtained in Soviet times, its location, and 
differences in infrastructural quality that strongly influence citizens’ con-
temporary socio- economic standing as former housing classes are translated 
into dwellings’ monetary value in the era of market economy. Furthermore, 
although being embedded in a new political and economic context, housing 
after privatization maintained its crucial relevance as it became ‘the chief 
source of household wealth’ (Zavisca, 2012, p. 1) for the majority of urban 
residents. In light of the uncertain labour market and low salaries, housing 
constitutes the most important element of financial security for the future, 
and the major form of capital for new home- owners with which to prof-
itably engage in the housing market. In contrast, most owners of badly 
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maintained (pre)socialist dwellings, often being built or extended informally 
and thus lacking proper documentation, find themselves in a disadvantaged 
situation. Furthermore, because of corrupt officials and the merging of pol-
itical and economic power and interest with regard to urban development, 
many home- owners receive far too little compensation for their properties. 
Finally, the everyday relevance of informality in the Soviet housing frame-
work has remained a strong factor in shaping contemporary dynamics of 
housing development in Baku. But whereas mechanisms such as blat and 
kin support remain relevant in the present, recent developments increased 
the role of (monetary) corruption in the public sector (e.g. education, police, 
administrations). Today it is money that has become a scarce resource for 
many, while in Soviet times it was the scarcity of housing, among other con-
sumer goods, that led people to apply informal practices to influence and 
compensate for state mechanisms of resource allocation.
In general, I have aimed to show some repercussions of the Soviet housing 
regime on today’s processes of social and economic reconfigurations in the 
everyday lives of citizens. This is not to say that the informal practices or 
tensions between ideological representation and everyday life described in 
this chapter are rooted in socialism. But it is the historical experience of 
socialist housing at large, its ideological and infrastructural emphasis as 
well as the peculiarities in housing policies and administration that still 
have great influence in the post- socialist era. The Yasamal neighbourhoods 
discussed here well illustrate such continuities within the contemporary 
urban context. In early summer 2014, roughly one year before Baku was to 
host the first ‘European Olympic Games’, the city’s Executive Power began 
the long- prepared demolition of one such neighbourhood called Sovetski, 
affecting an area of 50 ha that was home to 50,000– 60,000 people (Alibayli 
and Mahmudbeyli, 2014). Many of the inhabitants I  talked to expressed 
their nostalgic memory of Soviet times when dwellers were compensated 
with new apartments. At present, however, they have received financial com-
pensation of roughly one third the usual square metre value in this very 
central area  – not enough even to obtain a dwelling in the outskirts for 
most. Hence, most inhabitants are experiencing a process of unbundling 
infrastructure that characterizes the global trend of splintering urbanism, 
and which many Bakuvians interpret in relation to nostalgic memories of 
the Soviet welfare state.
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Notes
 1 The Flame Towers are three skyscrapers containing exclusive apartments, a 5- 
star hotel and office blocks. They have become the modern brand of the city, 
dominating the central skyline, and shall represent Azerbaijan architecturally as 
the historical ‘Land of Fire’.
 2 My use of the terms ‘(post)socialist’ and ‘(post)Soviet’ in this chapter require 
some brief explanation. Both versions refer to a geographical space, a historical 
era, a socio- political regime or an ideology. Although I use both forms, for the 
following reasons, I apply (post)Soviet more frequently. First, the Caucasus had 
long been a part of Tsarist Russia and later of the Soviet Union. Hence, in the 
present context, it is more accurate to speak of (post)Soviet. Socialism in Central 
Eastern Europe, for instance, was different from Soviet socialism, with the latter 
having been established much earlier and also emerging from a distinctively 
different empire. Second, the terms ‘socialist’ or ‘socialism’ summarize political 
ideologies, visions and imaginations of society based on Marxist principles, the 
practical implementations and outcomes of which brought forth different real-
ities of socialism.
 3 The preface of the Soviet Housing Codex stated that ‘Soviet housing legislation 
is designed to promote the right of citizens to housing, effective use and protec-
tion of the housing stock’. According to Article 44 of the Soviet Constitution 
from 1977, ‘Citizens of the USSR have the right to housing’ that is ‘ensured by 
the development and upkeep of state and socially- owned housing; by assistance 
for co- operative and individual house building [and] by fair distribution, under 
public control […]’.
 4 The anthropologist Katherine Verdery (1996, p. 21) describes the widespread 
practice of ‘hoarding’ productive resources like budgets and materials in socialist 
economies. Such strategies allowed firms to save resources for the next produc-
tion cycle, or for use as a means of exchange for needed goods with others. 
Although she talks about ‘hoarding’ on a different level, the same logic applies 
to families and their housing strategies. For families, housing as a collective 
resource of kin groups was hoarded for the next generation.
 5 Housing journals, newspaper articles and advertisements, as well as interviews 
with and participant observation among local real estate agents, provided an 
important source for understanding local preferences and ascriptions to different 
housing types.
 6 Those terms are still widely used across the former Soviet republics and refer to 
certain types of residential buildings having been constructed during the period 
of Stalin (Stalinka) or Khrushchev (Khrushchevka). Other, mostly later, types 
are named after the cities in which they were first projected, such as Leningrad, 
Minsk or Kiev.
 7 The Russian term ‘maiak’ literally means ‘lighthouse’. Among construction 
workers it denotes ‘plaster profiles’ – that is, an accessory used for achieving 
an even plastering of interior walls. The types of remont that follow reflect 
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increasing levels of comfort, ranging from ‘good’, ‘super’ to ‘excellent’ renova-
tion. Finally, ‘evroremont’ suggests European materials and the finest quality 
standards.
 8 The same term for courtyard house (hәyәt evi) is applied to the more spacious 
single or multi- family houses by rural migrants and middle- class families in the 
suburban peripheries as well as to the traditional rural housing architecture.
 9 ‘Pre- revolutionary’ is the expression used in the archival documents I  have 
worked with. They refer to the time prior to 1920 when the Soviets took power 
over Azerbaijan.
 10 The raiispolkom (raionnyi ispolnitel’nyi komitet) describes each district’s execu-
tive power. Each of those is subordinated to the Bakgorispolkom (Bakinskii 
gorodskoi ispolnitel’nyi komitet) – the central executive power of Baku city.
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5  Changing times, persistent 
inequalities?
Patterns of housing infrastructure 
development in the South Caucasus
Joseph Salukvadze and David Sichinava
Introduction
Yerevan and Tbilisi – the capital cities of the two former Soviet republics of 
Armenia and Georgia in the South Caucasus – enjoyed spectacular popula-
tion and territorial growth during the 70 years of Soviet power. The popu-
lation of Yerevan grew from fewer than 50,000 in the early 1920s to more 
than 1.1 million in the late 1980s, amounting to more than half the total 
urban population of the republic, while Tbilisi’s population in the same 
period increased from about 200,000 to more than 1.2 million (more than 
40 per cent of the urban population of Georgia). As in many large Soviet 
cities, housing development has been a main driver for spatial growth, espe-
cially since the 1960s, when the mass housing programmes began in the 
main cities all over the Soviet Union to overcome the scarcity of housing 
stock caused by rapid population and economic growth.
The provision of accessible and decent living conditions to everyone was 
one of the communist mantras. In this regard, housing was an essential and 
integral part of the basic public infrastructural complex, interlinked with 
many other infrastructural components, both social and technical, such as 
schools and kindergartens, roads, and green areas on the one hand, and elec-
tricity, sewage, water and gas networks on the other. Remarkably, the pro-
vision and maintenance of housing were performed by the state agency in 
a way quite similar to other infrastructure. We are therefore inclined in this 
chapter to consider housing itself as an infrastructure consisting of multiple 
internal (living spaces, utilities) and external (courtyards, roads, greenery) 
components. Although the above- mentioned housing concept  – housing 
for everyone – was challenged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
resulted in marketization of the housing supply, it did not completely alter 
the existing overall picture but added new features to housing development 
and distribution. These are reasons why we argue that the consideration of 
housing as infrastructure is sufficiently justified and rightful.
The link between inequality and the availability of and access to infra-
structure in general has been long attested (most famously in Graham 
and Marvin, 2001). As it has been argued, the solutions to infrastructural 
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problems most benefit those with better access to resources, while the poor 
are affected most negatively (Silver, 2015). In this chapter, we explore the 
nexus between housing as an infrastructure (a complex set of technical util-
ities, and social and environmental services within individual houses and 
their close surroundings) and social inequality – that is, the differentiated 
access to resources based on class and/ or other social markers. Considering 
these, we investigate the cases of Tbilisi and Yerevan, specifically focusing on 
the mass housing constructed and allocated between 1950 and 1990. Two 
perspectives guide our analysis:
 (a) How and to what extent has the production of housing infrastructure – 
that is, its planning, construction, and allocation, influenced urban 
socio- spatial inequalities when embedded within the Soviet housing 
system and private housing market respectively?
 (b) How and to what extent do these social inequalities affect housing 
infrastructures, their maintenance and provision?
Our empirical analysis is based on 71 carefully administered interviews, 
39 of which come from Yerevan and 32 from Tbilisi. The interviews were 
conducted in a convenient environment for the respondents, either at their 
homes or in the courtyards of the residential apartments. The interviews, 
conducted as semi- structured discussions, explored topics such as the history 
of their moving to the residence, their attitudes towards the changing phys-
ical and social environment in the neighbourhood, and patterns of residen-
tial mobility. The interviews took place in the spring and summer of 2015.
First, we review relevant literature on infrastructures with specific focus 
on housing as infrastructure. Additionally, we present several empirical and 
theoretical propositions on inequality during socialism and afterwards. We 
then explore the peculiarities and the trajectories of urban infrastructural 
development in Tbilisi and Yerevan. Based on the materials from in- depth 
interviews, we analyse perceptions of the physical changes to housing infra-
structure and the differentiated practices of infrastructure maintenance, 
with a specific focus on inequality. Finally, we discuss the findings through 
the lens of relevant theoretical concepts.
Housing as infrastructure
Contemporary debates on urban infrastructure often treat it as embedded into 
the urban fabric and only visible upon its breakdown (Graham and Marvin, 
2001; Star, 1999; Star and Ruhleder, 1996). Infrastructural disruptions alle-
viate underlying inequalities by providing a way for the commodification of 
infrastructure and its provision (Graham, 2010, McFarlane, 2010). On these 
occasions, as Larkin (2013, p. 336) argues, infrastructures (and infrastruc-
tural projects) ‘move from unseen’, thus asserting their visibility and sym-
bolic meaning (Amin, 2014). Tonkiss (2014, p. 362) suggests considering 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 J. Salukvadze and D. Sichinava
74
infrastructures as relational and ecological, because both these concepts 
shape the relationships between humans and material things, and also deter-
mine the nature of the environment where these relationships occur.
The Marxian definition of infrastructure presents it as the basic resource 
for a functioning society. As Humphrey (2003, p.  92) argues, infrastruc-
ture in the Soviet Union, especially in the first years of its existence, was 
perceived as ‘the economic basis’ for societal reproduction. In the Soviet 
Union, apart from the normative meaning, infrastructure symbolized how 
governmentality was exercised (Larkin, 2013). Infrastructure was taken for 
granted in the Soviet Union, and it was assumed that it would be provided 
even in places that had few if any conditions for living, even at the expense 
of vast capital investments (Humphrey, 2003, p. 93). Indeed, the right to 
housing was guaranteed by the constitution of the Soviet Union (e.g. in art-
icle 44 of the 1977 USSR constitution).
The atomized concept of ‘home’ has been an important focus of thought 
for various schools of Anglo- American geography and environmental psych-
ology (Moore, 2000). These works explored the emotional attachment to 
home as a place (Lewicka, 2011; Manzo, 2003; Rakoff, 1977). It needn’t be 
said that infrastructures similar to housing are experienced and ‘woven into 
the fabric of society’ (Carse, 2016, p. 35), and moreover reflect the dom-
inant political narratives of progress and modernization articulated by the 
ruling classes (discussed, for example, in Collier, 2011; Graham and Marvin, 
2001; Harvey and Knox, 2012). Indeed, the symbolic meaning of infra-
structure (elaborated in this volume by Tuvikene, Sgibnev and Neugebauer, 
Chapter 1), in the Soviet Union especially, as readily and universally access-
ible housing, promised social justice and overall prosperity for all urban 
dwellers (e.g. in Smith, 1996; Sỳkora, 2009), and was thought to antici-
pate the construction of a new society (Humphrey, 2005). Another symbolic 
meaning of housing as an infrastructure was the metaphor that proposed 
the ‘nation’ as the house for the multi- ethnic society, where each people 
possessed its own apartment (e.g. in Slezkine, 1994).
Soviet- era housing, despite being projected as egalitarian, was neither 
‘created equally’ nor ‘universally accessible’ (Alexeev, 1988b). The dire state 
of housing provision in the country (Gerasimova, 1998) necessitated large- 
scale mass housing construction programmes. The Soviet urban planning 
school invented a basic planning unit for several thousand inhabitants, the 
microrayon (Herman, 1971; Hess, 2017). This represented the essential 
building blocks for socialist cityscape assemblages and contained bundled 
(see also Graham and Marvin, 2001) infrastructures such as blocks of flats, 
roads, electricity grids, water, heat and gas supply, schools, kindergartens, 
and grocery shops.
Thus, although an overall provision of utilities, public open spaces, social 
facilities and other infrastructure was considered to be similar and standard- 
based, certain disparities have been observed from district to district in terms 
of better/ worse geographic location of housing units and residential estates, 
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quality and quantity of living spaces, design and arrangement of public 
spaces and, sometimes, provision of basic utilities and communal services 
(Gentile and Sjöberg, 2010). Such inequality had a strong impact on initial 
allocation and further redistribution of housing among different population 
groups according to their social, ethnic, and professional belonging, as well 
as the ability to negotiate with actors of the decision- making and housing 
distribution systems.
Perennial crisis in the Soviet housing construction sector (Morton, 1979) 
created fertile ground for creation of inequalities in a seemingly egalitarian 
society. Housing construction and allocation in the Soviet Union reflected 
both formal (Gentile and Sjöberg, 2006) and informal (Morton, 1980) 
power geometries. Entities operating in the priority sectors of the national 
economy (Szelenyi, 1987), for example, the military defence sector (Gentile 
and Sjöberg, 2010), and powerful state establishments, such as law enforce-
ment agencies and Communist Party institutions (Gentile and Sjöberg, 2010; 
Smith, 1996), were able to secure quality housing through their formally 
assigned power resources. But because the Soviet Union also possessed an 
all- embracing second economy (Kim, 2003; O’Hearn, 1980), the institu-
tion of informal networks of loyalty, so- called blat1 (Ledeneva, 1998), was 
a powerful source of ‘housing manipulations’ as well (Morton, 1980). The 
socio- spatial pattern of housing provision in the cities was even further 
complicated by ethnic differences (Gentile and Tammaru, 2006; Hess et al., 
2012; Sỳkora and Bouzarovski, 2012).
The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought immense changes, including 
to infrastructure. The economies of the former Soviet republics shrank enor-
mously. The newly ‘unblackboxed’ (Graham, 2000) water, electricity, and 
heating infrastructures pushed the urbanites to ‘micrological’ (Collier and 
Way, 2004, p. 267) interventions: in the 2003 film documentary, Power trip, 
directed by Paul Devlin, illegal individual electricity wires and water pipes 
represented practices of coping with dilapidation of infrastructure caused by 
a lack of maintenance.
Neoliberal economic policies, especially the overarching privatiza-
tion of the housing stock, exacerbated socio- spatial inequalities in urban 
space. The privatization of the formerly state- owned housing stock and the 
shortage of affordable housing in post- socialist cities helped to maintain 
relatively low residential mobility, offering certain housing options to the 
socially weak but often trapping average- income households and enabling 
only the most well- off to choose and move freely (Gentile and Marcińczak, 
2014; Neugebauer and Kovacs, 2015; Ruoppila and Kährik, 2003). These 
market conditions seemingly ‘froze’ the existing urban social geographies 
(Sỳkora and Bouzarovski, 2012) and the socialist pattern of bundled 
infrastructures:  many residents are still living in their centrally planned 
and more or less well infrastructured microrayons. However, the neoliberal 
turn with its reforms towards privatization and individualization means the 
unbundling of housing as infrastructure and splintering urbanism. This we 
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will discuss when looking at new in- fill housing construction in Tbilisi and 
Yerevan and at infrastructural developments in the Soviet microrayons.
Setting the context: shared trajectories of urban development
The contemporary physical and social fabrics of Tbilisi and Yerevan have 
been shaped by the events that took place after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and were contained in the Soviet- era socio- demographic, infrastruc-
tural and, to a certain extent, institutional conditions. The bulk of urban 
infrastructure, while a Soviet relic, is widely utilized. Only about 10 per 
cent of households in the capital cities of Armenia and Georgia reside 
in housing estates constructed after independence (Salukvadze, 2016). 
During the Soviet period, the population of Yerevan increased eighteenfold 
while the population of Tbilisi grew fivefold. The two cities housed from 
one fifth to one quarter of the population of their respective republics 
and played an oversized role in national economics (Gachechiladze 
et al., 1984). Such an explosion of population and industries yielded the 
physical expansion of the two cities to the outskirts. The population of 
Tbilisi mainly grew thanks to ethnic Georgians moving from other parts 
of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), while Yerevan absorbed 
newcomers from both the Armenian SSR proper and from other parts of 
the Caucasus, as well as via repatriates from the Middle East and Western 
Europe (Pattie, 2004).
Master plans played the most crucial role in shaping the physical 
characteristics of the city because they provided an outline for development 
usually 30 years ahead (Herman, 1971; Salukvadze et al., 2010). Such regu-
latory documents were developed three times for Tbilisi and four times for 
Yerevan.2 Among others, general plans provided a blueprint for housing 
provision, which with very few exceptions3 was planned, administered, 
and constructed by state institutions. In Tbilisi, new housing microrayons 
stretched along the Kura river, since the pre- revolutionary city core had 
already been developed. Unlike Tbilisi, Yerevan possessed negligible pre- 
Soviet urban infrastructure. The Armenian capital was built almost from 
scratch around a small historical core.
The urgent need for mass housing outweighed considerations of quality, 
and housing construction and allocation therefore did not always comply 
with rules of quality or of equality (Alexeev, 1988a; Morton, 1979). 
Therefore, the scarcity of goods and the inefficiency of allocation were 
countered with a widespread second economy (Mars and Altman, 1983; 
Scott, 2016), which according to various estimations (e.g. by Kim, 2003; 
Kim and Shida, 2014) accounted for about 15– 20 per cent of the national 
economy of the Armenian SSR, and for 27– 33 per cent of the Georgian SSR. 
Although illegal housing markets existed almost everywhere in the Soviet 
Union (Katsenelinboigen, 1977), and ‘housing manipulations’  – that is, 
the exploitation of one’s power in order to receive quality housing on time 
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(Marcińczak et al., 2013) – were especially widespread in the republics of 
the South Caucasus (Morton, 1980).
Housing manipulations in the South Caucasus capital cities can be 
attested to in the archival documents recording patterns of housing con-
struction. On average, apartments constructed in Tbilisi and Yerevan 
between 1950 and 1990 were about 37 square metres in size. However, 
the floor space fluctuated greatly across the industries and institutions 
doing the construction. The average floor space of an apartment in a house 
constructed through the Georgian Communist Party was about 53 square 
metres, followed by the planning committees of Georgia (50 square metres) 
and Tbilisi communal services (48 square metres). The disparity was less 
pronounced in Yerevan, where the most privileged sectors of the economy 
(machinery building, science and education, and communications) would be 
allocated 40- square- metre apartments on average.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union, which brought capitalism with all its 
perils to the South Caucasus, created the distinctive context (Golubchikov 
et al., 2014) in which the two cities are now operating. Populations expelled 
as the result of ethnic conflicts in the former autonomous regions of 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno- Karabakh, as well as in Azerbaijan, 
created waves of internally displaced populations and refugees  – mainly 
ethnic Armenians and Georgians who sought shelter in the capital cities. The 
displaced population was mainly housed in former government buildings 
such as hotels, university lodgings, and former scientific and educational 
institutions (Salukvadze et  al., 2013). The governments in both countries 
employed an exclusively neoliberal ‘developmental’ approach to the ‘tem-
porary integration’ of the new populations into the mainstream societies, 
which also included the privatization of the refugee camps (Manning, 2009). 
Armenia’s housing crisis and the low quality of existing stock were also 
exacerbated by the devastating earthquake of 1988, which caused signifi-
cant forced displacement (Sargsyan, 2013).
The rapid privatization of the housing stock, which was undertaken in 
Georgia in 1991 and in Armenia in 1993, not only created a new class of 
‘poor home- owners’ (Van Assche and Salukvadze, 2012) but also froze the 
existing socio- spatial disparities that now imbue the contemporary unequal 
economic geographies of the two cities. Privatization also meant that market 
forces would now regulate both the demand and supply side of housing con-
struction, maintenance, and allocation. The state withdrew from the pro-
vision of most social security (Collier and Way, 2004), including housing, 
and triggered the emergence of various types of new ‘urbanisms’, including 
apartment building extensions and illegal land squatting (Bouzarovski et al., 
2011; Stephens, 2005).
The economies of the two republics suffered enormously as a result of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. For example, between 1990 and 1994, the 
economy of Armenia cumulatively declined by 61 per cent while Georgia’s 
shrank by 85 per cent relative to 1990 (Sachs et al., 1995). On top of that, 
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Armenia was involved in a violent armed conflict with Azerbaijan over the 
Nagorno- Karabakh province (De Waal, 2013), which led to an economic 
blockade from Azerbaijan and Turkey in the mid- 1990s and chronic electri-
city blackouts referred to as the ‘Dark Years’ (Ter- Ghazaryan, 2013).
Post- Soviet transition in Yerevan and Tbilisi took place against the back-
drop of harsh political instability, economic decline, disruption of institutions, 
and population out- migration, during which both cities lost up to 200,000 
inhabitants each. In the meantime, both Yerevan and Tbilisi experienced dra-
matic urban transformation driven by the introduction of radical neoliberal 
approaches, which also brought immense changes to housing development. 
Foremost, overwhelming privatization of dwellings took place after which, 
by the 1990s, Armenia and Georgia, and their respective capital cities, had 
already became the world leaders in housing privatization, consequently 
reaching 96 and 95 per cent of their housing stock respectively (UNECE, 
2004; von Schweinichen, 2007). This was followed by the privatization of 
most utility service provisions and the destatization of construction business 
and building maintenance. The production of new housing occurred only on 
a commercial basis, often under conditions of ignorance of spatial planning 
and deregulation of building norms and rules. All these changes affected 
patterns of mobility and residential perceptions and attitudes towards 
housing and (housing) infrastructure (Herfert et al., 2013). They resulted in 
a significant transformation of housing units and housing landscapes on the 
one hand, and caused the social reconfiguration of residential districts and 
inflamed existing socio- spatial inequalities on the other.
Economic decline led to huge waves of out- migration from the cap-
ital cities, compensated by the influx of internal migrants. Needless to say, 
the remittances from the working migrants – and in the case of Yerevan, 
from the powerful Armenian diaspora  – significantly contributed to the 
local housing markets (and to the inequalities). Typically, in both cities, 
households receiving remittances were more likely to invest the funds in 
improving living conditions (Manookian and Tolosa, 2011), while real 
estate developers especially targeted Georgians (and Armenians) living 
abroad with luxury, newly built high- rise apartments (Gentile et al., 2015; 
Salukvadze, 2016). The diaspora contributed greatly to the physical infra-
structure of Yerevan by investing in luxury condos and gated communities 
(Petrosyan, 2016; Topalian and Petrosyan, 2015).
Although the roads of political development in the two countries diverged 
from the beginning of the 2000s, the characteristics of their economic pol-
icies did not differ much. While, after the infamous Rose Revolution, the 
Georgian government declared its alignment to Western- style democracy and 
announced its integration into European and Euro- Atlantic organizations 
as ultimate goals (De Waal, 2011), Armenia never did so. Governments in 
Armenia and Georgia to varying extents embraced a neoliberal economic 
model (Gugushvili, 2016; Ishkanian, 2014). The economic boom in the early 
and mid- 2000s, and the accompanying process of planning deregulation, 
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effectively created a new player on the housing market. Small development/ 
investment agencies started in- fill constructions in the central areas of the two 
cities (Van Assche and Salukvadze, 2012; Van Assche et al., 2012; Salukvadze 
and Golubchikov, 2016). The boom cycle was disrupted by the economic 
crisis of 2008. However, major flagship urban development projects, such as 
the Northern Avenue in Yerevan, soon began. New housing developments 
are currently almost completely conducted by the private sector (Sargsyan, 
2013). Contrary to the previously embraced approach of pre- planned 
microrayons, housing is now constructed as in- fills in areas considered to be 
prestigious (Jones Lang LaSalle, 2012). Often, newly constructed housing 
is marketed in the shell- and- core form, thus allowing relatively low prices 
with a corresponding low quality of delivery. The lack of prior neighbour-
hood planning and relatively flexible construction requirements ensures 
that, for non- premium buyers, access to infrastructural amenities is limited. 
This neoliberal approach of producing and selling shell- and- core houses of 
unbundled infrastructural services thus contrasts with the former reality of 
bundled infrastructural provision in the Soviet microrayons.
Access to housing and inequality
The housing allocation system of the Soviet Union primarily declared, and in 
general realized, egalitarian access to the infrastructural services of housing. 
Still, as mentioned earlier, it also showed differentiated access to resources 
determined by the workplace, blat, or necessity (Gentile and Sjöberg, 2010). 
The inequality was reflected not only by the location of the housing and 
the state of the neighbourhood but also by the quality of infrastructural 
amenities that were present in the apartments. Our interlocutors reported 
on malpractices during the housing construction and allocation process 
that were expressed in the exploitation of one’s workplace or status. To the 
bulk of the interviewees, the allocation of housing encapsulated a simple but 
prolonged procedure. Depending on the type of housing they were applying 
for, the queue would last for several years and the only way out of the situ-
ation was either patience, a lucky break, or manipulation.
Skipping the queue was one of the most widespread types of manipula-
tion. The geographic differentiation in terms of housing has been attested to 
in several studies (e.g. Gentile and Sjöberg, 2006, 2010). These ‘intra- urban 
landscapes of priorities’ were formed through a complex interplay between 
powerful entities and individuals, thus creating pockets of privileged 
populations. Our informants from the Kentron district in Yerevan, and the 
Vake and Saburtalo neighbourhoods of Tbilisi, worked in prestigious jobs 
that ensured better housing in a better location. Getting an apartment in a 
non- prestigious area, by contrast, did not require housing manipulations.
Indeed, the ‘prestigiousness’ of a particular neighbourhood was not 
defined only by the presence of a particular infrastructure or the quality of 
housing. The social composition of the neighbourhood or the apartment was 
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also a factor. Our interlocutor from Tbilisi, the spouse of an engineer, recalled 
her disappointment when their household was assigned an apartment in the 
peripheral Navtlughi neighbourhood, while all other fellow engineers were 
allocated apartments in the more central Saburtalo area:
Once, [at a party at another engineer’s home] I  complained with 
my fellow colleagues how I  was feeling left out [from the others]. 
I mentioned that I had an apartment in Navtlughi [the periphery], and 
then I was promised that they would give me an apartment on Pavlov 
Street [located in the Saburtalo neighbourhood]…Finally we were 
assigned an apartment – although it had a lower ceiling, it was [in a 
better location] on Pavlov Street!
Not only well- connected and privileged residents were concentrated geo-
graphically. Large enterprises constructed and allocated apartments to 
their workers in a spatially concentrated way. Residents often shared the 
same workplace or job type, at least at the apartment level: ‘Our apartment 
block was constructed [by the Factory after 26 Commissars of Baku]. Two 
other neighbouring apartments including one up on the hill were also 
commissioned by the same factory’ (Tbilisi, respondent from Didube). Still, 
even though the Soviet model of social welfare was a ‘deficit model’ and 
regulated people’s access to housing differently, it generally ensured more 
or less de- commodified access to social services (Collier and Way, 2004) 
and housing- related infrastructures. The provision of shelter, regardless of 
its quality, and relatively uninterrupted connections with hot water, gas, and 
electricity were mentioned by the respondents as sources of relative stability 
in their lives.
This overall feeling was contrasted by developments following the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union when the respective republics found distinctive 
ways of maintaining or completely replacing the existing modes of wel-
fare provision by simply dismantling the elements of the welfare state and 
scrapping social expenditures (Pascall and Manning, 2000). Both Armenia 
and Georgia were strongly advised by international monetary institutions 
to follow closely the principles outlined in the Washington Consensus by 
further reducing government spending on social security services (Deacon, 
2000), which indirectly contributed to the depletion of urban infrastructure.
Housing and infrastructural inequality
As attested by Gentile and Sjöberg (2006), residential blocks and microrayons 
commissioned by ‘less- prioritized enterprises’ were worse equipped with 
communal infrastructure. This was true for the South Caucasus as well, 
although problems with infrastructure were especially vivid in the peripheral 
neighbourhoods. In Tbilisi and Yerevan, after moving to new apartments, 
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residents often had to conduct basic repairs and maintenance themselves. 
Memoirs of moving to housing units not supplied with basic infrastruc-
tural connections are still striking. The most conspicuous examples come 
from the informants who moved to newly built bedroom neighbourhoods 
of Yerevan in the 1970s and 1980s: ‘People would lay cables together, reno-
vate walls (Yerevan, Avan)’; ‘When I moved to this neighbourhood, there 
were no shops or transportation, […] only mud and dust…I was so terrified’ 
(Yerevan, Malatia- Sebastia).
The inequalities were indeed exacerbated by the differentiated access to 
infrastructure and services, especially after the demise of the Soviet Union. 
Both cities privatized their energy and water supplies, which are currently 
owned or operated by large multinational corporations. The financialization 
of the utility sector, which turned from a service provider into a profit- 
making business, put an additional burden on the poorest citizens: ‘Today 
people would not be able to earn as much as they need to afford those [com-
munal] fees’ (Yerevan, Malatia- Sebastia). Water outages and timetables for 
water supply, as well as electricity blackouts are still present in Yerevan and 
to a lesser extent in Tbilisi, further exacerbating insecurity and provoking 
feelings of nostalgia for the Soviet Union: ‘Well, [in Soviet times] if some-
thing happened [with gas or electricity, the authorities] would announce it 
on TV and then come and repair it, if necessary’ (Yerevan, Kentron). Apart 
from disruptions, unpaid utility fees also mean disconnection from the infra-
structural networks, be it electricity, gas, or water:  ‘It has happened that 
I would pay the last money I had [to pay utilities] and stay without money. 
I have to do it, as you can’t sit without gas, without electricity in winter.’ 
(Tbilisi, Mukhiani).
Apart from the utilities, the transition also brought the withdrawal of the 
state from the repair and maintenance sector of housing itself. Almost all 
informants from both cities stated that at a certain point they had renovated 
their private apartments themselves. However, they did not mention a single 
initiative of self- organization aimed at solving communal problems by their 
own means. The involvement of the municipality is limited to participation in 
state- initiated programmes of infrastructure repair. Such ignorance regarding 
the public space on the part of the municipality could be attributed to the 
overwhelming privatization of the housing stock at the beginning of the 
1990s. Although privatization has assigned some obligations for looking after 
common spaces, as becomes clear from the interviews, the privatization of 
housing stock did not incentivize either private involvement or self- initiatives 
of the municipalities for the maintenance of shared spaces. Privatization and 
individualization have triggered fragmentation instead of local initiatives for 
cooperative infrastructure management. The national state still remains the 
principal actor in infrastructure maintenance and development.
So, with regard to the current physical state of neighbourhoods and 
shared infrastructures, the respondents mention that maintenance activities 
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are mostly initiated by the national state. The two cities utilize different 
models of public- private partnership for general maintenance. In Yerevan, 
special municipal entities (‘Zheks’) are responsible for maintenance, while 
in Tbilisi it is conducted through the Homeowners’ Associations (HOAs) in 
partnership with the City Hall and district gamgeobas4 (Salukvadze, 2016). 
However, these entities are not always helpful: the only way of solving the 
problem is to address the responsible authorities, which could drag the 
informants into a Kafkaesque bureaucratic trap. Now, the authorities in 
Yerevan ‘are aware of [the issue], they are informed, they know, however, the 
issue has not been solved yet’ (Yerevan, Nor- Nork). Concerning Tbilisi, the 
respondents are generally satisfied with the work of communal services and 
the responsiveness of city authorities when it comes to the repair of ageing 
infrastructure. However, the programmes imply the financial participation 
of the residents for funding repairs.
Conclusion
As has been argued, Soviet infrastructure was meant to embody the 
Marxist political project (Humphrey, 2005; Larkin, 2013). Overall, it 
created a safety network for most of the population in the manner of an 
‘authoritarian welfare state’ (Collier and Way, 2004). Simultaneously, as 
we show, housing infrastructure in the Soviet Union also encapsulated the 
differentiated treatment of certain populations, thus epitomizing inequal-
ities still persistent in post- Soviet society. Apart from materialities, the 
quality of housing infrastructure was also defined by its social content – 
that is, with the possibility of connecting and living with representatives of 
similar occupational classes.
On the other hand, McFarlane’s (2010) other argument on the persistence 
and reproduction of inequality through infrastructures is compelling in the 
context of the South Caucasus. The effects of this infrastructural depletion 
were overarching, and also exposed hidden inequalities and brought them 
to the surface. After the dissolution of the Soviet system, those with better 
access to resources were quick to recover, while the poor, the less connected, 
and those at the urban fringes, still struggle.
The persistent nature of Soviet urban inequalities was exacerbated by the 
perils of the Washington Consensus, which became a dreadful experience for 
the urban poor of Tbilisi and Yerevan. In the subsequent decades after the 
Soviet Union, Armenia and Georgia enacted far- reaching liberal reforms and 
reduced social expenses with the blessings of the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. The total privatization of housing stock, market-
ization of its provision, and the financialization of the communal sector fur-
ther exacerbated already existing inequalities that were put in place during 
Soviet socialism and before.
And finally, as Graham (2010) suggests, the politics of infrastructure dom-
inate urban political life. In the case of contemporary Tbilisi and Yerevan, 
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the circulation of neoliberal political regimes and rotating election cycles 
are intimately linked with the appearance of road construction works, as 
bitterly described by our interlocutor from the ‘peripheral’ Malatia- Sebastia 
neighbourhood of the Armenian capital: ‘When elections come, the asphalt 
patches pop up…after all, [the quality of the patches is] normal and they’ll 
stay there for two or three more years’ (Yerevan, Malatia- Sebastia).
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Notes
 1 Alena Ledeneva (1998) gives by far the most comprehensive definition of ‘blat’: ‘…
the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods and services 
in short supply and to find a way around formal procedures’.
 2 Respectively, in 1934, 1955 and 1970 for Tbilisi (Van Assche et al., 2012), and 
1924, 1935, 1951 and 1970 for Yerevan (Mamyan, 2005).
 3 For example, through cooperative housing or illegal squatting of urban land 
(Darjania, 2015).
 4 Gamgeoba – a municipal government of administrative districts in Tbilisi, headed 
by a manager appointed by the mayor.
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6  Post- Soviet ‘nuclear’ towns as  
multi- scalar infrastructures
Relating sovereignty and urbanity 
through the perspective of Visaginas
Siarhei Liubimau
Introduction
In this chapter, I  argue that focusing on the Soviet nuclear industry from 
a Lithuanian perspective opens a fruitful angle toward nuancing existing 
operationalizations of ‘post- socialist’ in relation to the realities of urban 
infrastructural transformation after the USSR. In order to do this, I unpack 
three aspects of a specific mode of urbanization inherent to the Soviet nuclear 
industry that are helpful in defining the significance of the infrastructural 
dimension of both Soviet and post- Soviet state- society relations. These aspects 
are the ‘nuclear’ as a Cold War phenomenon, the ‘nuclear’ as an imperial phe-
nomenon and the ‘nuclear’ as an exclusive Soviet welfare phenomenon. By 
contrasting these three aspects of the ‘nuclear’ and by grounding them in the 
particularities of the Lithuanian ‘nuclear’ town of Visaginas, I propose to dis-
cuss empirical realms and conceptual instruments that make it possible to look 
at the town’s path after 1991 from the perspective of its future rather than 
of its past. Additionally, my modest expectation is that approaching a par-
ticular urban unit through this threefold analytical construct will enrich and 
supplement already existing influential conceptualizations of post- socialism 
in urban terms as a market- driven process of dis- embedding infrastructures 
and places from the dominance of modernist, centralized top- down planning 
(Collier, 2011; Sykora and Bouzarovski, 2012).
Visaginas is a town in Eastern Lithuania1 that was built in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s as a part of the infrastructure for a large- scale strategic pro-
ject of the USSR – the North- West United Power System (UPS). The North- 
West UPS incorporated four nuclear power plants (NPPs)  – Chernobyl, 
Smolensk, Leningrad and Ignalina. All these NPPs were built with what, 
at the time, was the largest RMBK- type reactor in the world: a reactor that 
later, after the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986, became widely recognized 
as unsafe. Seven kilometres away from the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant 
(INPP), Visaginas was built just adjacent to the border with Belarus and in 
the close vicinity of the border with Latvia. Its sole function was to house 
the plant’s workers and their family members. In the 1980s, the INPP had 
around 7,000 employees, while the number of Visaginas inhabitants was 
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close to 35,000 people. Lithuania’s negotiations to join the European Union 
(EU) in 2004, however, required the country’s commitment to decommission 
both units of the INPP reactor. These tasks were executed in 2004 and 2009, 
respectively. Thus, the INPP is currently on course to be fully dismantled by 
2038, and for this purpose it employs around 2,000 people out of a current 
town population of 21,000 inhabitants.
In the given circumstances, the aim of this chapter is to address a crucial 
contradiction. On the one hand, the INPP is a key issue, one of the cen-
tral factors that, beginning with the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, has shaped 
practices of Lithuanian state sovereignty on different historical stages. On the 
other hand, Visaginas’ urbanity has been marginalized in locally grounded 
interpretations of post- Soviet transformations, and systematically reduced to 
a rupture that happened once and forever (Freimane, 2016). In the argument 
of this chapter, the deployment of the term ‘infrastructure’ in the conceptual 
context of early 21st- century discussions on urbanization processes provides 
a framework for an analytical narration of the Visaginas case as essentially 
combining these two contradictory elements. These discussions seek to over-
come operationalizations of the ‘urban’ as a bounded unit: a settlement- type 
embedded into a territorialized nation- state system of production and distri-
bution (Brenner, 2014; Schwarz and Streule, 2017). Instead, they endeavour 
to scrutinize urbanization as a multi- scalar process of the socio- territorial 
relational embeddedness of human habitat in a [neoliberal] world system. 
In this respect, in addition to the modernist understanding of urbanization 
as a process of concentration, Brenner and Schmid (2015, p. 162) introduce 
the terms ‘extended urbanization’ to designate the ‘fundamental conditions 
of possibility for the production of historically and geographically specific 
forms of “cityness” ’, and ‘differential urbanization’ to indicate the creative 
destruction of inherited geographical and social configurations in relation 
to the broader developmental dynamics of capitalism (ibid., 2015, p. 168). 
The interpretation of nuclear technology, as resulting both in concentrated, 
extended and differential urbanization, enables empirical work on the built, 
social and symbolic environments of ‘nuclear’ towns as essentially multi- 
scalar infrastructures. It also provides an opportunity for going beyond hege-
monic rupture when thinking about the INPP decommissioning, and thus 
also for this being of relevance to other cases of historically changing relations 
between city, industry and community. By adhering to the shared research 
purpose proposed by the anthropology of infrastructuring (Niewoehner, 
2015) to identify relations between technology, actors and symbolic orders, 
I will attempt to suggest epistemic lenses for scale- sensitive analysis of urban-
ization related to the nuclear industry in the Soviet context.
The ‘nuclear’ as a Cold War phenomenon
Both historically and conceptually, the nuclear industry is a phenomenon 
that is homologous to Cold War politics and economy. The Cold War as a 
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largely unseen, strictly dichotomous and technologically all- encompassing 
conflict implied new notions of threat, new arguments about protection 
and new representations of the enemy. In these circumstances, nuclear tech-
nology was one of the central factors in defining this conflict in institutional 
and ideological terms. Since the nuclear industry presented an instrument 
of destruction on a totally new scale – with mutually assured destruction 
as its most dramatic scenario – it therefore also required a reorganization 
of statehood. Gabrielle Hecht explains the nuclear state and nuclear excep-
tionalism as conceptions that nuclear weapons are fundamentally different 
from any other type of weapons that have ever existed before (2006). Joseph 
Masco (2006, 2010) develops a notion that the mode of US statehood after 
World War II was crucially shaped by the nuclear arms race and by the cen-
trality of the concept of planetary crisis. In technological terms, because the 
nuclear threat factor, this mode of statehood for the first time implied direct 
co- articulation with the entire globe, the earth as an integrated biosphere. 
This observation can equally be put into an institutional perspective and 
regarded as a situation wherein a new technological reality became pivotal 
for the realization of the US containment strategy. In developing this per-
spective, Masco comes to the notion of ‘the nuclear’ as inherent both to the 
logic of the nation- state embedded in fierce international competition on the 
one hand and to the understanding of the global as a ‘post- national’, fragile 
biosphere on the other. While internationally the US Eisenhower adminis-
tration was promoting the peaceful and positive aspects of nuclear science, 
domestically the ‘nuclear’ state was characterized by a mode of sovereignty 
that supposes a normalization of a state of exception or a state of emergency 
(Masco, 2006).
In the USSR in the period of the early Cold War, the centralized devel-
opmental state generally established legitimization for itself via large- scale 
infrastructural projects that were expected to enable the further central-
ization and control of territory, people and production. The aftermath of 
World War II and the consolidated features of the Stalinist state determined 
the brutality of at least the first years of the development of the nuclear 
industry in the USSR. It was Gulag and war prisoners  – often originally 
from areas where the dominant ethnicity was considered to be disloyal to 
the Soviet state – who did the most hazardous work in building emerging 
nuclear industry sites (Brown, 2013, 2015). The Special Committee, with 
Lavrentiy Beria at its head, curated the Soviet nuclear industry in the late 
1940s and early 1950s. This organization was characterized by secrecy as 
well as by violence and repressive segregation. It formed part of the structure 
of the State Defence Committee, which in its turn was created specifically 
for the coordination of Soviet military, political and economic policy during 
World War II. The Special Committee was founded specifically for managing 
nuclear projects right after the Hiroshima bombing in 1945. From this per-
spective, the Soviet nuclear industry too was initially an element of warfare 
in a strict sense.
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From the mid- 1950s, Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for peace’ programme (1953), 
as well as the recognition that uranium ore is quite widespread and thus 
cannot be exclusively mastered as a secret commodity by a sole super-
power (Hecht, 2006, pp.  324– 325), made the nuclear industry a more 
civic and public issue. In the USSR, this coincided with a change of pol-
itical course after Stalin’s death and Beria’s execution. Under Khrushchev 
as First Secretary of the USSR Communist Party, a new institutional 
agency responsible for the nuclear industry was founded in 1953. It was 
termed ‘the Ministry of Medium Machine Building’, and existed until the 
collapse of the USSR. Today, Russia’s Federal Agency of Atomic Industry 
(Rosatom) is considered the successor to this institution. In the mid- 1950s, 
the Ministry started the process of the formalization of the nuclear industry, 
its re- orientation towards commercial ends and its gradual internationaliza-
tion. From the early 1950s, it started to be perceived and planned from an 
economic modernization perspective (Josephson, 1999). This significantly 
strengthened the position of nuclear scientists, giving them more autonomy 
in terms of scientific work and political decisions, and creating possibilities 
for their public heroization. As a result of these Soviet domestic and inter-
national power shifts, the first NPP was built in Obninsk in 1954. As early 
as the late 1950s, an agenda existed for spreading the civic nuclear industry 
to the Soviet republics (Josephson, 1999, p.  204). Another shift that the 
Atoms for Peace agenda brought about was the start of the USSR’s cooper-
ation with Eastern European states to build their own nuclear power plants 
in 1955.
In a crucial sense, the Cold War was a conflict mediated by the process 
of decolonization and the worldwide universalizing of nationalization. 
Science and technological development, and the nuclear industry in par-
ticular, essentially became the driving forces of this paradigm. In such a 
perspective, the Atoms for Peace agenda combined both ends – the access 
of decolonizing nation- states to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, 
and the non- proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this respect, the Soviet 
republics and Eastern European states can be considered through the lens 
of post- colonialism. The military, political and technological formation 
of Soviet colonialism after World War II coincided with the rapid scien-
tific, military and institutional development of the nuclear industry. The 
USSR started mining uranium in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary right after the war, and fully controlled and 
dominated this process. However, as early as the 1970s, East European 
states could be at least partially autonomous. Schmid (2011) refers to the 
cases of Czechoslovakia and Romania choosing for themselves the types of 
reactor for their NPPs. Initially – because of USSR’s commitment to the non- 
proliferation policy, according to the 1970 Treaty of the Non- proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons – most of the equipment needed in Eastern European 
NPP construction projects was produced in the USSR. This defined the slow 
pace of their development. However, already by the 1980s, most of this 
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production was located outside the USSR (Schmid, 2011). The end of the 
Cold War, and the Chernobyl disaster prior to it, defined the fate of the 
nuclear industry and of related research and educational programmes in 
former USSR colonies. After 1989, most of the reactors built in Eastern 
European countries with Soviet participation were decommissioned, while 
the industry itself either stalled or was incorporated into the techno- political 
regime of the EU. From the perspective of the Cold War and of nuclear 
industry as its central technological factor, post- socialism therefore meant a 
growing prominence of the nuclear safety issue, instead of the issue of geo-
political rivalry and military threat.
The ‘nuclear’ as an imperial phenomenon
Although incorporation into the techno- political regime of the EU was 
precisely the fate of the INPP (Stsiapanau, 2017), it is less certain whether 
the INPP project can be considered through a strictly post- colonial lens, – 
that is, through a lens that sees colonialism as an ambivalent project that 
both subjugated and empowered the colonized territory. If we take a post- 
colonial approach to Lithuanian rapid industrialization and urbanization 
under Soviet rule as a central constituent of nation- scale society formation, 
the particular case of the nuclear industry does not really comply with the 
logic of this process. Both technologically and institutionally, the nuclear 
industry in Lithuania was exceptional in relation to other industrialization 
and urbanization projects that equally belonged to the context of disrupted 
Lithuanian statehood but facilitated the nation- building process via colonial 
institutions and infrastructures that nurtured mass urban solidarities, iden-
tities and lifestyles (Davoliūtė, 2013; Ivanauskas, 2010). As is increasingly 
recognized, the colonial production of territory- society relations in Soviet 
republics in the 1950s and 1960s involved the spread of university literacy 
and bureaucratization, as well as a growing autonomy of both institutions 
and individuals. In the 1970s, these features became structural causes for a 
crisis of identification with the Soviet project and for resulting dissent. Later 
on, in the 1980s, they became the grounds for popular mobilizations against 
colonial rule with varying combinations of ethnic and civic components 
(Derluguian, 2005; Ivanauskas, 2014). In the context of the colonial pro-
duction of territory- society relations in Soviet Lithuania, both the INPP and 
the town of Visaginas were literally exclaves of power and of professional 
and everyday culture. The local Lithuanian ethnic bureaucracy not only had 
no political leverage regarding this exclave, but also to a certain extent did 
not share a common language with those who were running it. Hence, when 
assessed in the broader process of the colonial making of Lithuania under 
Soviet rule, the INPP should be regarded as an imperial exclave rather than 
as a factor facilitating egalitarian nation- scale society.
Key decisions about the location, planning, building and operation 
of both the INPP and the town of Visaginas were indeed taken by the 
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Moscow- based Ministry of Medium Machine Building and, more specif-
ically, by the Leningrad- based branch of an institute associated with this 
ministry  – the USSR Scientific Research and Design Institute for Energy 
Technologies.2 This institute was founded in 1952 and was responsible for 
the research and development of all types of nuclear reactors, including 
RMBK. Apart from this, at least in the 1970s, it was responsible for related 
systematic infrastructural development including city planning. It is possible 
to identify an isomorphic effect in the dimension of social infrastructure. Key 
positions in the Soviet nuclear industry, and at the INPP in particular, were 
occupied by specialists of Russian origin, educated and professionalized in 
Russian institutions. Moreover, Lithuania beyond the INPP was geograph-
ically, socially and discursively off the map of the professional socializa-
tion and culture networks to which Soviet nuclear scientists and engineers 
belonged. Physicists from the research institutes at the Lithuanian Academy 
of Sciences, as well as architects and planners from Vilnius and Kaunas 
institutes, had very limited possibilities for strategically influencing the 
process and primarily held roles of local implementers. Architects from 
the Lithuanian Urban Planning Institute designed only public buildings in 
Visaginas. Furthermore, both the town of Visaginas and the INPP were run 
as a single entity by the INPP director and legally were the property of the 
Ministry of Medium Machine Building and not of the Lithuanian Soviet 
Socialist Republic. Both were transferred from the Ministry to the Republic 
of Lithuania only in October 1991.
At the same time, in the national history of Lithuania of the last 30 years, 
the varying claims, constructions and legitimizations of state sovereignty 
have been essentially framed by the technological and political horizon of 
the nuclear industry. These produced and mobilized particular meanings 
of the INPP and the institutions that dealt with nuclear technology. The 
national independence movement, Sąjūdis, became massive and prominent 
largely as an environmentalist, anti- nuclear movement. It was formed on the 
wave of success of the ecology club, Žemyna, which gathered momentum 
after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Sąjūdis was formed in 1988 and con-
sistently deployed nuclear technology as a target to reveal and criticize the 
harmful and unaccountable policies of various Moscow agencies in the 
Lithuanian context. An iconic event within this movement was the ‘Ring 
of Life’ in 1988: a meeting of tens of thousands of Lithuanians around the 
territory of the INPP with demands to stall it and to transfer its control 
to the Lithuanian Soviet bureaucracy. In such circumstances, the exclave 
nature of both the INPP and of Visaginas, their exclusivity and opaqueness 
for a broader and only recently massively urbanized society, as well as the 
growing doubts after the Chernobyl disaster about the modernizing mission 
of nuclear technology, made the INPP and Visaginas the locus from where 
Lithuanian national territorialization beyond the USSR was supposed to 
start. It is therefore revealing to compare the Lithuanian situation to that 
of Ukraine, where anti- nuclear protests were much less an issue of the 
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nationalizing state and did not directly imply ethnic mobilization against 
‘nuclear’ loci. Jane I. Dawson explains this mainly through the fact of the 
general weakness of the national movement in Ukraine compared with that 
in Lithuania. She depicts the Ukrainian situation as structurally similar to 
the Lithuanian, – that is, one where local scientists and engineers had no 
say in the strategic decision making related to the nuclear industry, as well 
as one where there were no ‘native’ facilities for training nuclear scientists 
(Dawson, 1996, p.  67). However, one can object that, in comparison to 
Lithuania, Ukraine was much better integrated scientifically and indus-
trially into the Soviet nuclear development agenda. This can be explained 
by the intensive ‘pre- nuclear’ development of physics in Ukraine, which 
created a basis for this Soviet republic to be later turned into the major 
field for nuclear development beyond the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR). The biographical dimension of the history of the ‘pre- 
nuclear’ development and institutionalization of physics and of the related 
industrialization of Soviet Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk in Ukraine can be 
found in Paul Josephson (1999, Chapter 7). For instance, the first director 
of the Scientific Research and Design Institute for Energy Technologies, 
Nikolay Dollezhal, was born in Ukraine and, before founding the institute, 
in the 1930s worked in high- ranking engineering and bureaucratic positions 
in Soviet Kiev and Kharkov. In this respect, because of the width and density 
of physics research and educational institutions, the intensive social infra-
structure overlap between the RSFSR and Eastern Ukraine, and the intensive 
relations of physics institutions to local industry, the Ukrainian case did not 
so obviously constitute an opaque exclave for broader Ukrainian society, 
even after the Chernobyl disaster. In contrast to the Lithuanian situation, 
there are reasons to apply a post- colonial as opposed to an anti- colonial 
lens to the course of nuclear industry development in Soviet and post- Soviet 
Ukraine.
The INPP’s story after 1991 is the course of the nationalization of an 
industry that had no predecessors in pre- Soviet political, technological or 
linguistic domains in Lithuania. The Lithuanian national institution respon-
sible for the functioning of the INPP after independence was the State 
Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI). In this period, a persistent 
trope in broad public policy discussions over the plant’s future was the issue 
of an inevitable dependency on Russian energy supply should the INPP be 
decommissioned. As evident in the results of surveys on the issue conducted 
in Lithuania in the 1990s and 2000s, 60– 80 per cent of the population were 
consistently against the INPP’s closure (Gaidys and Rinkevičius, 2008). 
Moreover, when a consultative referendum was held on the issue in 2008, 
88.7 per cent of the voters were against the shutdown, but turnout (47.6 
per cent) was not sufficient for the referendum to be valid. In 2012, the 
nuclear issue reappeared on the Lithuanian national agenda when another 
referendum was held on a new NPP in the Visaginas area. The new station 
was meant to be a joint international project between Latvia, Poland and 
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Lithuania, formed around a Hitachi- produced reactor. Voters, however, 
rejected the new NPP option  – 64.5 per cent voted against its construc-
tion. In any case, in 1999, in the course of negotiations over accession to 
the EU, the Lithuanian state had already committed to the closure of both 
INPP units in 2004 and 2009 (Stsiapanau, 2017). The decommissioning of 
the INPP was unequivocally presented as an EU requirement on the basis 
of safety considerations. This whole process since 1990 implied both insti-
tutional and discursive attempts to scale the INPP down to the purposes 
of a nationalizing Lithuanian state. In light of these attempts, one can say 
that Lithuania’s EU accession negotiations facilitated such a downscaling 
and enhanced the Lithuanian state’s agency in the form of pooled sover-
eignty, i.e. one enabled by interconnections within a net of supra- national 
institutions.
In existing social history and anthropology depictions of this pro-
cess of nationalization of the nuclear industry in Lithuania, as well as in 
arguments concerning its mechanisms, the Visaginas population is most 
often constructed as fully homologous to the INPP. Its current symbolic 
and emotional properties are therefore considered and interpreted almost 
exclusively in the perspective of the rupture of the INPP project and a 
resulting nostalgia (see Butterfly City, 2017; Žalia pievelė (2017). Analysis 
of local mass media narratives, as well as of town dwellers’ narratives, 
enabled grounded arguments about industrial decline and Soviet nostalgia 
to emerge as key tropes of the town’s semiosis in a broader web of the 
meanings of the Lithuanian transition (Baločkaitė, 2010, 2012; Šliavaitė, 
2005; Storm, 2014). This tendency is not a product of the researchers’ bias. 
Mono- functional and binary ‘town/ employer’ thinking clearly dominates in 
the process of projecting future scenarios for Visaginas. As it is possible to 
observe, the most powerful discussed visions of new sources of employ-
ment and, more broadly, of attempts to reinvent Visaginas’ urbanity are still 
projected as located outside the town and hence, as determined externally, 
in full analogy with the INPP. At the same time, not much attention is yet 
paid to actors in, and projects of, Visaginas’ nationalization in ethnic terms 
that de facto destroy the hermetic relations between the town and nuclear 
technology. These actors and projects exist in the domain of attempts at 
history writing, and hence of the creation of identity- giving narratives that 
emphasize the pre- INPP history of the area. They can equally be found in the 
domain of institutional change – the gradual incorporation and assimilation 
of ethnic Lithuanian bureaucrats into municipal governing bodies. This new 
bureaucracy not only possesses no socialization experience in nuclear tech-
nology but often actually lives in other towns and has long- term experience 
of working in other areas. This group hence elaborates new practices and 
symbols of belonging to the place – for instance, emphasizing the quality of 
the integration of built and natural environments, or the quality of welfare 
institutions and infrastructures.
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This widely perceived homology between town and nuclear power plant 
is amplified both in academic and public discourse by the fact that Visaginas 
is characterized by a multi- ethnic composition that is outstanding in the 
Lithuanian context. It is the town with the highest percentage of foreign- 
born inhabitants in the country (Valatka and Liubimau, 2016) and with 
a predominant usage of the Russian language. An eloquent example of 
Visaginas’ exceptional status in this respect is the fact that after Lithuanian 
independence, when the law on Lithuanian as the national language was 
adopted, Russian was still granted the status of second official language 
in the town and at the INPP – formally as one of the official languages of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. Indeed, to this day, the high pro-
fessional status of INPP employees reinforces a high status of the Russian 
language spoken in the town. These ethno- linguistic features, as well as the 
technological peculiarity of the site itself, are today considered primarily 
as resources for memorialization. This does not leave much space for other 
meanings to be applied to the town and to the INPP, except of what exactly 
can be memorialized of it and how exactly this should be done (Ruseckaitė, 
2016; Storm, 2014). At the same time, both despite and because of the excep-
tional history of the INPP and of Visaginas, there is still no town museum 
here. On the basis of observations of evolving initiatives in this direction, as 
well as of their assessment by town politicians and workers in the cultural 
sector, the question of how to relate the INPP history with that of the pre- 
nuclear period of the area is a hindering one.
This suggests that researchers today predominantly construct Visaginas 
through what it has lost. Meanwhile, there is no systematic work on 
establishing a multi- scalar interpretative horizon for this specific mode of 
urbanization that was caused by the project of Soviet nuclear development 
but retained key features in the context of Lithuanian statehood after that 
project ceased to exist. Looking at Visaginas in a multi- scalar perspective, one 
can see that the exceptional aggregation of technologies, material resources, 
human capital, and related lifestyles and values, as well as the establishment 
of a lasting isomorphism between all these, was strategically enabled by the 
Ministry of Medium Machine Building within its USSR- scale infrastructure. 
This Ministry, for its part, was an equally exceptional entity in the wider his-
tory of the USSR of the Cold War period. In the Soviet Union as an emerging 
superpower in a bipolar militarized globe (a ‘closed world’), the Ministry 
of Medium Machine Building was called on to secure and strengthen the 
Soviet grip on the globe by advancing the most powerful military and civic 
technology. This global Soviet agenda thus nurtured a network of a multi- 
scalar essence, with very well- financed, exceptional and often secret or 
semi- closed urban infrastructures. In addition, these sites had highly scientif-
ically advanced and technocratically disciplined populations where nuclear 
scientists and engineers were clearly the privileged professional group dom-
inating all domains of the decision- making process. Nuclear towns were run 
 
 
98 S. Liubimau
98
by the NPP’s directors and administrations that were accountable directly 
to the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. The KGB and Komsomol 
strictly filtered those who were offered jobs in such towns, especially those 
who had direct contact with nuclear technology. Composure, sobriety and 
the internalization of the Soviet stance on the geopolitical realities of the 
Cold War were considered the mandatory virtues of such workers. Visaginas 
is just one example of Soviet nuclear infrastructures, and therefore its social 
history cannot be properly written without the reconstruction of its techno-
logical, infrastructural and biographical connections to other Ministry of 
Medium Machine Building locations. There is evidence that many people 
holding scientists’ or engineers’ positions at the INPP and living in Visaginas 
were previously employed in other ‘nuclear’ urban sites throughout the 
entire USSR.
In such a vein, this particular Ministry’s projects are not so easily explained 
as phenomena of Soviet industrial modernity, forging egalitarian, urban and 
bureaucratized, nationalizing societies in the post- World War II period. The 
INPP and Visaginas are rather an imperial exclave phenomenon, in contrast 
to other large- scale infrastructural nationalizing state projects that required 
the massive employment of university- educated ethnic Lithuanian engineers 
and managers. Besides, the specificity of nuclear technology suggests that it 
is problematic to term the decommissioning of a nuclear power plant ‘de- 
industrialization’, because it takes much time and skilled effort to dismantle 
the technology, while some types of nuclear waste will foreseeably require 
thousands of years of professional management. Decommissioning is a 
long, open- ended process of generating or failing to generate individual and 
collective professional lineages and narratives of progress and hybridized 
identities, in line with opportunities provided by a partially rescaled infra-
structural, scientific, educational and power geography of the Soviet nuclear 
industry after the end of the Cold War. Despite its apparent technological 
and political centrality in the recent history of Lithuania’s regained inde-
pendence, Visaginas and the INPP have been reduced to marginal themes in 
the public history of post- Soviet transformation in the Baltic States. Both in 
academic and artistic discourse, the closure of the INPP has been translated 
into a closure of future projections and reworkings of both the technology 
and the community of the town. Visaginas has been systematically used as an 
example of trouble in order to portray the drama of irreversible post- Soviet 
transition. In fact, one can hypothesize that it is precisely the attention paid 
to Visaginas’ urbanity – with its particular centrally and externally planned 
constructed environment, as well as its particular centrally and externally 
assembled community – that made such marginalization possible.
The ‘nuclear’ as an exclusive Soviet welfare phenomenon
In the context of Visaginas’ historically evolving environment, an important 
feature is that neither the town nor the surrounding area have any social 
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or constructed urban history prior to this particular Ministry of Medium 
Machine Building project. In this sense, it is a prime example of Soviet socialist 
urbanism in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe. It was built from scratch, 
in the forest, in just 15 years beginning in 1975, while an over- abundance of 
resources is one of the most recurrent themes in talks by specialists related 
to the planning process. The town was ambitiously projected in the shape 
of a butterfly, but only one wing was finished. It is characterized by a wide 
variety of high- quality public spaces, and is pedestrian friendly:  there are 
no traffic lights in town. It typifies the ‘return to nature’ tendency in Soviet 
planning in the late 1970s. There is a very wide variety of types of USSR 
buildings from the 1970s and 1980s and, in this sense, it is jokingly called 
a ‘zoo of Soviet modernist architecture’ (Ruseckaitė, 2016). Visaginas is 
therefore taken primarily as an experimental case of Soviet urban planning, 
realized on a blank slate and therefore in its absolute form. Such an angle is 
reinforced by comparisons to other iconic cases of socialist urban planning 
in Poland, Estonia and Latvia (Baločkaitė, 2010, 2012; Cinis et al., 2008). 
In this respect, Visaginas is part of the arguments that portray nuclear 
towns as the utopian projects that came closest to the realization of Soviet 
ideals (Storm, 2014). Nuclear towns are sometimes discussed, in conditions 
broader than just the USSR, as similar to company towns, but ones that 
are owned by the government and thus exclude any possibility of private 
property. Such an interpretative line can be found in Kate Brown who 
researched the US case of Richland, Washington, as developing in parallel to 
Soviet Ozersk (originally Cheliabinsk- 40 and Cheliabinsk- 65) from the very 
start of the Cold War. Brown (2013, 2015) portrays nuclear towns as ones 
where dwellers had no civic or political authority, but where at least some 
of the dwellers were highly advantaged as consumers of goods and services. 
Focusing on the case of Ozersk, a city built to serve a plutonium plant from 
1946, Brown shows that a Soviet nuclear town presupposed the zoning 
and division of its population into privileged ethnic Russians, as opposed 
to unprivileged ethnic minorities, prisoners, prisoners of war, etc. The first 
group performed safer jobs and enjoyed better living conditions and wel-
fare, whereas the second group was forced to deal with the most hazardous 
tasks on contaminated ground. The first group lived in a closed city, while 
the second lived in camps and garrisons (Brown, 2015, p.  10). The first 
group is thus identified as properly ‘nuclear’, and the second as not ‘nuclear’. 
Such a split in the city was not conceived from the beginning, but occurred 
during the process of dividing loyal Soviet citizens from those who were dis-
loyal and undesirable. In the USSR context, such strict division was created 
by the path of the Soviet state from the 1930s and 1940s, and more pre-
cisely by the state’s strategies to violently discipline the labour force, like 
passport laws in the 1930s and labour laws in the 1940s. The Soviet nuclear 
industry in this sense, despite the relative autonomy of the elite of physicists, 
developed in significant ways along the path of the Bolsheviks’ state terrorist 
approach of segregation to managing its population. However, there are 
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arguments that the nuclear industry, both locally and internationally, gen-
erically implies such a strict segregation of activities that necessarily marks 
workers in this industry, and entire states, as either strictly ‘nuclear’ or as 
being merely related to the nuclear industry. The latter consist of low- skilled, 
hazardous, extractive activities, not legitimized as properly belonging to the 
‘nuclear’ industry, and therefore not scrutinized as ‘nuclear’ in medical, pol-
itical or economic dimensions. Discussion of this distinction as enacted and 
re- enacted in the course of the complex geopolitical process of the Cold War 
can be found in Gabrielle Hecht (2006).
Although Visaginas in the 1970s and 1980s still functioned as a semi- 
closed town (one had to get several permissions to settle there), it was 
already a product of another type of Soviet statehood – one that was more 
urbanized, bureaucratized and welfare oriented. Yet, even at this stage of 
the USSR, nuclear towns incarnated configurations of the welfare state 
that were very different in their essence from the universalizing tendency 
of welfare infrastructures created in wider society, i.e. not within excep-
tional or secret industrialization and urbanization projects. Several studies 
and interviews about the memories of dwellers of Soviet ‘nuclear towns’ 
depict them as spaces of abundance in the context of a broader environment 
of shortage. Chocolate, sausage and bananas are most commonly presented 
in such stories as those deficit goods that were steadily available to nuclear 
town dwellers, and therefore distinguished those dwellers from other Soviet 
citizens. The high social status of nuclear town dwellers, however, was a 
reward for agreeing with the normalization of the state of emergency, i.e. 
for loyal acceptance of hierarchical, technocratic governance by nuclear 
scientists and engineers, and with the internalization of the USSR’s geopolit-
ical agenda in the Cold War. As such, it is the global Cold War configuration, 
sustained by nuclear science and nuclear technology, that gave rise to such 
exclusive modernist urbanization projects.
What primarily attracts attention in Visaginas today is the underuse or 
decline of very high- quality school and kindergarten buildings that were 
and are considered major infrastructural achievements of Soviet modernity 
in the town (Ruseckaitė, 2016). This decline, however, paved the way for the 
most innovative efforts in town to re- tool and democratize its ‘infrastruc-
tural lives’. The new activities that are injected into these modernist educa-
tional infrastructures are a mixture of work and heritage, education (courses 
and workshops), and leisure. In the Lithuanian context, these institutions 
and the buildings that host them represent exemplars of an advanced provi-
sion of welfare. These initiatives are not merely reuses of modernist welfare 
infrastructures. They are rather mash- ups of material infrastructures, peda-
gogical traditions and interpretations of past, everyday and popular cultures 
that define varying and competing regimes and meanings of education, leisure 
and heritage in the town. By introducing new functions and meanings to 
these places, such efforts in effect destroy the hermetic relations between the 
 
 
Towns as multi-scalar infrastructures 101
   101
INPP and the city. For the initiators themselves, their efforts create arenas 
of further learning and socialization in a scalar context that is more com-
plex than the Soviet/ post- Soviet rupture. On the one hand, these initiatives 
are predominantly dependent on EU funding. The town is still quite well 
invested in – something often interpreted, for political reasons, as compen-
sation for the INPP closure. On the other hand, it is the community formed 
in Soviet times that predominantly sustains both the town’s material and 
social infrastructure in totally new conditions (the EU- embedded Lithuanian 
nation- state). This can be considered a case of gridding and producing a 
habitual mode of statehood from below (Jansen, 2014), yet it is substantially 
dependent on supra- national institutions. There is, for instance, a conflict in 
town between those who expect cultural and educational institutions to be 
more alternative and those who work on ensuring continuity with the Soviet 
period on the levels of individual professional biographies and of valuation 
of cultural products.
Conclusion
The urbanity of Visaginas, which has served as the case for this study 
of ‘nuclear’ urban infrastructures in the post- Soviet context, has been 
diagnosed as resulting from the intersection of three dimensions of the 
Soviet nuclear industry. In the particular circumstances of post- World War 
II Lithuania, the Soviet ‘nuclear’ urbanization process has been considered 
an essentially Cold War phenomenon, as an essentially imperial phe-
nomenon and as an essentially exclusive Soviet welfare phenomenon. All 
these dimensions of the Soviet nuclear industry have been discussed as 
interconnected in practice. The intention was to show that they produced a 
mode of urbanization and of Soviet state building that is critically different 
from the conventionally discussed features of Soviet industrial modernity 
in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe. The Cold War has been examined 
as a technological, institutional and ideological environment, sustained 
by a scalar framework that prioritized the scale of the vulnerable globe. 
In its specific USSR articulation, this scalar framework of global techno- 
political competition and containment via nuclear industry development 
implied the creation of an exceptional mode of urbanization – coordinated 
by the Soviet Ministry of Medium Machine Building and nurtured by this 
ministry’s material and human resources. Visaginas and the INPP, as one 
of the sites where this mode of urbanization was territorialized, can be 
properly comprehended and studied only in connection with the ministry’s 
other sites in the USSR. In comparison to other cases of Soviet nuclear 
colonialism, the Lithuanian case is particular, because it is characterized 
by only a very weak lineage of Soviet technologies and institutions related 
to nuclear development in the broader scientific and industrial landscape 
of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. Both technologically and 
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socially, Visaginas and the INPP became an opaque exclave for Lithuanian 
society. Despite this, from the moment of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, 
the INPP became the central focus of the process of the re- establishment 
of Lithuanian sovereignty. This process is more complex than the singular 
ruptures of Lithuania regaining independence and taking the decision to 
decommission the INPP in the course of integration into the EU. More 
attention should be paid to techno- social lineage, not only on the level of 
institutions and policies but also on the level of micro- interactions and 
socio- infrastructural mash- ups.
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Notes
 1 Initially named ‘Sniečkus’ (after Lithuanian Communist Party leader Antanas 
Sniečkus).
 2 NIKIÈT – Naučno- issledovatel’skij i konstruktorskij centr ènergotehniki.
References
Baločkaitė, R. (2010) ‘Post- soviet transitions of the planned socialist 
towns:  Visaginas, Lithuania’, Studies of Transitions States and Societies, 
2:2, 63– 81.
Baločkaitė, R. (2012) ‘Coping with the unwanted past in planned socialist 
towns: Visaginas, Tychy, and Nova Huta’, Slovo, 24:1, 41– 60.
Brenner, N. (ed.) (2014) Implosions/ Explosions:  Towards a Study of Planetary 
Urbanization, Berlin: Jovis.
Brenner, N. and Schmid, Ch. (2015) ‘Towards a new epistemology of the urban?’, 
City, 19:2– 3, 151– 182.
Brown, K. (2013) Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet 
and American Plutonium Disasters, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Brown, K. (2015) ‘Securing the nuclear nation’, Nationalities Papers, 43:1, 8– 26.
Butterfly City (2017) Directed by Černovaitė, O.  (Film), Ireland:  Planet Korda 
Pictures.
Cinis, A., Drėmaitė, M. and Kalm, M. (2008) ‘Perfect representations of soviet 
planned space’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 1– 21.
Collier, S. J. (2011) Post- Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Davoliūtė, V. (2013) The Making and Breaking of Soviet Lithuania: Memory and 
Modernity in the Wake of War, London and New York: Routledge.
 
 
 
 
 
Towns as multi-scalar infrastructures 103
   103
Dawson, J. I. (1996) Eco- Nationalism. Anti- nuclear Activism and National Identity 
in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Derluguian, G. M. (2005) Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus. A  World- 
System Biography, Chicago, CHI: The University of Chicago Press.
Freimane, I. (2016) ‘The centrality in and of Visaginas’, in:  Ackermann, F., 
Cope, B. and Liubimau, S. (eds) Mapping Visaginas. Sources of Urbanity in a 
Former Mono- functional Town, Vilnius, Lithuania:  Vilnius Academy of Arts 
Press, 41– 47.
Gaidys, V. and Rinkevičius, L. (2008) ‘Černobylio baimė, pigios energijos nauda ar 
kai kas daugiau? Dvidešimties metų visuomenė s nuomonė s apie Ignalinos AE 
sociologiniai tyrimai Lietuvoje’, Filosofija. Sociologija, 19:4, 102– 111.
Hecht, G. (2006) ‘Nuclear ontologies’, Constellations, 13:3, 320– 331.
Ivanauskas, V. (2010) ‘The projection of the ‘blossoming of the nation’ among the 
Lithuanian cultural elite during the soviet period’, Meno Istorija ir Kritika, 6, 
172– 178.
Ivanauskas, V. (2014) ‘‘Engineers of the human spirit’ during late socialism:  the 
Lithuanian union of writers between soviet duties and local interests’, Europe- 
Asia Studies, 66:4, 645– 665.
Jansen, S. (2014) ‘Hope for/ against the state: gridding in a besieged Sarajevo suburb’, 
Ethnos, 79:2, 238– 260.
Josephson, P. (1999) Red Atom. Russia’s Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to 
Today, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Masco, J. (2006) The Nuclear Borderlands:  The Manhattan Project in Post- Cold 
War New Mexico, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Masco, J. (2010) ‘Bad weather:  on planetary crisis’, Social Studies of Science, 
40:1, 7– 40.
Niewoehner, J. (2015) ‘Infrastructures of society, anthropology of’, in: International 
Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 12, 119– 125.
Ruseckaitė, I. (2016) ‘Visaginas – a zoo of soviet architecture? An interview with 
Marija Drėmaitė’, in: Ackermann, F., Cope, B. and Liubimau, S. (eds) Mapping 
Visaginas. Sources of Urbanity in a Former Mono- functional Town, Vilnius, 
Lithuania: Vilnius Academy of Arts Press, 35– 39.
Schmid, S. D. (2011) ‘Nuclear colonization?:  soviet technopolitics in the second 
world’, in: Hecht, G. (ed.) Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in 
the Global Cold War, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 125– 154.
Schwarz, A. and Streule, M. (2017) ‘A transposition of territory:  decolonized 
perspectives in current urban research’, International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, 1– 17.
Šliavaitė, K. (2005) From pioneers to target group:  social change, ethnicity and 
memory in a Lithuanian nuclear power plant community, in: Lund Monographs 
in Social Anthropology, 16, doctoral dissertation, Lund University.
Storm, A. (2014) Post- Industrial Landscape Scars, Basingstoke, UK:  Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Stsiapanau, A. (2017) Lithuania  – Short Country Report, HoNESt:  History of 
Nuclear Energy and Society Available at: www.honest2020.eu/ sites/ default/ files/ 
deliverables_ 24/ LT.pdf (accessed 12 December 2018)
Sykora, L. and Bouzarovski, S. (2012) ‘Multiple transformations:  conceptualizing 
the post- communist urban transition’, Urban Studies, 49:1, 43– 60.
104 S. Liubimau
104
Valatka, V. and Liubimau, S. (2016) ‘Comments on the socio- geographical specifi-
city of Visaginas in the context of Lithuania’, In: Ackermann, F., Cope, B., and 
Liubimau, S. (eds) Mapping Visaginas. Sources of Urbanity in a Former Mono- 
functional Town, Vilnius, Lithuania: Vilnius Academy of Arts Press, 29– 33.
Žalia pievelė (2017) Directed by Jonas Tertelis and Kristina Werner (Theatre) 
Lithuania: Lithuanian National Drama Theatre.
   105
7  Green infrastructure in 
post- socialist cities
Evidence and experiences from  
Eastern Germany, Poland  
and Russia
Dagmar Haase, Diana Dushkova,   
Annegret Haase and Jakub Kronenberg
Introduction
This chapter discusses the current state of, changes to and future prospects 
of green infrastructure (GI), using examples from an Eastern German, 
a Polish, and a Russian city. Urban GI  – that is, not only forests, parks, 
semi- natural areas and reused brownfield sites but also gardens, ceme-
teries, pocket parks, green roofs and green walls – present a complex pic-
ture in post- socialist cities across Europe. Because of strongly hierarchical, 
non- democratic societal structures and limited financial budgets during the 
period of state socialism, green spaces in cities were resources of very strict 
top- down planning, but which included participatory elements. Political and 
economic transition after 1989 brought fundamental change to cities, urban 
societies and also urban nature. This change embraced a reduction of air 
and water pollution and ecological restoration of water courses in parts 
of cities, but also diverted more attention to urban green spaces as places 
for physical and mental recreation, aesthetics, urban history and biocultural 
diversity. Post- socialist cities underwent periods of population decline and 
shrinkage while urban brownfield sites were transformed into new parks, 
gardens and interim use open spaces. In some of the post- socialist countries, 
urban gardening became fashionable among young urbanites including 
those involved in guerrilla gardening and community activism. Traditional 
allotment gardens and summer cottages came under pressure from those 
new uses. Faced by reurbanization, many post- socialist cities experienced 
a sort of balancing act between regrowth, new construction and in- fill 
development on the one hand, and the preservation and enhancement of 
green spaces and green infrastructure on the other. This chapter presents 
three case studies ranging from ‘the west’ to ‘the east’ of the post- socialist 
world: Leipzig, Łódź and Arkhangelsk.
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Green infrastructure in European cities with a focus on 
post- socialist cities
As highlighted in the introduction of this book, infrastructures ‘make’ a city 
in various ways, involving the biophysical and material but also the image 
and meaning of a city both as a place to live and to identify with (Tuvikene 
et al., this issue) and a place to be, to sense and to make (Schetke et al., 
2010). The concept of GI in cities has become increasingly important and 
prominent in the past decades, namely in an era when climate change and 
its impacts have been largely discussed in urban policy (Davies et al., 2015). 
GI is a cutting edge concept for cities across the different disciplines and 
spheres of science, policy, planning and governance. It is understood as a 
strategic approach to develop ‘…an interconnected network of green space 
that conserves natural ecosystem values and functions, and that provides 
associated benefits to humans’ (Benedict and McMahon, 2006, p.  321). 
In other words, ecosystem services and benefits are provided and enabled 
through a network of GI in cities.
GI components, ranging from larger woodland and nature areas, private 
gardens, and sustainable urban drainage systems to green roofs and balconies, 
are not only seen as biological or biophysical units, but also considered from 
the point of view of their interactions with people in the city and their place 
in human ideas, imaginations and appreciations of urban nature (Elands 
et al., 2015; Vierikko et al., 2017). In a practical sense, urban GI represents 
a planning approach or planning instrument aimed at creating networks of 
multifunctional green space in urban environments (Elands et al., 2015) for 
people in places and place- making by people as a reflexive concept (Vierikko 
et al., 2017). Thus, GI is considerably different from what we have so far 
understood as ‘grey’ or built urban infrastructure by being part of urban 
nature, consisting of living organisms but at the same time being designed 
and maintained by society.
The focus of our chapter is on the role, development and function of 
urban GI in post- socialist cities. We explore the nexus between the nature, 
design and thinking about GI on the one hand and post- socialist urban 
change in cities of the post- socialist world on the other.
Historically, most cities in Europe were almost devoid of green spaces, 
but were comparatively small and most people lived in the countryside. It 
was not until the 1850s that the importance of parks or gardens for urban 
dwellers was recognized to some extent (Dankowska et al., 2017; Swanwick 
et  al., 2003). This attitude dramatically changed during industrialization 
as urban populations began growing enormously and living conditions 
worsened in such a way that spaces for public recreation became key for 
restoring and maintaining the labour force and public health (Breuste 
et al., 2016). Land was acquired by city governments and large parks were 
created which, until today, characterize many capitals and large cities in 
Europe:  Hyde Park in London, many ‘Volksparks’ in German cities, the 
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Tiergarten Park in Berlin, the Prater Park in Vienna, the Pushkin Park in 
Moscow and the Slots- Kungsparken in Malmö, to list just a few.
Today, urban green spaces are seen as essential for well- functioning, 
healthy and liveable cities because they:  (1) play a recreational role in 
everyday life; (2) contribute to the conservation of biodiversity in the urban 
world; (3) contribute to the cultural identity of the city and of its residents; 
(4) help maintain and improve the environmental quality (such as of soil, air 
and water) of the city; (5) bring natural solutions to technical problems (e.g. 
sewage treatment) in cities (Nesshoever et al., 2017; Swanwick et al., 2003) 
and, (6) make cities stronger in mitigating and adapting to climate change, 
warming, heat waves and summer droughts (Scheuer et al., 2017).
Since the 2010s, the current rural- to- urban migration in almost all regions 
of Europe, the international migration and influx of young people into large 
and capital cities, related pressures for new flats and housing opportun-
ities and, last but not least, the functioning of neoliberal land policies and 
real estate markets have placed green spaces in danger of getting smaller in 
size or being developed or privatized and thus becoming exclusive to pri-
vate use. Scholars and practitioners test the potential and implementation 
of GI systems for ecological, social and economic sustainability and resili-
ence in increasingly polarizing urban contexts, namely in growing (Kabisch 
and Haase, 2014) and shrinking cities (Haase et al., 2014), the latter being 
particularly important for post- socialist cities. Moreover, these strands are 
linked to current debates on public and open spaces in cities in general 
(Rall and Haase, 2011; Vierikko et al., 2017) and forms of civil, bottom- up 
appropriation of open spaces (community gardening, interim use, etc.) in 
particular (see also Zupan and Büdenbender, this issue).
Three case studies in Eastern Germany, Poland and Russia
Leipzig, Eastern Germany
Leipzig, situated in the eastern and former socialist part of Germany, represents 
a ‘city of extremes’ (Rink, 2015). The city underwent a long phase of shrinkage, 
beginning in German Democratic Republic (GDR) times but most massively in 
the 1990s when it lost 20 per cent of its inhabitants (100,000 people) because 
of job losses, a remarkable decrease in birth rates and residential suburbaniza-
tion into the city’s periphery (Nuissl and Rink, 2005). By 2000, Leipzig had 
become the ‘capital city of housing vacancy’ with about 20 per cent of its flats 
vacant (Rink et al., 2011). Moreover, the city had thousands of brownfield sites 
due to industrial decline: in its urban region, the lignite coal industry left many 
pits and a partially destroyed landscape. From 2000 onwards, shrinkage came 
to a halt and, since 2010, Leipzig has seen dynamic regrowth of more than 2 
per cent per year (Kabisch et al., 2016a; Wolff et al., 2016).
Of course, this extreme development had impacts on existing GI, 
open spaces, brownfield and greyfield sites as well as on green planning 
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and greening strategies. Leipzig has an enormous natural heritage with a 
floodplain forest running through the city that provides an element of urban 
GI containing many different ecosystem services. Leipzig also features a 
diversified blue infrastructure, namely rivers and their wetlands, but also 
large post- mining lakes in the south of the city that are much less well 
known than the floodplain forest.
During the socialist period, GI such as new parks in the city’s core was 
developed and/ or enlarged mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, the 
centrally located Clara- Zetkin Park that was shaped according to a Moscow 
blueprint. Newly erected housing estates were planned with green spaces, 
although of limited quality. By and large, urban GI suffered increasingly from 
under- maintenance in the later decades of the GDR, and GI also suffered 
through industrial fallouts and pollution. The bad environmental situation 
was a crucial reason for out- migration from Leipzig since the 1960s, which 
made the city a shrinking one long before the political changes of 1990.
Post- socialist transformation brought an almost complete de- 
industrialization that led to massive job losses (80,000) but also to a sudden 
improvement of the environmental situation (decontamination and a 
decrease in air pollution as kinds of positive side effects; see Haase et al., 
2014)  and new priorities and strategies for urban development towards 
greater environmental quality and a greener, more liveable city. Thanks 
to transfer money received by Eastern Germany after 1990, the economic 
decline following political transformation did not lead to a cut in wel-
fare as in other post- socialist countries. From an environmental perspec-
tive, the post- socialist transformation thus offered a lot of relief, chances 
and new opportunities (Haase et  al., 2014; Püffel et  al., 2018; Rall and 
Haase, 2011). Urban sustainability and urban- regional greening strategies 
became overarching goals of policy- making and planning, and main targets 
of funding. Massive shrinkage, abandonment and de- densification created a 
specific situation for the development of urban GI and greening strategies 
in Leipzig. The high number of brownfield sites (numbering some 3,000 in 
2007, among them sites of 30 hectares and more as a result of demolition 
of housing since 2000, Rink et al. 2011, p. 52), as well as housing and com-
mercial vacancies, represented a challenge for restructuring but, at the same 
time, a chance for greening. Simultaneous to renaturation and the shaping 
of new green areas, residential and commercial suburbanization in the mid- 
1990s led to new soil sealing and construction of transport and commercial 
infrastructure in Leipzig’s hinterland (Nuissl and Rink, 2005).
After 1990, an overall improvement of GI in the city including the hinter-
land took place. A ‘green belt’ around the city was created, which included the 
renaturation of former lignite coal mining sites as new water landscapes, and 
also demanded the active cooperation between urban and regional actors.1 
Many of the above- mentioned brownfield sites saw green reuse through the 
creation of new parks and other green uses (Figure 7.1), while existing parks 
were enlarged, restructured and improved, and water landscapes such as the 
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Karl- Heine- Chanel were completely restructured and made accessible for 
walkers, cyclists and boaters (Stadt Leipzig 2017, pp. 43– 47). ‘Green’ interim 
uses, such as urban community gardens, playgrounds and urban agriculture 
experiments (e.g. the millennium field for Urban EXPO 2000), and new forms 
of use, such as urban afforestation areas, were set up (Rink and Arndt, 2016; 
Rink and Behne, 2017; Figure 7.1). Interim uses were legalized by a specific 
instrument, the so- called licence agreements, an informal planning tool to 
regulate limited term public- use of private property while still maintaining 
the owner’s building rights (Rall and Haase, 2011).
For realizing these projects, new cooperation between municipal and 
civic society actors was established. Greening strategies helped to reuse 
abandoned or post- demolition spaces, keep residential neighbourhoods 
attractive and improve quality of life. Some of the projects, such as the urban 
forest experimentation project (Rink and Arndt, 2016), were explicitly 
linked to sustainability and climate change adaptation goals. Other projects, 
such as the millennium field, became prominent examples of brownfield 
reuse during Leipzig’s involvement in the EXPO 2000. Generally, the phase 
of early reurbanization that followed the period of shrinkage from around 
2000 onwards was one of experimentation and innovation. In this vein, GI 
became a deliberate strategy for quality of life improvement. Massive public 
investment in GI and the environment made Leipzig one of Germany’s large 
cities with the best living conditions.
Since 2010, Leipzig represents one of the hubs of urban (re)growth in 
Germany. The city has seen yearly growth rates of more than 2 per cent 
during those years. Today, we see re- densification instead of de- densification. 
Less dense or green plots of land, as well as open space in general, have 
come under the pressure of high- density reuse (Haase et al., 2017a, pp. 17– 
18). Interim uses especially are under pressure: some 25 per cent of those 
areas are already rebuilt and many others will follow (Rall and Haase, 
2011). Additionally, community gardens that contributed to the upswing 
of neighbourhoods and attracted new inhabitants have to move constantly 
because of displacement. Traditional allotment gardens could also become 
endangered in the future by the demand for new building areas. At the 
same time, both green and blue infrastructures are increasingly deliber-
ately employed in restructuring and in new housing construction projects. 
New growth thus endangers some green qualities and standards that were 
achieved in the period of shrinkage. Simultaneously, first signs of ‘green 
inequalities’, due to city- wide segregation processes related to new, expen-
sive and ‘green’ housing projects, have emerged, mostly in the most attractive 
inner- city districts.
‘New thinking’ and planning priorities from the period of shrinkage, 
which had a stronger focus on green reuse of lots and areas that were unlikely 
to be rebuilt, lost their importance almost immediately as the city started to 
regrow. Interests once again follow the logics of the market and maximum 
benefit. This is all the more true because the municipality is (despite new 
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Figure 7.1  New urban green spaces resulting from brownfield conversion after 1990: the Lene- Voigt- Park named after Leipzig’s 
famous dialect writer making the place a post- socialist legacy with new meanings for recreation and health as well as 
a place of cultural heritage of the city (left); newly created green spaces in Leipzig: urban forest (centre); and spontan-
eous green interim use (right) after the demolition of former built structures
Source: A. Haase
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growth) poor and depends on private investment (Haase et al., 2017b). In 
this context, public ownership of space and good arguments for keeping 
public green spaces in the inner city are crucial for their maintenance. For 
this purpose, the city of Leipzig elaborated a new green space strategy in 
2017 (Stadt Leipzig, 2017). This is particularly important because GI on 
privately and individually owned houses or land patches is increasingly 
displaced by the construction of new houses.
Private use of green and blue infrastructures serves mostly only those who 
can afford to live in new housing complexes, revitalized lofts, etc. Within the 
past years, the urban green- health nexus has become more in focus because 
of increased traffic, pollution and health problems arising from exposure 
and a lack of greenery along main roads with heavy traffic loads (Kabisch 
et al., 2014). Another threat to GI and sustainability goals in Leipzig is its 
long- term austerity policy and the commitment of the city to get rid of muni-
cipal debts by 2037 (Haase et al., 2014).
At the moment, Leipzig finds itself in a puzzling situation: the city benefits 
from a good image whereby GI plays an important role but is under pressure 
because of new growth. The main question will be how opposing interests 
will be negotiated in the future. The post- socialist ‘legacy’ of the city still 
works as an ingredient of what we see today. On the one hand, post- socialist 
shrinkage and the related land/ building abandonment were partly turned 
into new green areas. On the other, its location in Eastern Germany makes 
Leipzig, despite its high attractiveness, one of Germany’s cheapest large cities 
in terms of housing and living costs, which now attracts further inhabitants 
thus causing re- densification and increased pressure on green infrastructure. 
The case of Leipzig is specific because of a combination of post- socialist 
changes and a simultaneous integration into Western German and European 
political and institutional structures. It is also specific because of massive 
state funding to improve the environment, and green and blue areas.
Łódź, Poland
Łódź is the third largest city in Poland, 140 km south- west of Warsaw. It 
currently has around 700,000 inhabitants, down from 850,000 in 1989. 
The area of the city is 293 km2 and, depending on which green space cat-
egories are included, the share of green spaces in the city area is between 
13 per cent and 60 per cent (Feltynowski et al., 2018; Kabisch and Haase, 
2014; Figure 7.2), the latter including arable land, orchards, brownfields, 
etc. Regardless of which measure we use, the share of green spaces in the city 
area has been shrinking with the ongoing socio- economic transition since 
1989 (Feltynowski et al., 2018; Kabisch and Haase, 2013).
Łódź, and especially its city centre, is widely perceived as grey and 
neglected, and it suffers from unsatisfactory environmental health indicators. 
Green spaces in Łódź are under constant pressure from the development 
of infrastructure and other priorities (Kronenberg, 2015). The potential 
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for green spaces to improve the quality of life for urban inhabitants has 
only recently begun to be recognized by local authorities (Giergiczny and 
Kronenberg, 2014). Much of this pressure is due to the reintroduction in 
Poland of a free market economy in 1989. The freedom to purchase land 
and houses has brought about socio- spatial changes in post- socialist cities, 
with suburbanization, fragmentation of ecosystems and gentrification of 
certain areas (Marcińczak and Sagan, 2011; Tsenkova and Polanska, 2014).
Despite rapid growth in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th, 
Łódź remained relatively compact until the beginning of the 21st century, 
with rather clearly designated functional zones and extensive agricultural 
areas (Dzionek- Kozlowska et al., 2018). During the socialist period, GI was 
under- maintained in the core city, whereas relatively large green spaces were 
established in the newly erected housing estates (Kronenberg et al., 2017b). 
Green spaces also increased because of enlargement of the city boundaries 
(Kronenberg et  al., 2017b). After 1990, Łódź’s development was focused 
on economic restructuring and strongly market- oriented. Shrinkage and 
Land cover/Land use
Forest area fewer than 500 pople
500 - < 1,500 people
1,500 - < 3,000 people
3,000 - < 6,000 people
more than 6,000
Green urban areas/parks
Cemeteries
Allotment gardens
City border
Availability of urban green
Figure 7.2  (left) Urban green space of Łódź in the Urban Atlas database; (right) 
Availability of urban green space and forest areas of a minimum size of 
2 ha to urban inhabitants living within a 300 m distance using detailed 
Urban Atlas data
Note 1: Urban Atlas only defines forest area and green urban areas
Note 2:  Only those grid cells that are shaded are within this distance. The respective 
colour of those grid cells represents the number of people living in that grid cell. 
Calculation is based on GEOSTAT 1 km² grid and Urban Atlas land cover data
Source: Kabisch et al., 2016b
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abandonment led to the emergence of many brownfield sites in Łódź’s indus-
trial areas, and suburbanization both outside and within the city borders 
led to new sealing and a decrease in green space (Kronenberg et al., 2017b). 
The baseline planning document for the city was ‘The study of land use 
conditions and directions’ (the master plan), which to some extent secured, 
until 2009, the compact character of Łódź as well as protected zones of 
ecosystem service delivery located around the city. Since 2016, national law 
has automatically released agricultural land within urban boundaries from 
productive functions and related protections, and simplified the procedures 
for acquiring building permissions. This reinforced urbanization, which 
earlier proceeded along roads and around existing suburban settlements, 
and later affected agricultural land around forests and in proximity to areas 
of protected landscapes, reserves and river valleys.
Also, earlier local zoning plans were repealed in 2003 as part of the reform 
of the spatial planning system. As a result, at the end of 2016, only about 
15 per cent of the area of Łódź was covered by new local zoning plans and, 
in the remainder, construction decisions are still been made ad hoc based 
on very simplistic criteria with priority given to any sort of investment. 
As a result, despite a shrinking population, urban sprawl has accelerated, 
supported by the general favourability of suburbanization by Polish policy.
Officially, authorities focus on inner city development, making use of 
post- industrial land and other brownfields. In 2014, the city initiated a large 
urban revival project, which focuses on the historical centre of the city with 
an overall objective to improve living conditions. In practice, the project 
focuses on restoring historical buildings and densifying the urban tissue, 
again in an attempt to make the city centre more attractive and encourage 
people to live there rather than move outside. In addition, there is a series 
of large- scale investment projects being carried out in the city centre around 
the reconstructed railway station. Unfortunately, these large projects, similar 
to most of the revitalization plans and many other smaller municipal invest-
ment projects, neglect blue- green infrastructure and significantly contribute 
to paving the city.
Street greenery and green spaces in residential areas provide a particularly 
relevant example of the loss of green infrastructure components in Polish 
cities in general and in Łódź in particular (Kronenberg, 2015). According to 
official data, the number of new trees planted in Łódź per year more than 
doubled between 2010 and 2015. However, it was only in 2015 that the 
number of planted trees slightly exceeded the number of removed trees for 
the first time. Young trees planted in Polish cities survive an average of ten 
years. Therefore, even planting as many trees as those that are removed does 
not ensure replacement, not to mention the differences in benefits offered by 
large removed trees and small, newly planted ones (Łukaszkiewicz, 2013).
To make matters worse, there is no inventory of street trees in Łódź and 
management practices in the city centre are largely restricted to removing 
trees that are deemed ‘in bad condition’ or related to new infrastructural 
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developments. Compensation plantings are ordered only when healthy trees 
are removed and these mostly take place outside the city centre. Although pre-
vious legal documents downplayed the significance of urban trees and urban 
green spaces in general (Kronenberg, 2015), new regulations introduced at 
the beginning of 2017 by the populist government have further loosened the 
legal protection of urban trees and green spaces.
Moreover, some green spaces are under particular pressure because they 
are seen as relics of the socialist past. In particular, this concerns allotment 
gardens, which are often seen as wastelands and potential investment areas 
by those who promote a ‘modern’ vision of the city. Moreover, as allotments 
are often used by underprivileged social groups, their interests are rarely 
voiced in public discussions.
All the above reflects how neglected green spaces have been in policy and 
especially decision making in Łódź to date. Even parks that seem to be the 
best- protected green spaces in the city centre are subject to threats such as 
road construction or encroaching residential buildings (Haase et al., 2017b). 
This has taken place despite several important research projects focused 
on urban green and blue infrastructures undertaken by research institutes 
and non- governmental organizations (Giergiczny and Kronenberg, 2014; 
Kronenberg et al., 2012; Ratajczyk et al., 2017). Since the beginning of the 
21st century, such research and knowledge dissemination activities have 
helped to introduce concepts of ecosystem services and blue- green infra-
structure to planning documents in Łódź.
At the same time, there have been attempts to promote and better pre-
serve GI in Łódź. The most prominent of these attempts was the formula-
tion of the Blue- Green Network concept in the mid- 2000s, which suggested 
that Łódź should invest in the rehabilitation and restoration of its 18 
rivers, and that these should serve as green and blue corridors that would 
connect the inner city with peri- urban zones. Interestingly, the rivers are 
not present in public awareness because most of them – at least in the city 
centre  – are hidden in underground culverts or other channels. Bringing 
them to public awareness, and hypothetically also to daylight, has been cru-
cial for discussions regarding GI. However, although this concept has been 
welcomed by most if not all stakeholders, and has been formally included 
in several planning documents, very little has happened to implement it in 
practice (Kronenberg et al., 2017a). Quite to the contrary, as indicated by 
the aforementioned examples of urban sprawl and ongoing urban revival 
activities, GI is hardly considered and never as an interconnected system.
In short, the post- socialist context has made the maintenance and devel-
opment of urban GI difficult because it has brought about the neglect of 
public interests and the high political prioritization of private interests. Even 
though there is already considerable knowledge and data on urban GI, and 
on the related social preferences in Łódź, this knowledge is not reflected in 
public decision making. To the contrary, factors such as limited budgets, 
inadequate regulations, neoliberal orientation and poor collaboration 
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between different stakeholders contribute to the further loss of GI. External 
initiatives, such as the European Union requirement to produce urban cli-
mate adaptation strategies, are often seen as an irrelevant and unnecessary 
burden rather than an opportunity to contribute to improved quality of life 
and to making the city more attractive for its inhabitants. Still, since 2012, 
when the city adopted its Integrated Development Strategy 2020+ (City of 
Łódź Office, 2012), and as a result of public pressure to include environ-
mental issues in this strategy, there is hope that more attention will gradually 
be paid to urban GI in decisions and documents. As shown by recent urban 
revival strategies, however, city authorities are still reluctant to use existing 
knowledge and translate it into practical decisions regarding the conscious 
use of urban GI.
Arkhangelsk, Russia
Arkhangelsk is one of the oldest cities on the Arctic Coast which, compared 
with the majority of other Northern Russian cities that were founded pri-
marily at the beginning of the 20th century, received city status in 1584 
when it was the most important seaport of medieval and early- modern 
Russia – hence its status as ‘gateway to the Arctic’. Today, Arkhangelsk is 
one of the largest seaports in Northern Russia and an important centre of 
saw mills, timber, shipping and the fishing industry (Feklistov, 2014). In both 
the Stalin and Khrushchev periods, the typical residential stone houses were 
built and prevail even today. The political transition after 1990 brought with 
it a phase of extreme uncertainty and decay: residents waited for many years 
for the state to decide on renovations and new flats, but nothing ever came 
to fruition (Belyaev et al., 2010). The lack of funding hindered any work 
that was to be done on the ageing wooden houses and, in turn, worsened 
living conditions. Under such circumstances, greening ideas and projects 
are without lobbying power and have little chance of being realized. These 
circumstances are quite similar to those in other post- socialist countries and 
cities, and make Arkhangelsk a very illustrative and knowledge- contributing 
case to the discussion on ‘post- socialist greening’.
Historically, Arkhangelsk had only a small number of parks. As far 
back as the 18th century, the areas surrounding housing were ‘greened’ 
largely thanks to foreigners who began to improve their neighbourhoods 
(Belyaev et al., 2010) using trees and shrubs for decoration, for example. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the first general plan was created and 
industrial areas, residential areas, the city centre and also open spaces were 
defined. In the years following World War II, activists established the All- 
Russian Society for the promotion and protection of urban green spaces, 
which became an important environmental movement. Available green 
space for all was one of the essential goals of urban planning in the Soviet 
Union. Most of the green spaces in Arkhangelsk were established during the 
Soviet period. Furthermore, per capita and minimum size targets of public 
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green space were developed for each settlement according to population 
size and geographical conditions. According to those targets, Arkhangelsk, a 
city belonging to the population category of between 250,000 and 500,000 
inhabitants, should have 34.4 m2 of green space per capita. To accomplish 
this target, extensive greening took place including the construction of large 
parks and squares. Green targets are therefore not only an instrument of 
the post- socialist period but have been deeply rooted in town planning of 
Russian cities for decades.
Per capita green space in the city significantly increased during the Soviet 
period, namely from 2 m2 (1850) to 18– 25 m2 (1950– 1960) to its max-
imum in the 1970s of 37 m2. However, in the early post- Soviet period, per 
capita green space declined to 27 m2 in the 1990s and to 19 m2 in the 2000s. 
This correlates with population growth and the new construction boom that 
included new houses for the upper- middle class as well as shopping malls 
and commercial space. Population and commercial growth also resulted in 
extreme air pollution, mainly from the pulp and paper industry, and thus 
former green spaces were not only built on but, additionally, became them-
selves sources of pollution (after having been built).
The development of urban greening in state socialist Arkhangelsk came 
about from the need to solve three key problems in the city: to provide for 
safe sanitary conditions and aesthetics of the urban environment; to create 
places where citizens could spend leisure time in an outdoor setting; and to 
shape opportunities for people to meet and communicate (Dushkova et al., 
2016). The strategy of greening the streets of Arkhangelsk reduces transport 
emissions by up to 35 per cent. Furthermore, green spaces (especially under 
trees) trap 20– 80 per cent of dust and minimize the overall noise level up 
to 25 per cent (Babich et al., 2008; Feklistov, 2014). Coniferous trees, the 
dominant type of trees in Arkhangelsk next to deciduous ones, reduce the 
strength and speed of wind in the winter up to 10 times (Dushkova et al., 
2016). This is of great importance because the frequency of weather with 
wind forces of more than 4– 5 m/ s (i.e. the threshold of negative physio-
logical changes in the human organism) in Arkhangelsk is very high. Urban 
green space contributes to a 25 per cent reduction in mortality rates relating 
to respiratory diseases: citizens and especially children from districts with 
higher green areas per capita have fewer respiratory diseases like asthma 
and bronchitis than their neighbours from ‘green- poor’ districts (Dushkova 
et  al., 2016). Green spaces also contribute to mental health, ecological 
education and fostering of a feeling of home among citizens (Dushkova 
et al., 2016).
Greening projects during the Soviet era were often carried out without 
taking into account ecological aspects and long- term management. This led 
to inhabitants of these new neighbourhoods being obliged to take care of the 
courtyards and backyards, squares and parks themselves. For this purpose, 
voluntary get- togethers of city residents, known as ‘subbotniks’ (taking 
place on Saturdays) and ‘voskresniks’ (on Sundays), appeared to improve or 
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clean up green spaces (Figure 7.3). Such ‘social cohesion practices’ aimed to 
contribute to the ecological and sanitary improvement of the affected green 
spaces and surrounding residential areas while, at the same time, promoting 
collectivism as the main purpose of public life within the major leitmotif of 
state socialism (Ignatieva et al., 2013).
Arkhangelsk today has a population of 350,982. Accounting for an area 
of 10,334 ha, public green spaces and parks make up 35 per cent of the 
city’s total area, or 29.9 m2 per capita (City Administration of Arkhangelsk, 
2015). Arkhangelsk has a higher percentage of green space compared with 
other Northern Russian cities, only ‘topped’ by Murmansk (56.5 per cent) 
and Petrozavodsk (44 per cent). According to Arkhangelsk’s general plan, 
the total green space shall expand to at least 3,446 ha of which 1,050 ha, 
or 36.2 per cent, still need to be converted. Statistically, Arkhangelsk can 
be considered a green city because of its large number of parks, gardens, 
squares, boulevards, green areas and urban forests. However, the past 
decades of transition have led to the deterioration of many parks because 
of a lack of finances and new in- fill constructions. While the legacy of the 
Soviet park tradition based on communist ideology is still apparent, there 
is a large discrepancy between what green spaces have remained and what 
are needed today.
The new general plan for Arkhangelsk, established after 1991 by the 
urban planning department, focuses on the ongoing process of urbanization 
leading to an increase of anthropogenic pressure on existing urban green 
areas and the worsening of the ecological situation in the city. The protec-
tion of existing green areas from development and the growing demand for 
parking represent the greatest challenges for Arkhangelsk’s central districts 
since their establishment by Peter the Great. Those districts that were created 
during the Soviet era have a higher amount of green area compared with the 
Figure 7.3  Public participation in greening during subbotniks:  (left) 1938, (right) 
2014
Sources: (left) Old Arkhangelsk, (right) Diana Dushkova
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central districts. However, these green areas need extensive repair and mod-
ernization after decades of neglect. New residential areas constructed over 
the past few years often completely lack green space (Feklistov, 2014).
According to the city’s general plan for future development (2009), one of 
the main tasks is the increase of green space by 70 per cent in relation to the 
actual total area. However, maintaining existing parks comes at the expense 
of local and supplemental budgetary funds allocated for the improvement 
of districts, and is thus partly weak. Given the lack of funding, greening and 
landscaping are sporadic and characterized by an almost complete lack of 
coordination among departments dealing with green areas and other related 
issues. Conflicts often occur because of differing needs within the urban 
planning strategy. However, such a governance perspective is extremely rele-
vant to the improvement of the urban environment.
After the fall of state socialism and the establishment of a post- Soviet 
capitalist regime, urban space has been characterized by an extreme pri-
vatization, the exclusion of citizens from decision making regarding spatial 
development and use, and a strict control of space by local authorities and 
business elites. Despite a liberalization and internationalization of values and 
consumption practices, the legacy of the Soviet era still shapes Arkhangelsk’s 
modern urban culture and the identity of its citizens  – for example, the 
residents’ appreciation and use of green spaces for aesthetic inspiration, 
recreation, sanitation and social encounters, or the continued practice of 
subbotnik. The green spaces continue to be places for everyday social inter-
action among city dwellers. At the same time, they are places of contestation 
where ecological activists protest against the demolishing of green areas for 
new building projects. Thus, current urban planning in Arkhangelsk is often 
challenged by different perceptions of urban space – either as a home and 
environment for local people to live, or as a place for investment and new 
housing and commercial projects.
Today, Arkhangelsk needs new ideas for finding a balanced way to navi-
gate its history and traditions, and it also needs innovations in the planning, 
design and management of urban landscapes. From its experience with the 
development of green areas during Soviet times, Arkhangelsk has consider-
able potential regarding the creation of a sustainable green infrastructure 
that could enhance the quality of urban life. The example of Arkhangelsk 
illustrates that citizens need to take an active role in greening and envir-
onmental protection actions. There is some well- founded hope that envir-
onmental concerns will become a part of mainstream strategies of urban 
development throughout the entire country in the future.
Conclusion
The cross- case study comparison presented in this chapter offers a full range 
of interesting findings that bring the discussion of GI in post- socialist cities 
forward, showing both similarities and differences, all of which have legacies 
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and path dependencies in the post- socialist past of the respective countries. 
In the following, we summarize these findings in four premises that we wish 
to bring into the discussion:
 1) There is no single post- socialist case or type or pattern. The comparison 
of the three cases shows that there are three different contexts and 
distinct pathways of post- socialist transformation that the cities have 
followed within the past decades. However, in all three cases, we have 
the legacy of the state socialist past that interferes with or has an impact 
on the way post- socialist transformation has emerged and developed. 
While the characteristics of this relation between legacy and transform-
ation are different across the cases, the fundamental structure of elem-
ents or ingredients of recent change are of the same nature.
 2) A common characteristic between the cases is the fact that, during the 
post- socialist period, multiple changes occurred at the same time and 
in a very short period of time. Post- socialist change as such gave way 
to new problems, such as rapid and rushed privatization or the with-
drawal of state action and planning. But new opportunities also arose, 
such as the development of a civic society and the transformation of 
fundamental mindsets and values, as well as developments in living and 
housing standards. This multiplicity of change and co- existence of both 
new problems and chances had an impact on all policy fields in post- 
socialist cities, including GI development and management. Arkhangelsk 
is distinct from the two European case studies in that more continuity in 
GI planning was apparent than in Germany and Poland.
 3) When looking more closely at GI development and management, we can 
identify slightly different developments in the three different settings. 
The Leipzig case is somewhat different from the other two cases in 
that the transformation period began with German reunification that 
brought new political, legal and institutional settings overnight, plus EU 
membership. Leipzig’s development has been characterized by massive 
shrinkage in the 1990s and reurbanization and dynamic regrowth since 
2010. The restructuring, decontamination and renaturation activities 
that occurred after 1990 were massively funded by the EU and par-
ticularly the national state, the latter dissimilarly to any other post- 
socialist context. While the ‘extreme development’ since 2010 favoured 
green solutions in the time of shrinkage, recently green spaces have 
come under more pressure due to increasing demand for construc-
tion space. The main question today is how opposing interests will 
be negotiated in the future and what remains from the ‘legacy’ of the 
post- socialist shrinkage period that produced new green areas such 
as parks, community gardens or interim use open spaces like pocket 
parks. Compared with Leipzig, Łódź and Arkhangelsk – although the 
latter to a lesser extent – have shown since the early 1990s what impact 
a more market- oriented and neoliberal approach to restructuring has 
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had on the cities, urban societies and GI development – which seems 
quite typical for many post- socialist countries in Eastern Europe except 
the former GDR (see also Hirt, 2012). GI was not a priority for trans-
formation, and qualities that were created during state socialist times 
were sometimes lost because of a lack of maintenance, use, care and 
demand during the times of restructuring, reorganization and social 
harshness in the 1990s. Nevertheless, there are enormous potentials 
for the future, and it has become clear that civic society especially can 
make a strong contribution to making cities greener and more healthy, 
perhaps with support from the municipalities but also in the absence 
of such municipal strategies and efforts. Nevertheless, EU initiatives, 
such as the guidelines for urban climate adaptation strategies or the 
NATURA 2000 programme, are predominantly perceived as ‘extra-
mural’, irrelevant and unnecessary burdens, rather than as opportun-
ities to contribute to improved quality of life and  catalysts for making 
cities more attractive for inhabitants. Compared with other cities, GI 
development in Arkhangelsk had already begun in pre- socialist times 
and was actively shaped in socialist times and later, exhibiting more 
continuity in urban governance than in Leipzig or in Łódź. A similarity 
between Leipzig and Arkhangelsk is the engagement of civil society in 
GI maintenance and stewardship, which we can also understand as a 
remnant from socialist times (subbotniks) and thus the function of GI 
management as a carrier of social norms, place making and identifica-
tion (Andersson and Barthel, 2016).
 4) The quality of green spaces in the three cities varies considerably in terms 
of shape, biodiversity, functions and use. At least in Leipzig and Łódź, 
land use pressure in the inner cities is high and green spaces are perceived 
to a certain extent as reserve land for investment purposes, so cheap 
and straightforward ‘green solutions’ (e.g. lawns and fast growing heat- 
and drought- resistant trees) are preferred because they serve to achieve 
municipal targets such as per capita green space or green space acces-
sibility minimums. Quality criteria, such as species composition, struc-
tural diversity or the preference of native plants or animals, rarely play 
a role. Setting these notions against what we have written in the intro-
duction to the  chapter – that GI is a place maker and identity creator in 
cities – the ‘economic view’ on GI being a functioning unit of the urban 
matrix rather than a living element of nature that has an impactthrough 
its diversity could become completely lost, and with it the ecosystem 
services that GI could provide. Finally, regarding the links between GI 
development and post- socialism, all three case studies show that GI can 
be looked at as a mirror of societal development, and that it reflects 
major determining factors and influences of post- socialist societies. All 
developments that emerged in the case studies are, until today, connected 
to the early phase of transformation or at least bear some of its leg-
acies. When compared with other types of urban infrastructures, GI is no 
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exception with regard to the outline of change as a mosaic of prevailing, 
new and hybrid structures, uses and mindsets. The increased interest in 
and importance of GI as an indicator for ‘green thinking’ and healthy 
solutions to urbanization problems in scientific and public debates is 
not a specific post- socialist phenomenon, but rather categorizes our 
three cities as typical examples of European cities, or cities anywhere 
in the world, being urged to cope with increased needs and demands 
for a greener and more healthy environment on one hand, and with the 
constraints of scarce municipal budgets and limited land availability, as 
well as general trends in market- driven urbanization, on the other.
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8  Moscow urban development
Neoliberal urbanism and green 
infrastructures
Daniela Zupan and Mirjam Büdenbender
Introduction
Moscow has changed dramatically in recent years (Büdenbender and Zupan, 
2017a; Kalyukin et al., 2015). Yet today, less than a decade after Moscow’s 
current mayor Sergey Sobyanin announced a new programme for Moscow’s 
urban development – from construction- driven to more human- focused – the 
first tensions in this new urban approach can already be observed. Members 
of the public question the honesty and motives of the agenda in intense 
public debates, while at the same time the city is increasingly struggling to 
finance its ambitious plans.
This chapter therefore sets out to systematically examine key aspects of 
Moscow’s current model of urban development and to identify causes for 
its underlying tensions. To do so, we build on a previous study in which 
we argued that Moscow’s transformation in the past years is a quintes-
sential case of neoliberal restructuring (Büdenbender and Zupan, 2017a). 
In this chapter, we advance this argument through the lens of green 
urban infrastructures. While green infrastructures include a broad range 
of open spaces that a city provides for its population  – including parks, 
sport facilities, cemeteries, green belts, areas for allotment gardens (Rusche 
et al., 2015) – we will focus exclusively on parks. We do so because parks 
have developed into new frontiers for commercialization, they are places 
where neoliberal subjects are forged, ‘participatory’ urban development is 
celebrated and cities’ global competitiveness is negotiated. This is particu-
larly visible in many of Moscow’s flagship projects that we examine here. 
Considering their centrality in Moscow’s neoliberal urbanism, we argue that 
parks are not only material urban infrastructures performing a variety of 
urban functions (e.g. recreational, environmental, sanitary), but have also 
become devices for the expansion of neoliberalism. Therefore, they function 
as infrastructures in a more metaphorical sense with very real effects for the 
urban environment and its inhabitants.
This chapter adds two contributions to the existing scholarship on post- 
socialist cities. First, we interrogate parks as infrastructure for neoliberal 
urbanization  – an aspect that has thus far received insufficient attention. 
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Here it is important to note that we study both new parks and existing ones 
that are currently being ‘upgraded’. In particular, our examples are Gorky 
Park, VDNKh and Zaryadye. Second, we engage with the malleability of 
green urban infrastructures in terms of their socio- material, symbolic and 
political functions and meanings. The chapter therefore focuses on polit-
ical agendas, rather than the everyday life dimensions and performances of 
neoliberal urbanisms. Both foci finally lead back to our initial aim: to inter-
rogate the tensions and contradictions built into the current dynamics of 
neoliberal urbanization in Moscow.
The study is based on a mix of qualitative research methods. We undertook 
a document analysis based on secondary literature and primary sources, such 
as government, professional and media publications (specialized journals 
on urban planning and design, planning documents, blogs, and published 
and unpublished reports). We also gathered information in person at the 
Moscow Architecture Biennale 2014 and the Moscow Urban Forum 2014. 
Furthermore, we conducted 12 in- depth, semi- structured interviews with 
academics, urban planning practitioners, policy actors and urban critics in 
Moscow.
The chapter is structured in five parts. Section 2 engages with the state of 
the art on green infrastructures and neoliberalism in post- socialist cities. In 
Section 3, we analyse green infrastructures in Moscow, presenting Sobyanin’s 
park strategy as a key arena of neoliberal urbanism and a stage of its con-
tinuous reconfiguration. Section 4 identifies emerging tensions in the con-
temporary strategy and discusses their underlying causes, while Section 5 
makes some concluding remarks.
Theoretical framework
The mobilization of sustainability discourses and associated green policies 
has been shown to be an important dimension of neoliberal urbanization in 
cities across the globe (Heynen et al., 2007). ‘Green neoliberalism’ (Gareau, 
2011) opens up new frontiers of capital accumulation and depoliticizes 
deeper issues surrounding the commodification of nature and human- 
induced environmental degradation. For instance, environmentally urgent 
issues such as reforestation and climate change mitigation are separated 
from the mode of production and class relations that have produced them 
in the first place. Mechanisms such as carbon trading platforms create new 
markets but shift attention away from deeper political issues of political 
responsibility and the (un)desirability of the commodification of nature 
(Felli, 2015). Active environmental policies and interventions such as river 
restoration, the clean- up of old industrial sites or ‘eco- investment’ in public 
transport have been shown to be important in re- imagining and re- branding 
cities to open up actual urban spaces for new waves of investment (Heynen 
and Perkins, 2005; Keil, 2002). Green urban infrastructures in particular are 
often considered a cheap ‘sustainability fix’ by which urban governments 
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and growth coalitions rework urban environments and ecologies to sus-
tain their own dominance and safeguard the interests of capital (Davidson, 
2013; While et  al., 2004). Indeed, parks and other green infrastructures 
are considered to make cities more attractive and liveable places, drawing 
people and investments to urban centres (Gulsrud et al., 2013). Rather than 
preventing economic development, the green infrastructure idea therefore 
tends to complement neoliberal agendas (Matthews et al., 2015). While the 
idea that urban sustainability can serve competitive capitalism is nothing 
new, recent studies found that it ‘gains new momentum in urban politics as 
the green economy is nowadays considered as a very profitable sector that 
may replace the previous industrial sector’ (Rosol et al., 2017).
Even though green neoliberalism has thus received considerable schol-
arly attention in the context of Western European and North American 
cities, there is a relative lack of research within the field of post- socialist 
urban studies. To be sure, there is significant scholarship addressing the 
processes involved in public space transformation (for an overview, see 
Kalyukin et  al., 2015) and some works tracing the history and function 
of green infrastructures in post- socialist cities (Åkerlund and Schipperijn, 
2007; Dushkova et  al., 2016). Studies on Moscow, for example, tend to 
focus on the loss or degradation of green urban infrastructures (Blinnikov 
et al., 2006; Zaykova, 2016). Still, so far there is relatively little critical dis-
cussion of the role of green infrastructures in processes of neoliberal urban-
ization in post- socialist cities. One exception is the work by Kalyukin et al. 
(2015), in which they analyse the transformation of Moscow’s Gorky Park 
since 2011, presenting it as a case of neoliberal reconfiguration.
This gap is particularly problematic because it can be assumed that the 
functions of green infrastructures in Russia have undergone fundamental 
transformations since the inception of market relations. The interplay 
between neoliberalism and what is mostly referred to as ‘socialist legacies’ 
has been framed differently in the literature on post- socialist cities (for an 
overview, see Büdenbender, 2017, pp. 23 f., 48). We follow Golubchikov 
et al. (2014, p. 624) who suggest that, in the context of global capitalism, 
‘the spatial legacy of state socialism should be re- imagined as the very infra-
structure of neoliberalization, within which neoliberal capitalism becomes 
embedded and which it uses for accumulation’. Thus, even when retaining 
their socialist- era appearances, these legacies ‘are now fundamentally 
subordinated to, and cater for, capitalist immediacies and are, accordingly, 
rendered a rather different ideology, meaning and significance than in the 
past’ (ibid., p. 623).
While Moscow’s parks therefore form parts of the city’s actual material 
infrastructure, they can also become the infrastructures through which 
dynamics of commercialization and neoliberalization can be unfolded. It is 
important to note, however, that we do not consider neoliberalism an all- 
encompassing and totalizing force. Instead we understand neoliberalization 
to be partial, messy, contradictory and contested. Neoliberalism is both a 
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conscious elite project and the (un- )intentional performance of everyday life 
practices, which tend to perform differently from envisaged or expected ‘on 
the ground’. Seen from this perspective, cities are important laboratories 
and battlegrounds for power struggles and central resistance sites of and to 
neoliberalism (Leitner et al., 2007; Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Hence, while 
neoliberalization unfolds in cities – not least through its parks – the context- 
specific limitations of and to this process might open up opportunities for 
counter- dynamics.
The politics of parks and Moscow
Parks are not a new topic in Moscow’s urban development. Indeed, many 
of the parks that are currently being restructured have their origins in the 
Soviet period. The Central Park of Culture and Recreation (Gorky Park), 
for example, was built in 1928. Gorky Park was regarded as a proto-
type for a new kind of socialist park and became a model for many of the 
urban parks that were developed all across the Soviet Union (Kulikov and 
Ostrogorsky, 2013, p. 108; Shaw, 2011, p. 343). The park was supposed to 
radically improve the organization of recreation and entertainment – a place 
for the proletariat to relax, politically develop and socialize with the prole-
tarian collective (Varshaver, 1932, cited in Kulikov and Ostrogorsky, 2013, 
p. 108). Also, parks were considered stages and media of political agitation 
and ideological propagation (Kulikov and Ostrogorsky, 2013, p. 108). Thus, 
emulating the example of Gorky Park, urban green spaces across the Soviet 
Union were planned as powerful cultural factories, combining political, edu-
cational and fitness functions on a mass scale (ibid.).
When socialism collapsed and countries underwent fundamental polit-
ical and economic restructuring, concerns about urban nature and greening 
became relegated to the bottom of policy priorities (Dushkova et al., 2016). 
Indeed, as was the case with public spaces more generally, parks were rela-
tively neglected from an urban planning perspective. They often served as 
grounds for spontaneously formed informal markets that were selling any-
thing from home- made food to imported goods. In the case of Moscow, 
this did not automatically mean that green spaces were entirely ignored by 
the city administration. Instead, the city considered them as underutilized 
spaces for future construction and commerce (Kulikov and Ostrogorsky, 
2013, p. 109). For instance, the city passed a resolution for the construc-
tion of a music hall, hotel and underground parking complex in Gorky 
Park in 2006. When it became clear that the city did not have the cap-
ital to realize the project on its own, it developed a concept that would 
allow external investors to buy up to 75 per cent of the park (ibid.; Aminov, 
2007, 2010). Only after public outrage did the city abandon these plans. 
Instead, it announced its intention to create a platform in the park where 
representatives of opposition parties and movements could hold discussions 
and rallies (Aminov, 2010).
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In many ways, the popular protest and the officials’ intervention in the 
development of Gorky Park are representative of the changing role of parks 
in Moscow’s urban development in the past decade. Another indicator of 
such a trend was the 2008 exhibition, Arch- Moskva, which was themed 
‘Urban Space’ and focused on the shift from architecture to the wider 
urban environment. Foreign experts were invited to showcase experiences 
from ‘the West’ with public spaces including fancy parks, bike lanes and 
river embankments. However, the exhibition did not reflect the interests 
of Moscow’s powerful mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, and his associates in the real 
estate industry, who were mainly concerned with erecting glass and steel 
skyscrapers and elite housing. The renovation of the Tsaritsyno Park in 
Moscow was possibly the greatest investment in green infrastructure and 
the biggest exception to the general disregard for public spaces under Mayor 
Luzhkov. Yet, it was framed in populist terms as an adventure destination 
for families, thus reflecting the mayor’s mix of pro- market and populist wel-
fare policies known as the ‘Luzhkov compromise’ (Büdenbender and Zupan, 
2017a; Samutina and Zaporozhets, 2014).
While the first signs of a new appreciation for parks therefore date back 
to the Luzhkov administration, a real shift in green space policy- making 
took place when Sergey Sobyanin became Moscow’s new mayor. Indeed, 
it was only then that parks became a strategic element of Moscow’s urban 
development model. This was made explicit when Sobyanin visited neglected 
parks in Moscow in 2010, stating that the current situation would neither 
satisfy the needs of tourists and visitors nor reflect the pride of Moscow: ‘We 
should develop world- class parks so that we may pride ourselves on them’ 
(Sobyanin, cited in RIA novosti, 2010, our translation). Further, he stated 
that a new strategy for parks and recreational zones should be set up, and 
promised public hearings for the city’s largest parks and competitions (ibid.). 
This can be considered the start of the special city programme for developing 
parks. Accordingly, the ‘Gosudarstvennaya programma goroda Moskvy – 
Razvitie industrii otdycha i turizma na 2012– 2018 gody’ (State programme 
for the city of Moscow: development of the recreation and tourism industry 
in 2012– 2018) was set up first in 2011 and from then on extended and 
prolonged (Mos.ru, 2011). This programme comprised the aim of creating 
and renovating more than 100 objects of greenery in the following years, 
including parks, boulevards and playgrounds (see also Belov, 2013, p. 171). 
More than 115 billion roubles were allocated from the city’s budget for real-
izing this ambitious programme (ibid.).
This strategy for green spaces was understood as a key element in 
Moscow’s new programme of becoming ‘a city comfortable for life’ 
(Pravitelstvo Moskvy, 2014) and can be assumed a central element of 
Sobyanin’s neoliberal urbanism. In our previous work (2017a), we identi-
fied three key functions of neoliberal urban policies. Applying this frame-
work to Moscow allowed us to assess the city’s evolution over the past two 
and a half decades from the vantage point of neoliberalization. The three 
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dimensions comprise:  making a city globally competitive (place- making); 
making the urban economy conducive for investment (space- making); and 
creating responsible, entrepreneurial city dwellers (scripting). They are also 
instructive for examining and evaluating Moscow’s recent park strategy.
Parks – new icons in the global city competition (place- making)
In the mid 2000s, the lack of a comprehensive urban development vision 
in Moscow under Mayor Luzhkov, and highly disorderly and unregulated 
construction, began to undermine Moscow’s global image. In the light of 
the global financial crisis, money became more selective and high- quality 
urban environments became a central factor for global competition to 
secure investment (Stanilov, 2007). Mayor Sobyanin sought to maintain 
Moscow’s global competitiveness and attract investment, tourists and the 
expat community by promoting an image of a city that was comfortable 
for life. Moscow joined many cities worldwide in integrating the so- called 
human- friendly and sustainable urbanism propagated with great success by 
the Danish planner, Jan Gehl, for example. In 2013, Gehl’s firm published 
a report entitled ‘Moscow – Towards a great city for people’, in which it 
recommended a makeover for the city including, among others, the reduc-
tion of private cars and the creation of walkable and liveable cityscapes. 
As a follow- up to the project, ‘Moya ulica’ (‘My Street’) was launched 
in 2014, a huge project that aimed at making Moscow more pedestrian- 
friendly (Howard, 2016; Mos.ru, 2017a). In the course of this programme, 
87 sites, among them streets, boulevards, embankments and squares, are 
being refurbished (Mos.ru, 2017b).
An analysis of city documents of public events where various parks 
and other ‘green projects’ were showcased revealed that green urban 
infrastructures had become crucial in Moscow’s re- branding strategy. 
Indeed, the city made a conscious effort to present itself as a convenient, 
eco- oriented, healthy and orderly place. According to Sobyanin (in RIA 
novosti, 2010), the intention is to create ‘world- class’ parks to compete with 
cities like London, Paris or New York. Indeed, green infrastructures seem to 
have replaced or at least joined the strategy of cultural competitive urbanism 
with museums (Bilbao strategy) and the cultural capital as the most sym-
bolic icons. In this vein, the Moscow city administration launched a number 
of iconic projects, among them Gorky Park, Zaryadye Park and VDNKh. 
International examples no less iconic than Hyde Park in London, Central 
Park and Brooklyn Bridge Park in New York, Millennium Park in Chicago 
and Gardens by the Bay in Singapore were presented as role models for these 
projects. Furthermore, international competitions were held and well- known 
foreign experts were invited to take part in several of the new projects. The 
new park strategy was spearheaded by the renovation of Gorky Park of 
Culture and Leisure in 2011, which was planned in a cooperation with the 
Strelka postgraduate research school of architecture, design and media and 
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the British firm, LDA Design. For Zaryadye Park, an international com-
petition was held, the winner of which was Diller Scofidio + Renfro, the 
American architectural firm responsible for the New York High Line project 
(for a critical discussion, see Lang and Rothenberg, 2017).
Parks – generating revenue for private capital (space- making)
It was not only its chaotic image that jeopardized Moscow’s position in 
the global economy. Luzhkov’s unregulated, opaque and haphazard building 
bonanza made it increasingly difficult to attract international business 
investments. To facilitate continuous commodification, urban development 
had to be regulated and regularized in a way that was favourable for private 
investments.
On the city level, Mayor Sobyanin made it his priority to put an end to 
the disorderly pattern of urban development. Among others, he placed a ban 
on the construction of new commercial properties in Moscow’s city centre 
to reduce the serious traffic jams, which were noted as a key obstacle to the 
city’s aspirations of becoming an international financial centre, highlighting 
the limitations of unregulated construction- driven growth (Corcoran, 
2011). Instead, many plots in the city, some of which had been designated 
for construction, were turned into or preserved as green spaces. It is note-
worthy that many of the flagship park projects are situated in relatively 
central locations of Moscow, a trend that is reflected in the city’s strategy 
for upgrading public spaces more generally. This is not to say that Moscow’s 
periphery has been entirely neglected, although in comparison with the city 
centre it has received fewer and more minor efforts to improve its urban 
environment. It is thought that improvements to Moscow’s most vital parts 
of the city centre will sooner or later spread out to the rest of the city – a 
logic resembling the notion of trickle- down economics.
On a micro- level, regulation takes place through abolishing illegal traders 
and removing rather chaotic stands of barbecues, stalls selling goods, etc. 
Instead, ‘high- quality landscapes’, designated zones that are designed in line 
with state- of- the- art trends by well- known international urban planners, 
are created in which tenants can open fancy coffee chains, restaurants, 
and amusement and cultural venues. While the parks themselves are pre-
dominantly financed by the city, commercialization strategies are set up to 
get revenues back. For Zaryadye Park, for example, commercial functions 
operated by private investors will include restaurants, a hotel, a concert hall, 
amphitheatres and perhaps even an ice cave (Mos.ru, 2017c).
Parks – a political tool (scripting)
Lastly, Sobyanin’s strategy involved re- scripting Moscow’s relation to its 
own citizens from a populist megacity into a seemingly more open and 
democratic one that reflects the tastes of the Western- oriented middle class. 
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Indeed, the city administration has actively invested in upgrading public 
spaces to accommodate the ‘disgruntled’ middle class and please the expat 
community. When protests erupted all over Moscow in 2011, parks were a 
quick way of showing that something was actually changing.
This strategy was spearheaded by the renovation of Gorky Park of 
Culture and Leisure in 2011, which was transformed from a derelict public 
area into the meeting point for the city’s middle- class youth and expats 
(Kalyukin et al., 2015; Weaver, 2015). This model of low- investment/ high- 
effect upgrading of public space combining international state- of- the- art 
design, attractive commercial spaces and free WiFi has since then been 
replicated for the Krymskaya Embankment and the high- profile Zaryadye 
Park. The renovation of public spaces in line with the tastes and preferences 
of a certain group is part of what has been referred to as ‘aesthetics pol-
itics’, one element in the toolbox of neoliberal scripting (Walks, 2006, 
p.  466). Concrete politics are concealed through the adoption of an aes-
thetic language that reflects the values and identification of the opposition – 
the Muscovite youth, creative and middle class. At the same time, social 
outcasts and groups that do not belong to this ‘hip’, ‘creative’, ‘cultured’ 
and ‘Europeanized’ lifestyle are made unwelcome, contributing to a wider 
process of socio- spatial segregation (Kalyukin et  al., 2015, pp. 681, 692; 
Zhelnina, 2014, p.  246). Thus, many of the currently emerging green 
infrastructures become scripted with the help of urban planning and design 
to exclude particular functions, practices and people, actually serving a 
sustained ‘fragmentation of the social and material fabric of cities’ (Graham 
and Marvin, 2001, p. 33), which excludes the majority of the population 
who are not considered part of this ‘new comfort’. Indeed, public spaces and 
parks in particular are discussed as central infrastructure for transforming 
Moscow into an economically successful, post- industrial city by stimulating 
competition and exchange among its inhabitants (Revzin, 2017) – or, put 
another way, that celebrate ‘civilized’ and ‘cultured’ consumerism (Kalyukin 
et al., 2015, p. 692).
Another factor limiting equal inclusion of citizens in the park strategy is 
their location in the city centre where very few Muscovites actually live. As 
mentioned earlier, the underlying consideration of this ‘trickle- down logic’ 
is ‘that market processes produce the most efficient allocation of resources, 
provide incentives that stimulate innovation and economic growth, reward 
merit, and consequently are conducive to the greatest good of the greatest 
number’ (Fainstein, 2014, p. 6). This logic of ‘maximizing the greatest good 
for the greatest number’ (ibid.), however, completely fails ‘to take into 
account the impacts of policies on minorities and its blindness to questions of 
distribution’ (ibid.). Thus, while these policies are legitimized by the promise 
of comfort and well- being for everyone in the future, they immediately con-
solidate the position and wealth of the few who are already better off.
Sobyanin (in RIA novosti, 2010) also promised to include citizens in 
important park projects. Consequently, (seemingly) open and progressive 
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tools of urban planning were introduced. This includes new participative 
planning platforms like ‘Aktivny Grazhdanin’ (http:// ag.mos.ru/ ), a web-
site that is used to include citizens in the park strategy (Mos.ru, 2017a), or 
promoted public campaigns inviting Muscovites to share their ideas of what 
parks should be like or to vote on regulations concerning green infrastructures 
(Aktivnyy Grazhdanin, 2017). City dwellers are also regularly invited to 
attend activities, including open- air theatre, sport and gardening activities 
to produce these public green infrastructures as democratic, open places for 
the urban community (Kudago, 2017). Yet, the public was excluded from 
taking part in the planning process of one of the most important projects, 
Zaryadye Park, even though there was significant popular interest in it: ‘The 
level of interest in the project is off the scale’, as one planner noted (Plotkin, 
in Muratov, 2013, p. 86). Public participation was limited to an online vote 
about different branding strategies for the park.
Summing up, Sobyanin’s park strategy can be considered a key element 
of his broader approach of transforming Moscow into a more comfortable 
and human- centred city. Rather than signalling a shift towards sustain-
able and socially just cities, the green space strategy is aimed at improving 
Moscow’s international competitiveness, further commodifying urban space 
and polarizing society, thus deepening neoliberal urbanism. Yet Moscow’s 
current urban development paradigm is wrought with tensions. In the 
following section, we discuss some factors that help explain why Moscow’s 
only recently set- up development model came so quickly under pressure.
Unravelling Moscow’s neoliberal urbanism?
There are growing signs that Moscow’s current model of neoliberal urbanism 
is coming to face its limitations. Public debates are increasingly critical of 
the strategy of urban upgrading – suspecting it to be a new source of illicit 
profits for the city elite or a stage for ‘Stalinesque’ ambitions – while pro-
fessional debates show a growing disappointment with the city’s failure to 
deliver on its promise of open and democratic planning processes. This is 
particularly visible in the cornerstone of Sobyanin’s strategy: green urban 
infrastructure. While some experts close to the city administration suggest 
that the mounting challenges are merely a reflection of Muscovites’ inability 
to appreciate ‘good urban development’ or their suspicion of authorities 
(Revzin, 2013, 2016; for a critique, see Belov, 2013, p. 171), we consider 
them an indication of the deeper conflicts underlying Moscow’s urban devel-
opment model, namely contradictions in planning procedures, symbolism 
and economic viability. In the following, we will consider these conflicts as 
they unfold in the city’s park strategy.
First, openness, transparency and participation have become new 
buzzwords in Sobyanin’s urban development strategy and were meant to 
replace Luzhkov’s opaque decision making. Yet, as time passes, it is becoming 
increasingly visible that city development under Sobyanin continues to be 
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publicly unmediated, technocratic and top- down, with small groups of 
authorized actors determining Moscow’s future development.
Indeed, the attempts to engage the public in producing parks in a par-
ticipatory effort is little more than a short- term fix, ‘distracting’ Muscovites 
from the opaque and top- down decision making that continues to be the 
daily routine in Moscow. But these efforts are barely able to conceal deeper 
issues, namely the absence of accountability, or rather the impossibility of 
democratic representation, in the wider context of an increasingly authori-
tarian regime. Indeed, half- hearted and apolitical initiatives to engage the 
population in discussions about the city cannot accommodate the types 
of political encounter and debate that make cities what they are:  polit-
ical organisms. Muscovites increasingly call out these contradictions and 
question the impact and underlying purpose of the introduced participation 
measures. Protests and the formulation of alternative civil initiatives (see 
Argenbright, 2016) are not merely a reflection of citizens’ inability to appre-
ciate good development, but rather show that people are very well aware of 
the deeper contradictions underlying the focus on current superficial partici-
patory initiatives.
At the same time, the increasingly independent and confident young 
planning community is no longer willing to accept the absence of open nego-
tiation processes and disciplinary debates in urban planning and design. 
Many question the legitimacy of decisions taken by a small group of political 
and administrative actors in collaboration with few foreign and domestic 
experts. In light of this, professional debates are increasingly characterized 
by open criticism and a disappointment with ‘imported’ best practices, which 
in many cases have neither fulfilled their promises nor met the expectations 
they initially raised. And although many urbanist discussion platforms 
have been set up in the last couple of years (e.g. Moscow Urban Forum), 
many of them present highly politically mediated platforms serving ruling 
authorities and elites instead of being stages for open and creative exchange. 
Other channels for professional exchange have become relatively uncritical 
and unreflective supporters of official policies, thus losing the potential to 
bring up alternative agendas or spur critical discourses. An example is the 
planning journal, ‘Project Russia’, which was initially founded in the 1990s 
to initiate exchange of progressive ideas and practices. Over the years, the 
publication has become increasingly commercialized and relies heavily on 
political backing with a growing number of issues dedicated to official city 
projects (on public and green spaces, see issues 3/ 2013, 1/ 2015 and 1/ 2016).
Second, tensions arise from what can be summarized as conflicts over 
symbols. Starting with Gorky Park, many existing and new parks in 
Moscow have undergone a ‘facelift’ with fancy cafés, global ‘state- of- the- 
art’ landscape design and frequently organized sporting and cultural activ-
ities – altogether symbolizing open, transparent and progressive urbanism. 
However, the aesthetics of a modern, ‘cool’ and internationally minded city 
ring hollow in the context of growing cultural conservatism and political 
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repression, revealing these green spaces for what they are – little more than 
a fix in Moscow’s place- making strategy. The image the city administra-
tion works hard to promote of Moscow as a modern, democratic metrop-
olis with a human face and state- of- the art green public spaces (Shalina, 
2012) does not sit comfortably with Russia’s national political development, 
which is characterized by increasingly repressive social politics and neo- 
authoritarianism (Umland, 2012). To be sure, the marriage of hyper- modern 
symbolism with repressive politics is not an impossible one, as examples 
around the world suggest. However, Moscow’s relatively active citizenry, as 
well as Russia’s confrontational stance in international affairs, suggests that 
the current fix can only be a temporary one.
These contradictions do not only play out between the national and the 
local scale but are continuously negotiated on the micro- level – for example, 
in the plurality of partly conflicting identities and symbolic meanings that 
shape the newly emerging parks in planned and built form. This is espe-
cially evident in the case of VDNKh, also referred to as ‘Soviet Versailles’. 
VDNKh has a long and complex post- Soviet history with various attempts 
to either sell the area to real estate developers – not surprisingly, during the 
mid- 2000s construction boom – and later, under Sobyanin, to revive it as a 
place of culture and leisure (Basharova, 2013; Schönle, 2016). Yet, while this 
huge park initially promised to be another playground for Moscow’s cre-
ative class, its development in recent years is more closely linked to the aes-
thetic of Russian patriotism than the Gorky- type global design. In particular, 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea has led to a shift in official aesthetics towards 
‘new patriotic glamour’ (Meduza, 2015) or ‘hipster Stalinism’ (Howard, 
2016). In the case of VDNKh, this new patriotic glamour finds expression 
in the fact that the administration of the park and city government will 
restore the exhibition to its 1954 condition (Schönle, 2016), a decision that 
comes not only at the expense of Western design trends but also at the cost 
of other epochs from the Soviet past, namely the modernist heritage of the 
1960s and 1970s, which is threatened with destruction (Archnadzor, 2013; 
Schönle, 2016). Yet, while this new focus on patriotic themes may resonate 
with many Russians, it does not reflect the official aesthetics and slogans the 
city of Moscow continues to promote internationally, thereby undermining 
the place- making strategy it set out less than a decade ago.
Third, there are economic contradictions:  the image of a prosperous 
global city full of young beautiful people strolling through parks and 
relaxing in outdoor cafés and bars does not only sit uncomfortably with 
Russia’s conservative and anti- modern cultural and political trajectory but 
is also increasingly difficult to maintain economically. While parks were ini-
tially considered a cheap and quick fix for the contradictions in Moscow’s 
previous model of neoliberalism, excessive competition procedures, Western 
architectural firms, the maintenance of these parks and continuous events 
have turned out anything but low cost. Gorky Park, for example, was not 
envisioned to be very costly to the city. Yet it turned out to be much more 
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expensive than expected, requiring the city to set up a long- term manage-
ment and event strategy to maintain it over time. In the case of Zaryadye 
Park, which is funded by the municipal budget and carried out by the muni-
cipally anchored Mosinzhproekt as general contractor, the costs during 
planning and construction work have already increased more than five-
fold – from 5 billion roubles to 27 billion (Aminov and Mercalova, 2015; 
Pastushin, 2017). One of the reasons for the increase in construction costs is 
the devaluation of the rouble due to a fall in oil prices and capital outflows 
since 2015 (Aminov and Mercalova, 2015). To deal with the mounting costs, 
another competition was launched at the beginning of 2017 to develop 
a comprehensive cultural concept and business model for Zaryadye Park 
(Pastushin, 2017).
Commercializing the parks – that is, renting out space for commercial 
activities – is an important source of revenue for the city, because it funds 
most of its park strategy with its own budget. Yet Russia’s economic crisis 
has dramatically affected living standards throughout the country, signifi-
cantly reducing the ability of average Muscovites to spend money on expen-
sive leisure activities in the city’s hip parks. Indeed, the limitations of the 
park strategy become ever more visible as the more affluent middle class, the 
primary target of Moscow’s roll- out neoliberalism, is increasingly suffering 
the effects of the crisis.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed the role of green spaces in Moscow’s urban 
development and identified limitations and tensions therein. We argued that 
Moscow’s new flagship parks form a key arena and infrastructure of con-
temporary neoliberalization: they play a central role in positioning Moscow 
in global intercity competitions, form a stage for the further commodifica-
tion of urban space and present places of socio- spatial polarization. Yet, we 
showed that the superficial nature of urban reforms and changes in officially 
sanctioned aesthetics, as well as deteriorating economic conditions increas-
ingly challenge the current role parks play in Moscow’s model of neoliberal 
urbanism.
These findings contribute to different streams of research. First, they speak 
to work on parks and green infrastructures in post- socialist cities. To date, 
studies on this matter insufficiently engage with the politics of parks and 
urban green spaces. By highlighting the political symbolism and functions 
of Moscow’s parks, this chapter encourages scholars to go beyond ‘neutral’ 
accounts of park upgrading and renovations and to explore the politics of 
green spaces.
Second, tracing the transformation in parks’ symbolic and material 
function allowed us to show that infrastructures, despite their durability, are 
malleable. Specifically, we studied how meanings and functions of Moscow’s 
green infrastructures changed dynamically, reflecting wider political and 
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economic transformations. These findings speak both to works on urban 
infrastructures and socialist legacies. Urban infrastructures form the back-
bone of our cities and are integral in shaping cities’ distinct form and char-
acter. The literature therefore generally considers them as urban fixtures (see 
Hommels, 2005, cited in introductory chapter). Yet, as our study revealed, 
green infrastructures can change significantly, despite their material perman-
ence. Indeed, during Soviet times, parks were key elements of the new socialist 
city as places of recreation, leisure and political education. While these parks 
outlasted the Soviet Union, testifying to the enduring character of urban 
infrastructures, they underwent several transformations, reflecting the chan-
ging political and economic context they are embedded in. While having 
served as spaces of social inclusion and political education in the socialist 
space economy, parks have since turned into a battleground of elite projects 
and market forces. This also echoes recent works in urban and economic 
geography that foreground the expansive nature of capitalism, its ability to 
develop through different institutional landscapes, and the market- enabling 
capacity of socialist legacies. For instance, while the development of parks 
in socialist cities was originally aimed at creating egalitarian public spaces 
for citizens – rather than consumers – they now enhance intercity competi-
tion and socio- spatial polarization. The meanings and functions of socialist 
legacies, just as of urban infrastructures, are therefore neither distorting nor 
enabling per se, but depend on the wider environment they are embedded in.
Finally, the understanding of neoliberalism as an intrinsically contra-
dictory, messy and partial project allowed us to point out context- specific 
limitations that threaten to undermine Moscow’s current model of neoliberal 
urbanism: in terms of place- making, the image of Moscow as comfortable 
and human scale with progressive green spaces of global rank will sooner 
or later crumble because it stands in direct contradiction to the politically 
repressive developments on the national level. In terms of space- making, the 
green space strategy is increasingly hard to maintain economically in the con-
text of a protracted economic crisis. Finally, in terms of scripting, improving 
parts of the cityscape through highly scripted green spaces that accommo-
date the ‘disgruntled’ middle class and please the expat community cannot 
lastingly placate an increasingly critical civil society. At the moment, though, 
it is hard to predict whether these tensions will entail just another round of 
neoliberal reconfiguration or if the underlying tensions and contradictions 
might lead to a more profound change in direction.
To obtain the latter and to enable truly progressive and equitable 
change – and thus make urban green spaces part of a socially and environ-
mentally sustainable urban development – urban planning in Moscow has 
to be repoliticized and rebalanced (Büdenbender and Zupan, 2017b). First 
of all, contemporary policies and strategies, such as Sobyanin’s ‘Moscow, 
a city comfortable for life’, should be subject to public scrutiny: questions, 
such as ‘comfortable for whom?’ and ‘at whose cost?’ must be asked and 
answered. Research, the professional public, education and journalism could 
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serve as crucial outlets and platforms for such critical debate. This, however, 
requires platforms independent of official politics and commercial interests. 
To rebalance Moscow’s urban development would require, first of all, a shift 
from favouring certain segments of the population toward providing equal 
conditions for all people. This would, inter alia, include cutting back exten-
sive spending on the beautification of central Moscow and instead aiming 
towards equal provision of green infrastructures in all parts of the city. 
Furthermore, it includes the creation of inclusive urban spaces in terms of 
design, aesthetics and functions. While civic green space initiatives can play 
a role in this process, they should not offer an excuse for government to shift 
basic responsibilities to the individual. In our view, the public sector holds 
responsibility for providing basic infrastructures, including public green 
spaces, thereby preventing (un- )intentional processes of (semi- )privatization 
of public space, be it through private developers’ projects or – as happens in 
some instances – through citizens’ initiatives.
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9  Bengaluru’s urban water 
infrastructure through the lens 
of post- socialism
Chandrima Mukhopadhyay and Tauri Tuvikene
Introduction
This chapter discusses Indian water infrastructure actors with regard to the 
extent to which the concept of post- socialism can be used beyond Central 
and Eastern Europe. Being inspired by an urge in urban studies and other 
social sciences to think of post- socialism as not only an Eastern European 
phenomenon (see also Stenning and Hörschelmann, 2008; Tuvikene, 2016), 
the study aims to contribute towards what post- socialism is in India, con-
ceptualizing post- socialism in the case of water infrastructures in Bengaluru, 
India  – a case without pronounced socialism. The case under study here 
highlights a ‘shrinking state’, where cities are undoubtedly experiencing rapid 
urbanization while the state finds it difficult to cope with the pace of such 
unregulated urbanization. Private sector actors intervene in such situations, 
converting the state’s incapability to deliver into business opportunities for 
themselves both in formal and informal ways (Tiwari and Gulati, 2011). 
The study discusses the ways in which private sectors fill up the vacuum in 
infrastructure created by the state, raising the question of whether such a 
‘vacuum’ may be temporary, as the state aims to recover the gap through 
innovation over time. This study thus highlights the move away from the 
public sector- provided infrastructure – also known as ‘bundle of goods’ – 
that citizens had equal access to, to unbundled and unequally re- bundled 
infrastructure networks (Graham and Marvin, 2001). In a modernist infra-
structure ideal, the state exercised a monopoly on the delivery and main-
tenance of infrastructures within the bundle. The process of infrastructure 
delivery remained often black- boxed and the bundle itself unopened as long 
as no failures occurred. In the context of ‘actually existing post- socialism’ 
(see Stenning and Hörschelmann, 2008) as well as developments in India, 
privatization of infrastructures brought discussions on the ‘unbundling’ and 
‘re- bundling’ of infrastructure to the fore. The unbundling is defined both in 
terms of separating various sectors of services like water supply and sanita-
tion, and segregating one single sector of infrastructure into different activ-
ities, like water generation (or drawing), treatment, transfer and supply to 
consumers.
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One of the most challenging contemporary urban issues in Indian cities 
is access to fresh water due to a combined impact of rapid urbanization and 
climate change. The extent of private sector intervention in urban develop-
ment has been mainstreamed in many ways, which raises many questions 
regarding who bears responsibility for the provision of public good and even 
initiates debate on whether water is a public good. The study develops the 
basic framework on post- socialism in the water sector of Bengaluru based on 
a public- private nexus and formal- informal- illegal dimensions. Bengaluru is 
located outside what is usually known as a ‘post- socialist region’, providing 
novel insights both on the term itself as well as the governing of water in 
shrinking state conditions. This intersection of post- socialism and water 
governance in a place supposedly far away from what is usually considered 
post- socialism, both geographically and conceptually, is a key challenge of 
the chapter.
The study is based on qualitative methods complemented by some quan-
titative data in terms of measuring water demand and supply. The research 
is based on a case study of water supply, focusing on domestic water supply 
to the upper and middle classes, using multiple methods: analysis of policy 
documents, media reports, blogs, other reports and documents, and semi- 
structured interviews in Bengaluru. The initial secondary source materials 
were reviewed from August to November 2015. The first visit to Bengaluru 
was conducted in February 2016. Another visit was arranged in February 
2017. A total of 22 interviews were conducted with private sector actors, 
government officials, academics, activists and residents. Some reflections are 
based on personal experience of the change in attitudes among the main 
government actors related to water supply in between two consecutive visits 
to the city. The change in attitudes clearly shows that citizen participation 
played an important role in changing the government’s perception towards 
acknowledging the fact that integrated urban water management, including 
lakes in the city, has an impact on sources of water. It also reflects that the 
state tried to cope with the water crisis in the city through technological 
innovation. Reflections on post- socialism were added after initial analysis 
through collaboration with the second author of the paper.
Understanding post- socialist urban transformation through 
(water) infrastructure
To define the debate in terms of post- socialism, Pickles (2010) discusses how 
‘various projects of communism have been and still are being dismantled 
and replaced by alternative capital market economies and democratic pol-
ities’ (Pickles, 2010, p. 127). Some of these might be termed ‘post- socialist’, 
others better as ‘post- collectivist’, to use the term by Pickles (2010) for cap-
turing states such as Vietnam or China that remain in many ways socialist 
despite a move away from state- focused and collective modes of governance. 
Still others, such as the case here in India, are examples of a country with 
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little explicit socialism and which cannot be simply termed ‘post- socialist’ 
because of its territorial and temporal position. Nevertheless, the chapter 
proposes to consider provision and management of water infrastructures in 
the case of Bengaluru through conceptualizations of post- socialism.
There are various insights that post- socialism brings to the fore. First, one 
of the key tenets of post- socialist studies is the argument that post- socialist 
cities are in transformation with different elements going through processes 
at different speeds (Sýkora and Bouzarovski, 2012). For instance, there are 
significant continuities in material infrastructures, which in many ways 
affect social processes while being at the same time themselves influenced 
by social practices and values. Second, because urban transformation takes 
place through infrastructure, the debate on water also reflects processes of 
urban transformation (Sailer- Fliege, 1999; Stanilov, 2007) –  for instance, 
how bore wells, private sector water tankers, automated water dispensing 
units and, recently, waste water recycling systems are integrated parts of 
newly urbanized areas in Indian cities, and, in return, how they decide future 
directions of urbanization. Planning for water with its spatial implications 
is also an integral part of urban planning. Third, the subject of urban trans-
formation through post- socialist infrastructure opens the debate regarding 
both material and social divides. Through splintering urbanism and premium 
spaces (Graham and Marvin, 2001), the global actors might be connected to 
the network, whereas vast masses are left outside functioning infrastructural 
delivery both in the global North and South.
These three points raise larger questions of intersecting infrastructures 
with post- socialism, but there is also some empirical research on water in 
socialist and post- socialist conditions. For instance, Beveridge et al. (2014) 
write about partial privatization and partial re- municipalization of Berlin’s 
Water Utilities Company. The study focuses on commercialization, privat-
ization, re- regulation, public contestation and re- municipalization, and 
discusses the dilemma of how the physical property of water supply and 
sanitation is not really suitable for liberalization, showing also the import-
ance of public preference for collectivized provision of water. Wissen and 
Naumann (2006) write about the recent trend and opposition to privat-
ization and neoliberalization of water supply and sewage in a European 
context, showing the political struggles of water governance. Such studies 
highlight the different practices of governing water, principally showing pri-
vatization as well as perceptions among various social groups of water being 
importantly a public good.
Nevertheless, many of the post- socialist water studies have focused on 
the conditions of diminishing population, highlighting problems emanating 
from the situations where the existing infrastructure is underused. There are 
similar ongoing studies in the US context that raise questions about water 
affordability due to shrinking population (Susskind and Carolini, 2018). 
While the withdrawal of the state characterizes those situations as well, 
the conditions in India differ because its population growth is to an extent 
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unimaginable in post- Soviet and Central and Eastern European cities. The 
narrative of how to handle a situation where the large infrastructures remain 
unused due to population decline is very different from the descriptions of 
massive water shortages resulting in public outcries in a situation where 
more than one quarter of the population lack access to pipes at homes and 
where vast areas of cities rely on water only for some hours of the day or 
have no access to running water at all (Gandy, 2008). Tiwari and Hingorani 
(2014) show that the master plans in India are incapable of keeping up with 
the organic growth of the city. This brings to the fore diverse actors of water 
provision and highlights a different role of the state within it, beyond being 
merely a provider of water in pipes – that is, areas outside ‘master planned’ 
spaces always depend on private sector water vendors.
The principal way of accessing water for urbanities in ‘Western cities’ is 
through the tap in their individual households, which is also the principal 
expectation of what constitutes access to water in the above- cited literature 
on post- socialist water utilities, while lower- income or even lower- middle- 
class communities in Indian cities need to rely on taps in the public space. 
The urban water supply is understood as functioning through large- scale 
hard infrastructure like pipes and water treatment plants, generally iden-
tified as ‘big water’ (Bell, 2015), and delivered and maintained by a public 
sector authority. This is a state- centred approach. However, the demand 
side or water usage patterns in the household – the ‘everyday water’ (Bell, 
2015) – includes water storage facilities like water tanks and all sorts of 
vessels besides (or in replacement of) water taps. The privatization of water 
supply in the global South includes privatization of previous state- owned 
utilities (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012; Kacker and Joshi, 2016) but there 
are also various forms of formal and informal water provision by private 
sector actors, in addition to public sector- provided utilities that depend on 
surface water. Because of a scarcity of surface water and logistic reasons, 
only private sector water vendors, both formal and informal, draw and pro-
vide water from the ground water table. This is also applicable to informal 
housing, which would otherwise not have access to water.
Facing the interlinkages of water supply and natural resource man-
agement, the proponents of market environmentalism argue that water is 
an increasingly scarce resource that must be fully priced for its economic 
and environmental value if it is to be allocated to highest- valued purposes 
and managed efficiently by private sector companies whose accountability 
to citizens and shareholders is more direct and effective (Bakker, 2005). 
Nevertheless, opponents say that water is non- substitutable, essential for life 
and, hence, the state’s responsibility to provide while private sector involve-
ment must be prevented (Bakker, 2005, 2010). While the perception is that 
private sector participation in water supply is pro- poor, Bakker (2007) 
shows that in Jakarta, Indonesia, it has essentially benefited mainly middle- 
and upper- income households, and that disincentives for the municipality, 
the private sector and the households influenced such an outcome. The lack 
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of state involvement in water provision is therefore often also associated 
with social and economic divides.
Such dimensions of spontaneous and unplanned urbanization and 
dependency on informal actors and ‘everyday water’ (Bell, 2015) already 
brings in the divided character of post- socialism both in terms of spatial 
inequalities and in shifting away from forms of centralized availability in 
the past to the differentiated ones in a contemporary city. As discussed later, 
the case of Bengaluru shows that formal development permits are approved 
on the grounds that such development would have to depend on private 
sector water vendors and the ground water table. This is the situation where 
post- socialism might have value in conceptualizing, even though there was 
no explicit socialism in the formal politics of Bengaluru.
Understanding socialism and post- socialism in India
The case of India would involve a discussion of post- socialism without 
socialism, because India never had socialism in the sense that countries 
featured in this book’s other chapters did. Nevertheless, after independ-
ence from British colonialism in 1947, India ideologically adopted socialism 
following Nehru but without formal political adoption (Figure  9.1). The 
formal tie between India and the Soviet Union was the treaty with the Soviet 
Union in August 1971. A principal economic reform came in 1991 influenced 
by the Washington Consensus and structural adjustment, as observed in the 
other chapters on post- socialism in this book. With economic reforms on the 
one hand, the private sector was allowed to enter many sectors of activity, 
which had earlier been under state- owned enterprises. On the other hand, 
there was an effort to decentralize power, including financial power, from 
the central government to urban local bodies.
After economic reforms in 1991, the 73rd and 74th constitutional 
amendments were introduced in 1992 and enacted in 1993. Those 
amendments recommended a three- tier government (central- state- local), 
and started the Panchayat Raj Institute to empower the urban local body 
institutes as a first step towards public participation. However, in reality, there 
has been limited implementation. The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban 
Renewal Mission (JNNURM) was one of the prominent central government 
urban reforms that allotted central government grants to urban local bodies 
for initiating projects for physical infrastructure development and modern-
ization. The programme was launched in 2005. In the case of Bengaluru, 
nevertheless, the chief minister of Karnataka had developed an image of 
‘Singaporization’ following a modernization narrative, with the aim of cre-
ating an image of a global city (see also Zupan and Büdenbender, this issue). 
While a major part of the central and state government funds were used to 
create Bengaluru’s ‘Singaporization’ image, which highlighted state develop-
ment of neoliberalist urbanism, it was highly criticized as having ignored the 
local need for service delivery to local authorities (Benjamin, 2008). Thus, 
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rather than seeking water provision for the masses, infrastructures were part 
of seeking global city- ness for some rather than for all.
With this political background and history of urban reform, it is argued 
here that water is an appropriate sector for discussing post- socialism in 
India, both in terms of process and outcome. In addition, it is also argued 
that other conceptual frameworks like post- colonialism and neo- colonialism 
could be applied to explain certain processes, namely the caste system, with 
which water supply and the sanitation sector has been associated, and which 
is better described through the lens of post- colonialism. The lower castes 
were traditionally not allowed to access or draw water from the well, which 
was one of the main sources of water. The history of colonized countries 
show that colonizers invested little in services like water supply and sanita-
tion for the benefit of the larger population who were indigenous. Because 
they were concerned about their own health and hygiene, they invested in 
safe water supplies for their own communities. The lower castes thus relied 
on informal ways of provision for their survival. Nevertheless, the value 
of post- socialism is in the ways in which it draws attention to the post- 
collective nature of infrastructure governing and highlights the privatized 
unequal circumstances.
Neoliberalization:
Whole hearted adoption under
Modi government (since 2013)
[Start-ups]
CHRONOLOGICAL EMERGENCE OF POLICIES AND IDEAS
Political stages Bengaluru-specific milestones
Impact of climate change and fast
and random urbanization
(Unliveable city)
Water crisis: Dependency on
ground water table in urban
periphery under private sector
farmers’ ownership [NOT on
perennial basin]
Proposal of Singaporization
(Central and state government
funding) [Globalization]
First establishment of IT sector in
India in Bengaluru: Silicon Valley of
India (1990s) [Change in economy]
Liberalization and economic reform:
Early 1990s under Manmohan Singh
as Finance Minister
Signing treaty with Russia (1971)
Post-independence:
Ideologically socialism (1947)
Figure 9.1  Chronological emergence of policies and ideas
Source: Chandrima Mukhopadhyay
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This chapter focuses on urban infrastructures. Because of its environ-
mental and regional dimensions, the ‘urban’ understanding of water is that 
municipalities bear responsibility for water supply and management of 
sanitation sectors within municipal areas, including sorting out technical 
matters such as water taps, water storage tanks, water treatment plants, 
water purifiers, water closets, sewage lines and sewage treatment plants. 
Both hard and soft infrastructure of water governance make water, as urban 
infrastructure, different from the rural areas.
Public- private nexus in urban water supply in Bengaluru
Bengaluru is a megacity comparable to the size of Moscow by popula-
tion. The city is located in the southern part of India and is the capital of 
Karnataka state. It draws its surface water from Cauvery River, which is 
100 km away from the city. The state of Karnataka shares its water from 
Cauvery with the neighbouring state, Tamil Nadu. The hard infrastructure 
of water treatment and water transfer demonstrates ‘big water’ in infrastruc-
ture, following Feenberg’s (1990) technical code, and as discussed by Bell 
(2015) using the lens of integrated urban water management. However, the 
‘big water’ delivered by the Bengaluru Water Supply and Sanitation Board 
(BWSSB) constitutes only a small percentage of Bengaluru’s domestic and 
commercial water needs. As shown in Figure 9.2, Bengaluru is served by mul-
tiple sources of water, namely BWSSB- delivered surface water, bore wells, 
rainwater harvesting and greywater harvesting. Such components could be 
considered ‘hard infrastructure’ of water supply, but there are also various 
soft infrastructure components. For instance, there are multiple institutions 
involved in water provision:  from the public sector side, BBMP (Bruhat 
Bengaluru Mahanagar Palike) and KUSP (Karnataka Urban Services for 
Poor) are two other institutions that are involved in surface water supply. 
Besides this, there are licensed private sector water vendors, private sector 
water producers (those who dig bore wells, extract water, treat and package 
Public sector:
BWSSB
Pipe and tap
water Water storage Water storage,
messy pipes Tap water(different types)
Surface water:
 Cauvery river Ground water
table Water tanker Rainwater
harvesting Reusing
water
Private sector
developer,
individual 
household,
politicians
Private sector
(BBMP licence)
and BBMP
Private sector
developer and
individual
household Householdpractices
Figure 9.2  Multiple sources of water
Source: Chandrima Mukhopadhyay, influenced by Button (2017)
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it), unlicensed private sector water vendors, community bore well suppliers 
and illegal water mafias. The combination of both hard and soft infrastruc-
ture demonstrates a ‘pattern’ indicating which hard infrastructure is related 
to which soft infrastructure. Figure  9.2 shows the distribution of such 
actors in terms of formal- informal and public- private nexus, as well as the 
potential water sources, thus highlighting the intersection of soft and hard 
infrastructures. Table 9.1 shows a matrix including a public- private nexus 
and formal- informal- illegal dimensions. It is important to note that there is 
a continuum between formal and informal within such a matrix, which is 
dynamic in the sense that informal private sector actors continue to lobby 
the public sector actors with authoritative power to formalize their business 
as they invest in both the establishment of hard infrastructure and the skill 
required to run the water- vending business. Nevertheless, such investments 
tend to be small and the state, moreover, prefers to recover its role in ser-
vice delivery over time, even though it uses informal services to fill up the 
vacuum in the meantime.
Post- socialism in urban water supply through the lens of 
commodification: material and social transformations
The rationale behind selecting the water sector in Bengaluru to define post- 
socialism in India is its position on water commodification within the Indian 
state on multiple levels. However, with the recent crisis in accessing water 
in cities, the political position that every citizen should have access to safe 
water has been contested, mainly because of the state’s incapability to deal 
with the situation, which is affected by an increasing number of warmer 
days and which remains beyond their control. The government’s position 
on denying responsibility for providing basic services to illegal migrants has 
been widely criticized. Informal private sector water vendors in the suburbs, 
who are also known as ‘water mafia’ in Bengaluru, filled up that vacuum 
by providing water to illegal migrants at low cost. However, the local 
governments that struggle with access to water, both because of the impact 
of climate change on water sources and the increased demand of water due 
to higher temperatures, deny that it is their responsibility to deliver water 
to everyone at no cost and point out the lack of public finance sources 
(interview with BWSSB, February, 2016; see also Thomas et al., 2014). The 
city authority, mainly in the form of BWSSB, continuously works towards 
overcoming the gap in its services. In the case of Bengaluru, there has been 
no case of de- municipalization of water like there has been in Germany 
as shown earlier (Wissen and Nauman, 2006). However, because a large 
section of the population depend on the ground water table and only pri-
vate sector vendors provide packaged or processed water, a large share of 
water supply is under private sector control. However, over time, as city 
authorities like BWSSB extend their water supply network, there is also a 
form of ‘re- municipalization’. BWSSB also buys services from the private 
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Table 9.1  Matrix showing range of actors involved in water supply in Bengaluru
Public Semi- public Semi- private Private
Formal Bengaluru Water Supply  
and Sanitation Board 
(surface water supply 
from Cauvery River)
PPPs to control water loss 
during transformation 
(contractual)
No example of asset sale
Licensed private sector 
water manufacturers and 
vendors in partnership 
with the state (private 
sector- initiated)
Licensed private sector 
water vendors
Semi- formal
Semi- informal
Informal Politician- funded local bore 
wells
Unlicensed private sector 
water manufacturers 
and vendors
Illegal Water mafia
Source: Chandrima Mukhopadhyay
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sector to deliver water in areas that are under its domain, but they struggle 
with shortages of water for various reasons. However, there is also an ever- 
increasing number of private sector providers of water. The case of water 
privatization shows that technological advancement has played a big role in 
privatization of infrastructure.
Besides commodification, the case of Bengaluru is also interesting 
because it demonstrates the importance of integrated urban water manage-
ment, taking into account various water providers and sources of water. In 
Bengaluru, nevertheless, there has also been a lack of integrated urban water 
management that has led to a water crisis in the city.
Water tankers are frequently visible in the urban landscape of Bengaluru 
and also in many other cities. Such tankers form the new hard infrastruc-
ture of water supply. While private sector actors mainly use tankers, BWSSB 
also uses them at times when it fails to meet its obligations to deliver water. 
While such tankers form a part of the city’s water landscape, especially 
during summer, there is evidence that, during periods of restricted water 
availability, corrupt lower- level public sector officials accept bribes to not 
release water through BWSSB- supplied pipes, thus increasing the demand 
on the private sector water vendors. Political parties also influence the terri-
torial nature of ground water supply (DNA, 2016). For instance, Electronic 
City on the periphery of Bengaluru entirely depends on private sector water 
tankers. Although the development is outside the boundary of the munici-
pality, BWSSB takes responsibility for its water supply because Electronic 
City is one of the largest contributors to urban economic growth. However, 
surface water supply does not reach there. BWSSB has an arrangement with 
the private sector water vendors to buy water from them. In addition, as 
now mandated by law, Electronic City has adopted rainwater and greywater 
harvesting systems. Although the development faced a water crisis only 
a couple of years ago (interview with Electronic City resident, February, 
2017), continuous private sector water tanker availability has led to an 
unlimited supply of water of late. Figure 9.3 shows Electronic City’s private 
sector water vendors who first treat water in a tank and then store it in over-
head tanks for supplying apartments. However, for low- income communi-
ties, people have to collect water directly from the tankers and their pipes 
without the service managers in the middle. The low- income communities 
face an everyday struggle for water in terms of its availability, price and 
quality.
Packaged water is also an important component in the drinking water 
landscape of Bengaluru. Since this is a profitable business with little invest-
ment, there are many private sector actors involved (interview with private 
sector operator, February, 2016 and with well- informed citizen, February, 
2016). While BBMP issues licences, there are also other, illegal vendors 
(interview with well- informed citizen, February, 2016). The main problem 
with such packaged water is that there is no quality control, nor general 
control on the use of resources that threaten to over- exploit the ground 
 
 
152 C. Mukhopadhyay and T. Tuvikene
152
water table. The concept of packaged water provision through the corporate 
sector has been popular in Bengaluru (interview with well- informed citizen, 
February, 2016). Nevertheless, the quality of such packaged water is always 
a matter of negotiation between the private sector vendor and the users, 
without any form of state intervention.
Findings show that a large section of the population in the greater 
Bengaluru area, either because of their spatial location or their social class, 
are excluded from public sector and even formal water supply (whether 
public or private), and they must depend on private sector and at times 
even informal private sector actors for their access to water. The public 
sector, despite having the knowledge of informality- illegality, depends on 
private sector actors to help them solve the problem of providing water to 
many communities. However, there is a serious concern about the quality 
of water in a lack of state regulation. While high- income communities can 
afford to self- organize themselves in regularly checking the water quality 
from government- approved agencies, low- income communities do not have 
access to such checks. It remains a matter of negotiation and trust between 
the vendor and the consumers. In fact, there is a strong conflict of interests 
Figure 9.3  Private sector water tanker delivering water to storage tank in Electronic 
City
Source: Chandrima Mukhopadhyay
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between actors, both among the private sector competitors (based on who 
serves a higher number of customers), and among the public- private sector 
actors (based on the fact that the private sector loses its business if an area 
is served by the public sector). However, questions are raised on whether 
it is necessary to make the overall self- organized system legal and formal, 
because formalizing the sector could impose new bureaucratic restrictions 
(interview with ground water table expert, February, 2017).
Informal and illegal dimensions in an integrated urban 
water sector
Water supply and related issues demonstrate varied dimensions of infor-
mality and illegality in the urban sector. Bengaluru, being the Silicon Valley 
of India, experienced rapid unregulated growth. As the city grew, and its 
economic base shifted from agriculture to the tertiary sector, its ancient man- 
made interconnected system of lakes and canals, locally known as Raajkelua, 
was neglected (interviews with well- informed citizen, February, 2016, and 
social activist, February, 2016). In fact, sewer lines were laid inside the box 
of the canals, ignoring the fact that all lakes in the city were interconnected 
through those canals. In the absence of agricultural activity, those canals 
were probably seen as wasted infrastructure. This diminished the possibility 
of recycling rainwater collected through canals in the future. Moreover, 
with large- scale, unregulated real estate development in Bengaluru, many 
developers saved money on construction of a sewage treatment plant by dis-
posing of their untreated sewage directly into the lakes. Belanduru Lake, one 
of the largest lakes in Bengaluru, was more than once flooded with toxic 
foam that blew around in the wind and entered the houses of nearby resi-
dence complexes (Akshatha, 2015). Recently, Varthur Lake was choked with 
foam (The Times of India, 2017). The lake was also inaccessible to the citi-
zens. Because of the extent and complexity of the problem, as well as various 
intersecting interests, the day- to- day monitoring of such activities by the state 
and imposing penalties for breaking the rules is resource consuming.
Media reports show that there were innumerable legal cases related to the 
blocking of canals and discharging of sewage. Bengaluru used to be known 
for its lakes, which are part of a discussion on green infrastructure and on 
integrated urban water management. Over time, the state started neglecting 
the lakes’ importance to the urban water system, which contributed to the 
water crisis in the city. However, through bottom- up movements by citizen 
groups, the state was convinced to accept the role of lakes in integrated 
urban water management as well as their contribution to the growth and 
health of the city (interview with academic, February, 2016).
The water supply and sanitation sector shows strong dimensions of infor-
mality and illegality. Informality indicates any type of service that is provided 
either by the public or private sector but is not registered as a formal service. 
The aforementioned discussion presents a case of water vendors, many of 
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whom do not hold a licence from BBMP. Those services would be called 
‘informal’ because they do not have the formal licence. However, users are 
probably aware of this fact and still choose to buy water from them at 
their own risk, because this resolves their problem. ‘Informality’ is popu-
larly referred to as ‘jugad’ (see Mahadevia, 2015) in Hindi, which means 
‘arrangement’. Because of the shrinking state, the wider population beyond 
‘master- planned’ areas often depends on jugad for their day- to- day sur-
vival. For Bengaluru, even master- planned areas would not only depend on 
formal water provision but also on informal private sector water vendors. 
However, while the disposal of untreated sewage in the lakes by large- scale 
developments is illegal and there is a law in place that forces developers to 
treat the sewage before disposal, in the absence of rule and order, the illegal 
untreated disposal still takes place with such practices heavily contributing 
towards contamination of the ground water table, affecting water accessi-
bility and producing a generally unhealthy environment.
Within the continuum of formality- informality- illegality, the rights and 
wrongs of these informal and illegal sectors are not very well defined. For 
instance, debate remains on whether the right to sell the ground water table 
belongs to the private sector landowners or to the state, because water is an 
environmental management factor. Moreover, there is a debate on whether 
it is the right of the state to deny service delivery to illegal migrants, or 
whether the presence of informal private sector vendors delivering water 
at a low cost in support of unregulated growth is a way to solve problems. 
Although informality could be used as a temporary solution for the state, 
there must be more inclination towards planned urbanization over time to 
assure optimum use of resources in the long run.
Conclusion
The case of Bengaluru demonstrates the impact of the lack of an integrated 
urban water system while also highlighting innovative ways of ensuring a 
continuous water supply in a city that has restricted access to surface water 
and public sector- delivered water. Within such an uncoordinated system, 
large- scale urban development projects have an impact on both water avail-
ability, by increasing demand for water, and the state’s ability to cope with 
the need for other services such as sewage treatment. The latter is particu-
larly complicated by illegal disposal of untreated sewage in lakes, which 
creates toxic foam and contaminates water sources. As discussed earlier, 
both informality, like unlicensed private sector water vendors, and illegality, 
like disposal of untreated sewage in the lakes, contribute towards material 
and social change in the urban areas, raising concerns but also providing 
solutions (such as relying on informal water vendors as a kind of state 
supply).
Apart from highlighting an Indian case on informality and illegality 
in relation to water delivery and management in a megacity, this chapter 
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also highlights post- socialism. In fact, post- socialism in India is in many 
ways both similar to and different from the post- socialism in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE). First, post- socialism in Indian cities means primarily 
‘a shrinking state’, and not so much the ‘shrinking population’ that has 
characterized many non- capital city regions of the former Soviet Union 
and CEE. While shrinking states have been noted in literature on other 
kinds of infrastructures such as public transport (see Weicker and Sgibnev, 
this issue), the literature on post- socialist water provision has been particu-
larly focused on areas with shrinking populations because the problems 
emanate from such circumstances. Second, as opposed to the lack of ser-
vices amid conditions of existing material infrastructure in the context of 
many instances of water provision in CEE cities, in Bengaluru there is often 
a lack of material infrastructures in general. Nevertheless, an assemblage of 
a new kind of hard infrastructure by various formal, informal and illegal 
private sector actors creates ‘an illusion of continuous water supply’ (as 
Button, 2017 says about Mumbai) by the state. Here the illusion has a 
double meaning, as referring on the one hand to continuous water supply 
and, on the other hand, to the active role of the state. However, the water 
supply is neither continuous, nor is it delivered by the state. Moreover, 
there is a confusion among consumers about who pays taxes on the ser-
vices and to whom the taxes should be paid. Thus, there is a diverse mix of 
state and private actors, including formal and informal means of governing. 
Third, while in the CEE context, even middle classes often find it difficult 
to afford to maintain and fully use previously existing infrastructure. In 
the case of Bengaluru, the interviewed medium- income and high- income 
groups managed to afford the water supply both in terms of quality and 
quantity. Nevertheless, self- organized usage ends up being quite expensive 
for low- income groups. Moreover, questions of quality are also pertinent 
for lower- income groups needing to negotiate with vendors over water 
quality, which is otherwise centrally provided for those relying on big 
infrastructures. Still, the similarity with post- socialism includes a mixture 
of change and continuity in the Indian case much the same way as in CEE 
post- socialism. First, there is the existence of diverse formal and informal 
actors related to both small and big infrastructures, highlighting the form 
of hybridity of past provision and present lack of management in the 
neoliberal- oriented post- collective conditions, which can be perceived as a 
form of post- socialist conditions. Second, the high dependency on various 
formal, informal and illegal private sector water provisions is not neces-
sarily a permanent state of affairs and, considering that the state manages to 
overcome difficulties through technological innovations, it is quite similar 
to the post- socialist narratives of infrastructures including the collapse of 
infrastructures that are accompanied by different means of overcoming the 
rapid dismantling of the state. As various chapters show in this book, this 
collapse is less pronounced considering the various practices and activities 
in which the missing provisions are overcome. Thus, there is a complex 
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transformation rather than a clear- cut transition from one infrastructural 
system to another, as highlighted by post- socialism and explicated by the 
case of Bengaluru water management.
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10  Public transport in Brno
From socialist to post- socialist rhythms
Ondřej Mulíček and Daniel Seidenglanz
Introduction
Public transportation was at the centre of political and planning concerns 
in many European socialist countries because it played a crucial role in the 
everyday travel- to- work mobility of the population (Fuchs and Demko, 1977). 
Rapid industrialization of socialist cities and generally low rates of private 
car ownership created the conditions under which extensive development of 
public transportation infrastructure took place, at least in Central European 
socialist countries like former Czechoslovakia, often extending and reshaping 
the pre- socialist networks. Public transport infrastructures developed during 
socialism have nevertheless survived the decline of this era and have become 
an unavoidable basis for the recent, post- socialist advance taking place in, 
of course, significantly transformed political, social and economic contexts. 
Despite many social changes including transport mode preferences and indi-
vidual mobility behaviour, the transport systems were and still are active 
agents co- defining spatiality and temporality of the socialist as well as post- 
socialist everydayness (Grubbauer and Kusiak, 2012).
When studying urban public transportation, issues of urban space and 
time inevitably emerge, folded and intertwined in many different ways and 
scales. Regardless of how we approach public transportation, whether as a 
materialized technology, routinized everyday practice or subject of planning 
policies, it represents a specific socio- technical ensemble embedded deeply 
into the spatial and temporal settings of the city. Transport routes, lines, 
stops, timetables, vehicles and transport policies thus interconnect the 
various places of the city in space and time.
The concept of rhythms can help to deeply understand the urban spatio- 
temporality of a city. Lefebvre (2004, p. 15) contends in this regard that ‘every-
where where there is interaction between a place, a time and an expenditure 
of energy, there is a rhythm’. He gives time the same role that space plays in 
shaping and structuring the lived experience of the city. Moreover, according 
to Schatzki (2010, p. 14), everyday life and broader societal reality can be 
conceptualized as a whole of interacting rhythms of material, living and social 
bodies or structures. The rhythms representing everyday life include, however, 
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not only the short- term and visible circadian or circannual recurrent routines 
like work- commuting, schooling, festivals or holidays, but also less obvious 
economic and political cycles of longue durée in which linear ‘becoming’ fuses 
with repetitive processes in a number of distinct combinations (Schwanen 
et al., 2012). The whole city can be certainly understood as a polyrhythmical 
entity produced and reproduced by continuous negotiations between the 
daily routines of individuals on the one hand and the long- term rhythmicity 
of grand political, economic, social and planning structures on the other.
This embeddedness of public transportation in urban everydayness, how-
ever, is not obdurate and linear, but there are ways and conditions under 
which the recurrence of social and technical routines is combined with for-
ward movement (Felski, 1999). Different urban structures, regardless of 
whether they are material or non- material, show clearly distinct ‘internal 
timing’, stemming from their functionality, technology, durability and (spa-
tial) configuration (Parkes and Thrift, 1979). However, they also manifest 
distinct degrees of entrainment with dominating, superior rhythms. The 
calendar, socially accepted working hours, election periods for municipal 
politicians or the average time of master plan validity are the superior beats 
introducing ‘outer’ time into public transportation or any other urban 
structure from larger- scale levels. The oscillations in the large scales can 
substantially disturb the steady everyday cycles as they trigger change, mod-
ernization, obduracy or obsolescence – all the attributes that are primarily 
bound to a linear understanding of time. Terms like ‘post- socialism’ or 
‘post- industrialism’1 can serve as good examples here because their prefix 
‘post’ evokes the idea of linear time composed of non- repetitive succession – 
that is, the time of linear ‘becoming’ from socialism/ industrialism to post- 
socialism/ industrialism. Šrubař (2001) points out, however, that linearity 
and cyclicality of social processes are not mutually exclusive. He argues, 
referring to Braudel and Foucault, that there are cyclical rhythms not only 
in the scale of everyday mundane life but also in the processes of longue 
durée. Still, large- scale cyclical rhythms do not necessarily return to the 
same starting point because they involve a component of linear develop-
ment. This partial linear change results from the complexity of the grand 
social structures that carry the rhythms – they are permanently negotiated 
and remodelled by the interaction of numerous everyday repetitive routines. 
Šrubař (2001), in this sense, conceptualizes post- socialism as a distinct part 
of the rhythm of modernization oscillating between etatism and liberalism.
Layering the short- term rhythmicities of daily commuting with the 
longue durée rhythms of infrastructural materiality, economy and planning, 
we conceptualize public transportation as a spatio- temporal structure. 
While some discourses of the post- socialist city emphasize discontinuity and 
rather quick transformation of urban routines, this study sheds light also on 
inertias and semi- stability stemming from repetitiveness of urban rhythms. 
It confronts the linear and recurrent component of urban development and 
thus traces urban change and obduracy as a multi- scalar, spatio- temporal 
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phenomenon. In short, we ask for the form and context of obduracies 
embedded in the rhythms of public transport infrastructure in the socialist 
and post- socialist city.
The chapter presents a case study of the city of Brno – the second largest 
city in the Czech Republic and a Central European city in terms of geo-
graphic location. Simultaneously, it can be found at a certain point in time. 
Its temporal coordinates can be thus defined as follows – current Brno can 
be considered a representative of a metropolis in the second decade of the 
21st century or as a representative of a metropolis still transforming from a 
socialist to a post- socialist period of its existence. The chapter is divided into 
four sections. The first section briefly describes the broader urban context of 
Brno. Attention is paid primarily to long- term economic, demographic, con-
struction, social and political progress. This first section enables consideration 
of the specificities of development of the local public transport system within 
the framing settings. The attention in the second section of the chapter is paid 
to the rhythms of the construction process of transport infrastructure and its 
entrainment with institutionalized political and planning cycles. The dyna-
mism of urban planning documents and political narratives is confronted 
with repetitive planning objectives and socio- technological normativities. 
Analysing the timetables of public transport in more detail, we directly com-
pare the different daily rhythmicities of socialist and post- socialist Brno in the 
third section. We show how public transport transfers the industrial beats of 
socialist Brno into spatio- temporal configurations of daily human flows and 
how persistent these rhythms are under the conditions of a post- industrial 
city. The final discussion attempts to present the public transport system of 
post- socialist Brno as a result of urban polyrhythmia, in which both human 
and non- human rhythms interfere and overlap.
Case study Brno: on the way from socialist to post- socialist 
public transport
The recent development of public transport systems in Brno has been 
undoubtedly influenced by the broader urban context and economic, social 
and political changes (Gray et  al., 2008; Pucher and Buehler, 2005) that 
have taken place not only in Brno but also on national and international 
levels during at least the last two centuries. It covers the modern history 
of the city, starting from the era of capitalist industrialization at the end 
of the 18th century and running until the present day. In this chapter, pri-
mary attention is given to the eras of socialist industrialization and the post- 
socialist development since the 1990s.
The era of gründer capitalism followed by capitalist industrialization, 
which was then replaced by the era of socialism with its particular form of 
industrialization, all have in common rapid population growth in Brno. The 
population grew from approximately 100,000 inhabitants in 1869 to almost 
400,000 in 1991 (Table  10.1). The built- up area of Brno has expanded 
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Table 10.1  Development of population and employment in basic economic sectors in Brno
1869 1921 1930 1950 1961 1970 1980 1991 2001 2011
Population 
(thousands)
105.0 237.7 284.0 299.1 324.2 344.2 371.5 388.3 376.2 385.9
Employment in:
agriculture (%) – 2.9 2.0 – 2.0 2.2 1.8 2.7 1.0 0.6
industry (%) – 42.7 37.2 – 58.0 49.7 47.5 42.1 29.1 22.8
services (%) – 54.4 60.8 – 40.0 48.1 50.7 55.2 69.9 76.6
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: censuses, Útvar hlavního architekta and Plánovací odbor MěstNV (1966)
new
genrtpdf
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significantly over this period because of the construction of many new city 
neighbourhoods, including panel housing residential units built between 
the 1960s and 1980s (Table  10.2), and administrative incorporations of 
adjacent communities into the city. By contrast, the era after the fall of the 
socialist regime in 1989 has been marked by stagnating population numbers 
and construction activities within the city itself (Tables 10.1 and 10.2), while 
the spatial growth has continued on the metropolitan level because of inten-
sive processes of residential and commercial suburbanization.
Building Brno as a modern capitalist industrial city has been associated 
with the development of the textile and engineering industries since the 
end of the 18th century (Kunc, 1999). The end of the 18th century and the 
following 19th century were periods of productive industrialism, a distinct 
mode of urban reproduction and capital accumulation (Byrne, 2002) that 
became deeply rooted into daily urban routines, symbolism and social strati-
fication, as well as into the complex of urban technologies serving the fast 
growing city more effectively. The planning and construction of transport 
infrastructures, primarily in the form of tramlines, reflected, however, the eco-
nomic beat of the city, because these served the factories and not the residen-
tial areas. Since 1869, private companies have operated the tramway system, 
aligning it solely to commercial profit generated by the freight transport that 
used a dense siding system connecting individual factories (Závodná, 2016).
Until 1918, Brno was a part of the Austro- Hungarian monarchy with a 
significant proportion of German- speaking inhabitants. After the declaration 
of the independent Czechoslovakia in 1918, the geopolitical position of the 
city changed substantially, becoming a predominantly Czech urban centre 
of the new national state. The industrial character of the city remained but 
was nevertheless filled with new symbolism and topology. The continuous, 
rapid population growth was increasingly understood as an important par-
ameter of building the ‘new Czech Brno’. Questions about the ideal spatial 
and social organization of the city were raised, and the planning for growth 
became the focal point of regulatory studies at that time, which argued for 
expanding the network of public tramways as the skeleton of new terri-
torial development. Preferably, the suburban, predominantly Czech residen-
tial neighbourhoods were connected and the rather scattered area of the city 
was filled in with new housing construction along these transportation axes 
(Kuča, 2000). Transport infrastructure planning was fully passed under the 
control of the municipality, which used it as a powerful tool to foster the 
modern functional zoning of the city and to introduce a social dimension to 
transport policies, for example by limiting the fares for workers.
The socialist regime reshaped the urban capitalist industrialism after 1948. 
As local decision making had to reflect the aims of the national economy as 
a whole (Hoffmann, 1994), the city- based socio- economic narratives were 
replaced by national or even transnational ideologies of socialist modern-
ization closely linked to industrialization. The post- war socialist industrial-
ization itself did not necessarily mean a fundamental change in the spatial 
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Table 10.2  Development of housing production in Brno
Total flats  
in 2001
From which flats constructed:
until 1919 1920– 1945 1946– 1970 1971– 1980 1981– 1990 1991– 2001 Un- known
Number of flats 151,724 14,697 34,216 31,955 34,341 25,479 9,008 2,028
Average number of flats 
constructed per decade
– – 13,686 12,782 34,341 25,479 9,008 – 
Sources: censuses
new
genrtpdf
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and functional organization of the city. The spatial distribution of indus-
trial production in socialist Brno mostly reflected the capitalistic patterns, 
while only a few new premises were built on greenfield plots. Nevertheless, 
the volume of labour force employed in industry increased significantly in 
socialist Brno. Its share of the total employment became even higher than 
in the previous, inter- war period (approximately 50 per cent, or even more, 
versus about 40 per cent, Table 10.1).
The provision of housing for the growing number of industrial workers 
was ensured through massive housing construction based on national 
urbanization strategies (Musil, 2001). The construction of large housing 
estates became a key component of socialist modernization, which changed 
the urban landscape and topology of everyday urban life more significantly. 
There are many examples of large housing estates constructed in Brno on 
the greenfield plots (e.g. Lesná, Bystrc and Bohunice), whose population has 
grown to 20,000– 25,000 inhabitants in a relatively short period of 15 or 
20 years. As a clear consequence, the average number of flats constructed per 
decade peaked in Brno precisely during the 1970s and 1980s (Table 10.2). 
Consequently, the existing mass transport system has been significantly 
adapted to these enormous shifts in the concentrations of resident popu-
lation, employing various transport technologies including the key system 
of fast trams (Seidenglanz et al., 2016; Voráček et al., 1975). Figure 10.1 
illustrates this close relationship that socialist urban planning developed with 
an enlarged public transport system as the backbone of newly constructed 
residential neighbourhoods and industrial premises.
This development of transport infrastructure in Brno was fully in com-
pliance with national transport policies of socialist countries in general, 
including former Czechoslovakia, because they preferred public provision 
of urban transport. Public transport as a collective mode corresponded with 
socialist ideology and the rigid planning culture (Žídek, 2006) that, in an 
effort to balance urbanization and industrialization processes (Musil and 
Link, 1976), sought an economically optimal and socially sustainable modal 
split in urban transport (Voráček et al., 1975). At the same time, the import-
ance of public urban transport was increased by the rather low availability 
of passenger cars, a consequence of the quite peculiar relation of socialist 
regimes to automobiles (Jastrząb, 2011; Siegelbaum, 2011).
After the demise of the socialist system in 1991, Brno was affected by 
gradual de- industrialization as the employment in the industrial sector 
decreased significantly and the employment in services grew (Table 10.1). 
The ‘industrial society’ was removed from city- related narratives, although 
not entirely from the materiality, temporality and rhythmicity of the city. 
Socialist industrialism is still present, visible through more or less tangible 
differences between relict elements (underused or vacant industrial sites, 
persisting everyday rhythms of elderly people who worked from 6am till 3pm 
shifts in factories, etc.) and the new emerging structures (shopping malls, 
new suburban or in- fill housing developments, floating working hours, etc.). 
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As Wu (2003) points out, the transition from socialism to post- socialism 
has to be interpreted with respect to historical, socialist and pre- socialist 
structures (Enyedi, 1996) in order to grasp the complexity and ambiguity of 
the post- socialist city.
The rather homogeneous and well- plannable collective time- space of 
socialist Brno thus inevitably changed into multiple overlying time- spaces 
as soon as industry lost its position as a dominant employer and whole- 
city pacemaker. Spatial and transport planning has been confronted with 
a multiplex model of the city (Graham and Healey, 1999) where the clear 
topologies and rhythms of socialist public transport were replaced by 
more complex relational patterns without a unifying planning or political 
narrative. The number of collective actors relevant to the spatio- temporality 
of the transport market has increased compared with socialist times, and 
the still important journeys between places of home and work have been 
enriched by new topologies including consumption, leisure, research and 
other sites (Pucher and Buehler, 2005; Urbánková and Ouředníček, 2006). 
Moreover, the still- dominant radial relations between Brno and its hinter-
land developed during the eras of industrialization, namely as the material-
ization of massive centripetal commuting for work has been replaced by a 
far more complex mix of multi- directional relations during the post- socialist 
and post- industrial period because of the processes of suburbanization 
within the metropolitan region of Brno. These elements are strong stimuli 
to the reconfiguration of the urban public transport network into a regional 
one. The creation of such a regional integrated public transport system 
was preceded by the total reorganization of the urban transport system in 
2000. It comprised, among others, route changes, the reduction of the total 
number of lines and the introduction of a transfer tariff model (KORDIS, 
2014), thus reflecting the wider transformation of urban and metropolitan 
time- space and rhythms.
All earlier noted transformations were of course framed by considerable 
changes in the transport policies of the post- socialist era. The difficult relation 
of the socialist regime towards passenger cars has been replaced by a sup-
portive attitude, resulting in important investments in road infrastructures, 
for example. The demand for private cars and their daily use has developed 
very progressively (Kraft and Marada, 2017) since then. Unlike with 
roads, investments in urban public transport were heavily curtailed and all 
responsibility for their planning, construction, operation and maintenance 
was transferred from the state level to the level of municipal governments 
(Pucher and Buehler, 2005). These profound policy changes, coupled with 
the lack of money, expertise and experience at the municipal level, resulted 
not only in the almost entire suspension of any extensions to key urban 
transport infrastructures in the past decade of the 20th century but also in 
the cancellation of services in peripheral areas at off- peak hours or during 
weekends (Šťastná and Vaishar, 2017). Public transport infrastructure 
inherited from the socialist era is thus necessarily more or less conserved in 
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the dynamically developing time- space of post- socialist Brno with its newly 
emerging destinations like shopping malls and suburban residential areas 
at the outskirts of the city. The latter are, however, not served well by the 
existing principal transport infrastructures (Seidenglanz et al., 2016).
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the situation of urban public 
transport in Central European post- socialist countries has begun to sta-
bilize, or even to partly improve (Seidenglanz et al., 2016). Although this 
development has many causes, the growing environmental awareness and 
application of the European transport policy approaches, supported heavily 
by co- financing from European Union (EU) structural funds are among 
the most prominent reasons, at least for countries in the EU (Moriarty and 
Honnery, 2013).
Planning rhythms and materiality of transport infrastructures
Transport planning in Brno has always been closely linked to demographic 
and economic cycles of different scales. As shown earlier, Brno has been a 
growing city since the onset of industrialism in the 19th century. The growth 
continued during socialism and the cycle culminated, in terms of both popu-
lation and administrative area, in the 1990s when the growth was replaced 
by population stagnation and decline. This demographic cycle should be 
considered a frame- setting rhythm enveloping the subtle cycles of pro-
duction modes, socio- technical formations and planning narratives in the 
socialist and post- socialist city of Brno. There are differences in how these 
rhythms are reflected under particular political and economic conditions in 
specific planning actions.
With the onset of socialism after 1948, the planning cycle shifted towards 
industrial pragmatism. A total of four zoning master plans were approved 
in the city of Brno in the socialist period. The plans from 1952 and 1956 
focused primarily on the post- war renovation of the housing stock and its 
distinct separation from the industrial sites, without major ambitions to 
extend significantly the built- up area of the city. The master plans of 1968 
and 1988 utilized the potential of panel technology and proposed locations 
of large housing estates mainly on the outskirts of the city. Unlike the situ-
ation of industrial Brno in the 19th century, the spatial dynamics of the 
socialist city were tied mainly to the provision of housing. The newly built 
housing estates represented the novelty and spatial dynamism in contrast 
with the industrial production premises that remained locked mostly in the 
pre- socialist locations of the wider inner city. There is one common feature 
in the plans, namely the zoning approach (rayonization) that is necessarily 
based on the effective link between the place of residence and the workplace.
This was the default pace- making axis of the socialist Brno deter-
mining transport planning narratives and the long- term cycles of chained 
investments. The national planning document of the 1970s states in this con-
text: ‘…the main political- economic task of public transport is the transport 
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of the population for work…in order for public transport to fulfil its 
function, it must be cheap and efficient…’ (VUVA, 1979). The Czechoslovak 
socialist planning preferred tramways to become the backbone of public 
transport systems in large metropolises, and partly also in industrial mid- 
sized cities, according to Voráček et  al. (1975). These planning priorities 
were transferred to the urban level through five- year economic plans and 
zoning master plans. The local transport planning in socialist Brno, as well 
as in other industrial cities, was considerably subordinated to the needs of 
industrial enterprises that not only influenced the location of new lines but 
also required coordination of line timetables with the rhythm of working 
shifts. Relatively simple and stable patterns of home- to- work journeys 
enabled the introduction of a non- transfer tariff in the 1970s with the fare 
kept at relatively low rates.
The preference for tram transport was fully respected also in Brno. 
However, because of varying topographical conditions, trams were in some 
directions supplemented by a trolleybus network. Until the completion of 
the first large housing estates in the mid- 1960s, the transport plans focused 
on extending the existing tramlines to a few newly built industrial facil-
ities (Figure 10.1). The first new tramline, which was built as a product of 
socialism, was the short branch opened in 1951 connecting EJF electrical 
factory in Horní Heršpice in the southern part of Brno to the rest of the tram 
network. Another extension was implemented in 1961 to connect the TESLA 
electrical engineering factory in the northern part of the city itself (DPMB 
and TM, 1980; DPMB, 1989). After the beginning of the construction of the 
large housing estates, the transport investments were reoriented into these 
areas. There were five new tramline sections opened in Brno connecting the 
new housing estates, namely the lines to the residential areas in Královo 
Pole (1973), Lesná (1973), Bohunice and Starý Lískovec (1980 and 1982), 
Bystrc (1983 and 1984) and Líšeň (1986 and 1989). The vast majority of 
lines were constructed in the segregated light rail form. The general goal 
was to guarantee reliable accessibility of the city centre within 30 minutes 
to almost all inhabitants of the peripheral housing estates (Útvar hlavního 
architekta, 1966). Although the construction of the tramlines was planned 
in coordination with the housing estate construction, in most cases there 
was a significant delay between the finalization of the housing estate and 
the completion of the lines because of a lack of investment money (Půlpán, 
1993). Accordingly, there are many examples of provisional and temporal 
bus services in housing estates substituting for still unfinished tramlines – 
these bus lines were not usually cancelled and often were operated in par-
allel with the later completed tramlines.
To a large extent, socialist planning in Brno created and reflected the 
topology of a self- contained industrial city. The beats of the city were 
industrialized in the broad sense of the word because there were predictable 
planning rhythms stemming from the recurrent home- work movements as 
well as from the state- led system based on a cycle of five- year plans. These 
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Figure 10.1  Scheme of Brno tram and trolleybus lines development since 1950 to 
the present
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beats were framed and further developed by quasi- regular sequences of new 
massive housing construction. Socialist public transport played a vital role 
in making those socialist rhythmicities and topologies through the physical 
connections of the residential and productive zones of the city. Large and 
long- term investments in the tram and trolleybus material infrastructures 
could be interpreted as confidence in the plannability and predictability of 
the spatio- temporality of a socialist city. Moreover, for at least 35 years, the 
residents of Brno through their daily routines have repeatedly reproduced 
the state- preferred transport relation between the city centre and the resi-
dential outskirts. The configuration of public transport in Brno thus co- 
defined the everyday, spatio- temporal imagination of the passengers and 
planning representation of the city.
All three of the modes of public transport noted earlier – trams, trolleybuses 
and buses – have been in operation in Brno after the demise of the socialist 
regime at the end of 1989. No socialist section of tram or trolleybus lines 
has been closed to the present day. However, the infrastructure development 
of public transport itself has significantly slowed down because only very 
few new lines have been opened (Figure  10.1). Most of them have been 
the completion of older socialist plans only. Examples are the direct tram 
connection between the central railway station and Bohunice housing estate, 
opened in 1994, the short extension of tramline in Líšeň (1998 and 2004), 
and the linking of the two independent trolleybus systems in the western and 
eastern parts of Brno by a new semi- tangential line opened in 1994.
The urban planning scheme for Brno changed significantly during the 
1990s as the clearly articulated rhythms of the socialist industrial city and 
the cycles of the national plans disappeared. The first (and, at the same time, 
also last) post- socialist master plan was approved in 1994. It had to cope with 
the decline and spatial dispersal of new housing construction, the downturn 
of industrial production and the onset of tertiary urban economy, as well as 
with an emerging depopulation trend. Planning, more specifically transport 
planning, thus moved beyond the normative approach based on the good 
predictability of time- space rhythms to a more reactive, not prescriptive but 
regulative position. The suspension of investments in large public transport 
material infrastructures was one of the impacts of the planning ‘interpret-
ative uncertainty’ about the future spatio- temporal configuration of the 
city. New important places and post- industrial pacemakers, like suburban 
shopping malls, industrial/ logistical areas or technological parks emerging 
primarily in suburban localities, thus became outside the reach of tram and 
trolleybus lines and served by a more flexible bus network.
Instead, the planning focus turned to the non- material aspects of public 
transport organization while operating the material infrastructures inherited 
from the socialist period. The massive reorganization of public transport 
links that took place in 1995 can serve as an example to illustrate the clash 
between the spatio- temporal image of the city associated with its socialist- 
industrial era on the one hand and a planning intervention representing 
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post- socialist rhythmicity on the other. As mentioned earlier, during the 
socialist period, public transit operated within a clearly defined origin- 
destination matrix in which the inner city held a prominent role. Radial 
organization of public transport, however, appeared to be problematic and 
economically inefficient within a more complicated post- socialist urban con-
figuration. Increasing numbers of intra- city destinations, as well as increasing 
complexity of everyday rhythms, have prompted the transport company’s 
planners to rebuild the system vigorously. Starting in September 1995, the 
number of operated tramlines was reduced from 22 to 13, the bus lines 
were shortened significantly in order to serve as the feeders of the tramway 
system, and a number of tangential links have been introduced over time. 
The new model of operations has departed from the industrial image of 
a uniformly timed city and offered a more connected network. This shift 
inevitably increased the number of necessary transfers, however, and thus 
reinforced the importance of time at the expense of space – the non- transfer 
tariff using single- trip tickets was replaced by a transfer tariff with time- 
based fares, which introduced new metrics into the time- space of the city. 
Although there was no significant physical development of immobile infra-
structure, it was so far the most fundamental modification of the system 
after 1989. The familiar and stabilized functional city image, so embedded 
in the socialist rhythmicities, has been broken and the new topologies of 
new Brno – neither socialist nor industrial any more – have emerged.
Daily rhythms of public transport services
There are certainly many distinctions between the spatio- temporal regimes 
of life during socialism and post- socialism reflecting the changed context and 
conditions for everydayness. First, there is the growing complexity of anchor 
points such as places of home, work, education, consumption, leisure or fun 
now distributed in a more scattered manner in the wider space of the Brno 
metropolitan area. Second, there are significant shifts in the typical times 
of the beginning and end of working hours, shopping hours and the usual 
times of many other ordinary activities. The time- space pattern of socialist 
Brno was heavily dominated by its strong industrial base, which not only 
employed almost half of workers (47.5 per cent in 1980, Table 10.1) but 
also embedded many other urban activities including shops, health care, kin-
dergarten, etc. The daily regime was thus set for many people by an early 
morning start of working hours at 6 a.m. and a quite early afternoon end 
at 2.30 p.m. After the end of the socialist era, the importance of industrial 
plants in the life of the city decreased noticeably. The formerly high share of 
employment in industry has been compensated primarily by the growing sig-
nificance of a tertiary sector comprising roughly three quarters of workers in 
2011 (Table 10.1), with its much less strict requirements for both spatial loca-
tion and working hours. The spatio- temporal regime of post- socialist Brno is 
thus characterized by later starts and ends, and also by a higher heterogeneity 
between various social and professional groups (Kunc, 1999; Mulíček et al., 
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Figure 10.2  Distribution of city bus services during the working day in Brno in 1989 
and 2009
2016). The spatio- temporal concentration has changed during the transi-
tion from socialist to post- socialist rhythms – a change towards increasing 
de- synchronization of formerly uniformly rhythmized industrial time- space 
(Gutiérrez and García- Palomares, 2007; Preston and O’Connor, 2008).
Common everyday life is always strongly connected with varying demands 
for travel, and it has an impact on the beats of public transport supply. It is 
thus not stable in time and space, and varies between daily, weekly or sea-
sonally based peaks and off- peaks (Docherty et al., 2008; Kärrholm, 2009). 
The intimate micro- rhythm of everyday life in Brno thus reflects, modulates 
and merges even with the very long rhythm of the transition from socialism 
to post- socialism. The results of merging rhythms are well expressed in grad-
ually changing public transport timetables. In the case of Brno, they are 
analysed in the study of Mulíček et al. (2016), who compared the distribu-
tion of bus connections available on working days in 1989 and 2009 – that 
is, in the years illustrating the socialist and post- socialist era. The general 
supply of buses has not changed significantly since then but their temporal 
distribution did (see Figure 10.2). Although the presence of morning and 
afternoon peaks is still clearly visible in the daily temporal regime of public 
transport services supply in Brno, buses were divided more evenly during the 
working day in 2009 than in 1989, meaning the distinction between peak 
and off- peak intervals between individual services was evidently smaller in 
2009. The ratio of buses operating in peak and off- peak hours was 3:1 in 
1989 and 2:1 in 2009. Moreover, both morning and afternoon peaks shifted 
into the later hours as the high point of bus supply moved from 5– 6 a.m. in 
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1989 to 7– 8 a.m. in 2009, and apparently less noticeably in the afternoon 
during the analysed period.
Although the former socialist temporality is now pronounced in public 
transport rhythms in a much more relaxed way than 25 or 30 years ago in Brno, 
it is still present here. Despite the large decrease in employment in industry 
(only about one fifth of economically active workers in this sector according 
to the census conducted in 2011, Table  10.1), its legacy cannot be simply 
and totally excluded from the life of the city. Good examples are surviving 
spatio- temporal habits and behaviour of mainly older residents who lived out 
substantial parts of their adult lives in socialism and therefore still consider 
earlier times of waking and starting their daily activities as a kind of temporal 
norm. Another reason the industrial rhythms are still noticeable in the public 
transport timetables in the form of specifically distributed peak hours is the 
fact that the imprint of the polyrhythmic tertiary sector on public transport 
scheduling is not so straightforward, even though this sector now dominates 
in the city economy. Actually, tertiary activities are more dispersed in terms of 
spatial as well as temporal coordinates, and thus lack the uniform rhythmicity 
and immense power of the former industrial pacemakers. Moreover, even if 
there are well- pronounced tertiary pacemakers like shopping malls, they are 
often located out of the reach of the principal infrastructures of public trans-
port developed during the previous socialist period, so their contribution to 
the rhythmicity of the entire transport network and general timetable is at 
least partly limited. In summary, although the imprint of tertiary activities on 
timetables of public transport in Brno becomes increasingly obvious, it still 
accounts more for a temporal modification than for a total transformation.
Moreover, the process of merging the individual micro- rhythms with the 
systemic transformation from a socialist to post- socialist regime is rather 
complex, and its manifestations are not evenly distributed in the area of 
Brno. There are some spaces where the socialist temporality in public trans-
port is more obvious and, vice versa, spaces where post- socialist temporality 
is more evident. We can thus identify some forms of socialist or post- socialist 
segments in the time- space of the city. The former includes primarily indus-
trial localities or industrial parks, where the older work temporality is still 
dominant, while large shopping malls or hypermarkets and office parks 
represent service- driven pockets of gradually emerging post- socialist Brno. 
Their differing temporality can be illustrated by the rhythms of public trans-
port services departing from representative stops within them, as shown in 
Figure 10.3 in the cases of stops Slatina, závod (‘Slatina, factory’ in English) 
and Modřice, Olympia. The stop Slatina, závod is located in the middle of 
a large industrial area in Slatina and in the close vicinity of a new industrial 
park, Černovické terasy. It is characterized by the clear distinction of peak 
hours in comparison with off- peak periods. Besides the morning and after-
noon peaks, there is one more peak in the late evening hours, after 10 p.m., 
in Slatina, závod. This peak corresponds exactly to the end of the afternoon 
shift and to the beginning of the night one in the factory. This type of peak 
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Figure 10.3  Distribution of public transport services departures from stops Modřice, 
Olympia and Slatina, závod during the workday in 2015
 
174 O. Mulíček and D. Seidenglanz
174
was quite typical of many localities in socialist Brno and has survived until 
today, but in a very limited number of places. The stop Modřice, Olympia, 
on the other hand, represents a large retail area located in the southern 
part of the city, a place of consumption equipped with a hypermarket, 
many brand stores and shops, and also with leisure and entertainment facil-
ities. Temporal distribution of public transport services reflects the highest 
demand for travel in this area after the end of work hours, i.e. during later 
afternoon. The demand is low during morning hours, and the morning peak 
is, interestingly, almost entirely missing. The minor peak after 9 p.m. closely 
corresponds to the closing time of the majority of shops.
Conclusion
Urban transport infrastructures including public transport systems have never 
been a prominent theme within studies dealing with the conceptualization and 
theorization of various forms of post- socialist transformations. However, this 
omission can be assessed as an undervaluation of their significance both for 
the spatio- temporal functioning as well as the planning of the cities themselves, 
and for the spatio- temporal ordering of ordinary daily routines. Reflecting the 
research question, public transport infrastructure can be viewed contrarily 
to those discourses of the post- socialist city that emphasize discontinuity of 
the urban story and the disruption of routinized representations of the city. 
It is a lively agent contributing not only to urban transformation and change 
but also to continuity, persistence or even obduracy of urban spatio- temporal 
features. What is important is the fact that urban transport infrastructure 
cannot be perceived as a passive recipient only reflecting the ongoing socio- 
economic and political changes. This chapter employs another, more inclusive 
view of public transport systems. It stresses their broader embeddedness in 
the material as well as non- material urban fabric. Transport infrastructure is 
then seen as an agent that interlinks various urban times, places and meanings, 
and transfers spatial and temporal fragments of the socialist city into the time- 
space of post- socialist urban everydayness.
The analytical tool of rhythms is employed here to explore urban public 
transport and its position in the processes of spatio- temporal transform-
ation with particular emphasis on the socialist and post- socialist periods. 
The public transport infrastructure is conceptualized as a polyrhythmic 
entity reflecting the nature of city functioning. Different phases of its devel-
opment, fast or slow extension, reorganization, reconfiguration, stabiliza-
tion, and maybe even partial reduction, are deeply embedded into the urban 
spatio- temporal fabric. They should be perceived as a consequence of spe-
cific combinations of different urban rhythms linking particular places in 
various temporalized topologies. All these merging rhythms are of a very 
diverse nature:  some are very short with daily alterations, some are of a 
longue durée- type with alterations across decades, some are produced very 
intimately by individual persons, and some are of a collective nature and 
produced by non- human actors. The whole public transport system including 
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its needed infrastructure can be certainly understood as a polyrhythmical 
entity produced and reproduced by continuous negotiations between repeti-
tiveness of all these rhythmical routines, which also reflect effects induced by 
grand political, economic, social and planning structures in action.
Post- socialist and also post- industrial transformation of public transport 
infrastructures and systems in the spatio- temporal context of Brno can be 
interpreted, therefore, as an effect of a specific mixture of interfering, mer-
ging and overlapping rhythms that started to work mutually in the turn 
from the 1980s to 1990s in Czechoslovakia and are still in action today. 
Alongside the rhythms of economic conversion from the industrial to post- 
industrial era, there have also been shifts in the temporality of the users of 
public transport. There are also planning rhythms in the development of 
public transport materialities – within them the fast expansion of infrastruc-
ture that reflected the spatial and population growth of Brno, which were 
replaced by their conservation after 1990. We can confirm the obduracy of 
socialist infrastructure in terms of its materiality. The built transport lines 
and terminals are clear socialist legacies in which the topology and rhythms 
of socialist Brno are still imprinted. Conversely, the immaterial dimensions 
of public transport infrastructure, including planning and operation, have 
undergone significant development. Although the spatio- temporal enclaves 
of socialist daily rhythms or the echoes of socialist planning proposals can 
still be found, the post- socialist economic and planning reality overlays 
most of such socialist immaterial relicts with a rather different context. The 
functioning of physical transport infrastructure in new topological frames 
is thus only allowed thanks to substantial transformations of its immaterial 
settings consisting in the fundamental change in the organization of the lines 
related to tariff and timetables modifications.
Note
 1 ‘Socialism’ and ‘industrialism’ are not understood as identical terms in this 
chapter. Both bear their own meanings on the theoretical level. However, the 
everyday materialization of socialism in a particular time period has been sig-
nificantly influenced by the complex interplay of urbanization and industrializa-
tion processes (Pickvance, 2002). In this regard, we can consider the post- socialist 
post- industrial city as a case sui generis and distinctive from the general concept 
of post- industrial urbanism.
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11  Predictability and propinquity  
on the Sofia Metro
Everyday metro journeys and 
long- term relations of transport 
infrastructuring
Anna Plyushteva
Introduction
Like all infrastructures, the Sofia Metro has both relational and non- 
relational qualities (Ash, 2013, p.  26). Its material durabilities imply an 
identifiable object, a bounded space. At the same time, it is defined by mul-
tiple human and material relations to the outside and elsewhere. In this 
latter sense, the metro is not an infrastructure but an entanglement of infra-
structural relations that it is party to and which it enables (Amin and Thrift, 
2017, p.  17). Thus, through the everyday journeys they undertake, the 
passengers of the Sofia Metro not only experience particular metro service 
characteristics but, in so doing, continuously constitute the meanings and 
practices that shape the metro and the wider Sofia transport system. While 
the situated experiences of the metro service may be brief and mundane, 
they contribute to the long- term project of building, maintaining and chan-
ging the city’s transport infrastructures. The present chapter works with 
these multiple temporalities of the Sofia Metro’s infrastructural relations.
On the one hand, the everyday time- spaces of people, objects, meanings 
and affects represent a specific and situated ‘here and now’ of inhabiting 
Sofia in the late 2010s. These socio- technical entanglements, which I discuss 
in terms of everyday mobility practices,1 are substantial in their own right, 
and not simply a lens through which broader societal and political processes 
can be read. On the other hand, everyday practices, including those related 
to reliability and propinquity, both illustrate and continuously modify what 
is valued in relation to mobility, by whom, and at the expense of what alter-
native perspectives.
Because the metro project originated in state socialist Bulgaria in the 
1960s and was not launched until the late 1990s, the turbulent histories of 
the past few decades are entangled within it. In connecting the socialist and 
post- socialist decades of Sofia’s history and problematizing the boundary 
between them, the Sofia Metro case study can respond to the need for greater 
historical continuity in examining post- socialist cities, a need highlighted by 
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Ferenčuhová (Hirt et al., 2016). This chapter challenges perceptions of the 
rapid changes of ‘post- socialism’ by noting continuities of infrastructural 
ideals and narratives of automobility that continue to structure transport 
and mobility practices in Sofia.
In this chapter, I use predictability and propinquity to demonstrate that 
the Sofia Metro is both part of the urban everyday and an ongoing project 
that links post- socialism to the many temporalities of transport planning 
in the Bulgarian capital. While the concepts of predictability and propin-
quity are widely used in transport planning, they have slightly different 
meanings here. In its quantitative incarnation, predictability is mainly used 
to discuss the scheduling and reliability of trip durations. Propinquity often 
denotes crowdedness on public transport as distinctive from proximities 
within private cars, which generally involve fixed distances between 
commuting bodies. In this chapter, predictability and propinquity are 
explored qualitatively as collective socio- material practices of inhabiting 
the metro. The chapter suggests that such inhabitation practices are central 
to the way the metro creates diverse links between the infrastructural city 
and its inhabitants.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I outline the theoretical traditions 
that inform the way infrastructure, propinquity and reliability are 
conceptualized in the discussion. The following section provides a brief his-
tory of the Sofia Metro and describes the research project on which the 
chapter draws. The main body of the chapter discusses predictability and 
propinquity in turn, in terms of the socio- technical configurations that are 
being generated on the metro and construed through everyday uses and 
mundane interactions. Using qualitative data from repeated ride- along 
interviews with a group of Sofia commuters, reliability and propinquity are 
framed as two dimensions of the relationship between the metro and the 
city – a relationship that is contemporary and immediate, as well as histor-
ical. Through mundane mobility and the meanings and practices it generates, 
I  show that, since 2012, the metro infrastructure and the city have been 
intermittently connected by links of differentiation, complementarity and 
inseparability. While propinquity and predictability are made on the metro 
with the specific materialities such as those of trains, tickets and turnstiles, 
they also shape broader meanings for Sofia mobility, most notably in rela-
tion to automobility. I argue that metro practices should be read as both 
situated in the metro space and excessive to it, suggesting that meanings 
linked to the private car are particularly significant in the way metro pro-
pinquity and predictability are construed.
Relational perspectives on (post- socialist) infrastructuring
Thinking relationally about infrastructure entails accounting for its multiple 
spatialities and temporalities, and conceiving of infrastructural flows as more 
than the movement of matter through matter. The Sofia Metro has material 
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properties that distinguish it from other transport infrastructures and urban 
spaces in contemporary Sofia. When discussing the everyday practices of 
its users, it is important to pay attention to their situatedness. A  journey 
through Sofia by metro is unlike another journey because of the specific 
socio- material interactions involved (Latour, 1991). The metro is made up of 
underground track tunnels and stations, as well as some visually distinctive 
covered overground tracks in the outskirts of the city. Barriers require the 
validation of tickets on entry and turnstiles define the rhythm of exiting a 
station. It has a recognizable visual identity through logos, maps and signs. 
However, these are not uniform but rather constitute a patchwork, reflecting 
the lengthy and incremental construction of the Sofia Metro.
At the same time, the metro is not just an infrastructural system. It is 
defined by relations of infrastructuring, which bind it to a range of human 
and non- human actors, from passengers and cars at street level to station 
staff and train drivers, to car parking bays, trams, cycle lanes, electricity and 
data cables, and to various urban places with their distinctive and chan-
ging meanings and atmospheres. In this sense, a metro is not a ‘thing’ but a 
process of making, sustaining, changing and severing relations (Amin and 
Thrift, 2017; Carse, 2012). It is in these relations that the work of the metro 
as an urban infrastructure is enacted, because they entail supporting, enab-
ling, disrupting, connecting and fragmenting the multiple ways in which a 
city is inhabited (Latham and Wood, 2015). One mode of living with the 
Sofia Metro and its infrastructural relations is to perform mundane metro 
journeys. Looking closely at the everyday practices of those who regularly 
ride the metro is particularly helpful in accounting for the spatial ‘excess’ of 
infrastructure: the excess is especially visible in the trajectories of mundane 
journeys, which through repetition make the metro a sustained yet changing 
part of urban spaces and social interactions. In attending to these everyday 
uses of the metro, both its intrinsic and relational properties can be drawn 
upon in order to glimpse the ways in which the decades- old metro project, 
and its particular socio- material manifestations as they have come to be, 
shape and are shaped by post- socialist conditions in Sofia.
However, ethnographic research on daily practices is not by definition 
well suited to accounting for the longer temporalities of infrastructure (Amin 
and Thrift, 2017, p. 59; Carse, 2012, p. 543). In this sense, the lens of post- 
socialist urbanism presents a particular opportunity because infrastructural 
changes of multiple directions and scales have been ongoing over recent 
decades, and are occurring at present at a rapid pace (Hirt, 2015; Hirt et al., 
2016, p. 514). As a result, the post- socialist urban context can lend itself to 
the ethnographic study of the multiple temporalities of infrastructure – of 
everyday use, of political projects, of construction, decay and repair, and so 
on. Arguably, these urban dynamics make Central and Eastern European 
cities like Sofia more than useful sites for empirically studying the relational 
nature of infrastructure. They also present an opportunity for further re- 
theorization of infrastructural relations in a way that is consequential to 
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urban theory beyond the region (Robinson, 2016; Tuvikene, 2016). Thus, 
in the case of the Sofia Metro project, the ‘everyday’ of everyday metro 
mobility speaks not only to daily repetition and current routine but also to 
a long history of infrastructuring the city beyond pre- defined periods and 
milestones.
The Sofia Metro is not simply an arena of the social and political 
processes of post- socialism, nor is it a material monument to them (Harris, 
2013). Partly as a reflection of their sheer scale, complexity and cost, urban 
metro projects across the globe are inevitably saturated with political and 
ideological meanings from the earliest stages of their conception (Butcher, 
2011; Gibas, 2013; Richmond, 2005; Tomic et al., 2006). The Sofia Metro 
is no exception, even if the ideological slogans it was intended to embody 
have shifted multiple times, most notably from a ‘modern Socialist city’, 
prior to the change of regime in 1989, to a ‘modern European city’ there-
after (Plyushteva, 2016). However, the everyday politics of infrastructure are 
much subtler and more ambiguous than the rhetoric of official documents 
and slogans might imply. It is these nuances of living with infrastructure that 
a study of everyday practices can help illuminate.
Crucially, this also reflects an uneasy and intense relationship with the 
private car, with which the metro project has been entangled throughout 
its history, well before the sharp increase in car ownership that started in 
the 1990s (Mott Macdonald, 2011; Pishtachev, 1972). The construction of 
the metro reflected public and political attitudes towards the private car, as 
well as economic and technical developments. For instance, freeing up street 
space for private cars by moving public transport underground was an influ-
ential argument among Bulgarian experts in the 1960s and 1970s, a position 
shared by many of their colleagues worldwide (Sofia People’s City Council, 
1974). Even if such expectations have been modified since, they are present 
in local politics and daily practice, necessitating a post- socialist history of 
infrastructuring construed as relational and ongoing rather than as a linear 
progression through old and new (Blazek and Šuška, 2017).
Predictability and propinquity are two characteristics of transport 
experiences that have been present, in many different guises, in the rhet-
oric around the Sofia Metro since its conception. In the transport planning 
documents, they take on specific technical and quantifiable meanings.
Predictability refers to the punctuality of transport – that public trans-
port arrives and departs as scheduled, and that private car trips are not 
delayed by congestion or roadworks more than the expected amount. This 
characteristic of mobility is recognized by transport experts as being highly 
valued – passengers often care more about predictable journey times than 
speediness (Cox et al., 2006).
In the ethnographic account of predictability discussed later, it takes on 
a different and more nuanced meaning. In qualitative terms, predictability 
can refer to more than expected journey duration. As will be seen, pre-
dictability can refer to expectations around comfortable temperatures or 
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the dependability of ticket validators. Very often in the case of Sofia, these 
notions of predictability are contrasted with imaginaries about the past, 
especially the proximate past of the ‘transition years’ of the 1990s.
Propinquity, on the other hand, is related to what transport planners 
might refer to as ‘crowdedness’. There are specific numerical values of what 
is acceptable crowdedness on public transport (often defined as four to five 
people per square metre; Tirachini et al., 2013), and crowdedness is known 
to be important to passengers who experience it as a loss of control and 
compare it unfavourably to what has been termed the ‘privacy’ of the car 
(Gatersleben and Uzzell, 2007; Smith et al., 2010, p. 10; Urry, 2004). The 
notion of propinquity, in the sense of proximity to others’ bodies, allows 
me to expand on the idea of crowdedness to reflect on the experiences, not 
necessarily negative, of sharing the metro space with strangers (Bissell 2018; 
Wilson, 2011). As demonstrated later, the same level of crowdedness can 
feel different in different settings. The proximity proximity of others is a 
complex sensory experience that is also about seeing the actions of others, 
hearing their utterances or the sounds from their headphones, and smelling 
their bodies or their shopping (Sliwa and Riach, 2011).
The question of embodied proximity on public transport contrasted with 
the privacy of the car takes on a particular meaning in the context of what has 
been termed the ‘growing privatism of post- socialist urbanism’ (Hirt, 2007). 
Whether this trend of withdrawing from public life is indeed present, and 
whether it can be glimpsed through the changing place of transport modes 
in urban life, remains a contested issue (Barnfield and Plyushteva, 2015).
Research background and methods
The idea to build an underground rail system in Sofia dates back to the 
1960s. The earliest relatively complete plans were approved in 1974. 
Ground was broken in March, 1978, and construction started and stopped 
several times in the 1980s and 1990s, with the change of political regime 
in 1989 representing one of several big challenges faced by the project. The 
first small section of Line 1 was launched in 1998, and a North- South link 
started running through the city centre in 2009 – nearly 40 years after the 
first announcement of a metro project was made. The entire second line was 
launched in 2012 (Figure 11.1).
In the 1960s and 1970s, urban planning in the city focused on a vision 
of automobility: the car embodied convenience, modernity and prosperity, 
and was desired by many while remaining unaffordable for most. In this first 
phase of metro planning, the key rationale was the creation of an under-
ground transport infrastructure that would remove the increasingly unfash-
ionable tram from the streets, opening up space for unimpeded flows of 
automobility. These were the origins of the infrastructural vision that came 
to shape how transport propinquity and reliability in Sofia were lived and 
construed. This vision was defined by a clear hierarchy of transport modes, 
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with the private car at the top, the metro placed second, and ground- level 
public transport, walking and cycling attracting little political attention. 
By the 2000s, however, this rationale had undergone a transformation, 
at least in terms of discourse. As car ownership finally reached the mass 
scale that 1970s planners had envisioned, it turned from a utopian soci-
etal arrangement to a problem of congestion, a health risk and an environ-
mental threat. The Sofia Metro was now called upon to replace the private 
car rather than facilitate its unimpeded movement. Nevertheless, this was 
framed in terms of offering a convenient and reliable alternative to drivers, 
carefully avoiding antagonizing them (Sofia Municipality, 2009). The hier-
archical order was thus barely disturbed – while discourse shifted from sub-
stitution to complementarity, the dominance of the private car underwent 
transformations but seemed resilient both to the collapse of state socialism 
and the expansion of a large infrastructure such as the metro.
Figure 11.1  Phases of metro construction. Line 1 was launched gradually between 
1998 and 2009, and the entire Line 2 was opened simultaneously, 
in 2012
Source:  Map by Miles Irving, UCL Geography Drawing office, using www.
openstreetmap.org
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The data presented here originate from my doctoral research and were 
collected between 2012 and 2015 using repeated ride- along interviews with 
a group of 20 inhabitants of Sofia. All participants lived or worked near 
a station along Line 2 of the metro, which opened in August 2012. Over 
the course of the research, at least four in- depth interviews were conducted 
with each participant, producing a total of 87 interviews. The ride- along 
interviews explored changes in everyday mobility, and particularly in 
commuting to work and further education, before and after the participants 
started using the newly opened metro line. The sample included six men and 
14 women, with ages ranging between 22 and 57 at the start of the study. 
Participants’ accounts are reported here using pseudonyms.
While mobility studies have generated a wealth of qualitative data on 
everyday journeys, interviews and ethnographic observations producing a 
‘snapshot’ view of the everyday mobility of individuals remain more common 
than longitudinal approaches (see also Jirón et  al., 2016). In the study 
presented here, the repeated ride- along method made it possible to combine 
the in- depth study of minute practices of commuting with the longer- term 
temporal rhythms they are connected to (Kusenbach, 2003). The focus of 
the discussion that follows is on the way participants’ reflections on their 
everyday mobility shifted and transformed over time, particularly in relation 
to journey predictability and the proximity of strangers.
The joys and fatigues of infrastructure predictability
Predictability in the sense of a reliable schedule and journeys of foresee-
able duration was a concern for the planners of the Sofia Metro from the 
outset. In 1974, the Sofia People’s Council presented the plan for a metro as 
a solution to the delays that had beset public transport with the expansion 
of automobility. As per the dominant transport knowledges of the time, the 
metro was expected to replace the city’s tram network altogether:
With the construction of the metro, the difficulties which have set upon 
the public transport will be removed. Convenient, fast and reliable 
connections of the main centre with the entire urban organism will be 
provided. With the introduction of the metro will begin the gradual 
removal of the tram transport, which has proven complex and burden-
some to the street network.
(Sofia People’s City Council, 1974)
By the time Line 1 of the Sofia Metro was completed 35  years later, the 
importance of the tram had been re- established and practically no tramlines 
were being removed. However, the delays caused to all ground- level public 
transport by booming numbers of private cars had reached critical levels, 
while trams, buses and trolleybuses suffered from chronic underfunding. 
Few everyday journeys in the late 1990s could be considered predictable 
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because long delays were commonplace, and breakdowns and accidents 
were widespread. When the metro opened against this background, its 
new users enacted various practices related to the predictability of trans-
port, making the notion of predictability part of their everyday mobility. 
In this context, predictability is not simply an indicator of transport service 
quality:  it is made, invested with meaning and continuously reconfigured 
through practices of interacting with the metro infrastructure. By travelling 
on it, passengers wove its connections to the rest of Sofia, taking meanings 
and expectations outward. However, as the predictability of the metro 
became part of everyday life, it could also give rise to sensations of tedium 
and annoyance, and reflections on the sterility of metro infrastructures.
To begin with, most research participants framed predictability in everyday 
journeys in Sofia as a trait exclusive to the metro and chronically absent from 
all other modes of getting around the city, including the private car. The most 
notable aspect of predictability was the way the metro, as the only mode of 
transport with exclusive right of way, was claimed to arrive exactly on time 
in nearly all cases. The lack of predictability in car journeys (in terms of trip 
duration, disruptions due to the behaviour of other drivers, unannounced 
roadworks and so on) was frequently interpreted as being offset by the 
privacy afforded by driving (a theme I return to in the next section). By con-
trast, the way a tram/ trolleybus/ bus journey seemed to always disrupt one’s 
plans was framed as frustrating and with no compensatory aspects. In this 
context, the predictability of the metro was repeatedly pointed out by its 
new users as exceptional and excellent. Participants were keen to praise the 
service, invariably contrasting it with the annoyances and disappointments 
associated with using ground- level public transport in Sofia:
The tram I used to take, the duration of the trip used to vary a lot more. 
Traffic, traffic accidents, congestion, traffic lights, more cars…
(Bella, 13 January 2015)
This type of argument was often part of a broader narrative of the metro as 
an exceptional kind of space in Sofia: a ‘good’ thing, contrasting with the 
messy city above. Not only did the metro trains run on time, they were also 
clean, pleasant and air- conditioned, and thus made starker the sense that a 
bus, or even a street, was a place of unreliability, with significant possibility 
of dirt and unpleasantness:
Yesterday I had to make a bus trip for the first time in a while. The bus 
was so strange and exotic to me. It was so strange. I have been spoilt by 
the metro, how clean and nice it is. It was brutal on the bus.
(Janna, 15 January 2014)
This reliability of train frequencies and other metro technology enabled 
a new kind of precision in scheduling and performing everyday mobility. 
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One participant spoke of looking at the number of people exiting a metro 
station as she approached it on her morning commute, thus guessing how 
long ago a train had passed. Several others noted the ability to ‘check in’ 
at the entrance gates without removing one’s travel card from the bag or 
jacket pocket: unlike the travelcard readers on trolleybuses and trams, those 
at metro entrances were reliable enough, allowing an effortless gesture to 
produce the desired result every time. Overall, the research participants 
relished the predictability of the metro: having one’s morning routine built 
around the 07:09 metro train came to be seen as an unremarkable thing.
For a long time, the convenience and predictability of the metro, whether 
it had to do with train departures, temperature or mobile phone signal, occu-
pied a central place in participants’ accounts of their journeys. However, 
the meanings and the practices attached to the reliability of these mundane 
infrastructural arrangements did not remain static. The first transformation 
was the acknowledgement, heard more and more frequently, that the metro 
service was not infallible, and thus possibly not quite the polar opposite of 
the urban reality outside:
Well, not that the metro is perfect. I guess sometimes it’s actually cold in 
winter and warm in summer.
(Nell, 7 January 2014)
It gets so busy, you can’t board, really. Just like the trams and buses have 
always been, the same experience. No difference.
(Emma, 4 February 2014)
Once there was a suicide, but there is no information then. People stand 
on the platform and no one is saying how long till the next train, no one 
is giving updates. Just Big Brother watching us from somewhere keeps 
saying we mustn’t cross the yellow line.
(Bella, 7 January 2015)
Even when the ‘veneer’ of predictability had not come off in tragic 
circumstances, the predictability of the metro infrastructure was revealed 
over time to have more ambivalent significances. It was noted that the daily 
practices that resulted from it could paradoxically be linked to having to 
rush and being stressed:
When I was taking the metro, I always left the house at the last minute. 
Since moving here, I know exactly how long it takes me to walk every-
where, and I leave on time and I am never late. I am definitely late a lot 
less. With the metro, you know there is a train every few minutes, and in 
rush hour, every three minutes. So I used to postpone going out, postpone 
and postpone, safe in that knowledge. As a result, I was constantly late.
(Maria, 13 June 2014)
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Maria was not the only participant who experienced predictability as a 
reason for daily journeys becoming more last- minute and harried. The pre-
dictability associated with the metro also shaped the affective charge of 
everyday mobility in other ways. As the precise and regulated nature of 
mundane metro journeys persisted over time, some participants began to 
experience it not in terms of pleasure and peace of mind but rather in terms 
of sterility and tedium:
I do get a bit twitchy in relation to the metro, restless because of how 
repetitive the routine is. One tires of experiencing the same thing over and 
over again. The routine and the repetition are just killers for me. Once 
you pass the level of the mechanical, it becomes really frustrating, it’s not 
nice any more, you are just focused on the fact that nothing changes.
(Tanya, 14 February 2014)
In some cases, participants started to express appreciation for those socio- 
material interactions on the metro that broke with its rigid predictability:
I think the train drivers do wait for people. It has happened to me. Once 
at Mladost- 3 it happened to me, it was when I was leaving for work in 
the morning. I was walking down the stairs, he waited for me, and I got 
on. It’s nice. (…) How much of a difference can this half of a minute 
make to the schedule, really?
(Anton, 11 October 2014)
Thus, predictability is part of the ongoing shaping of transport practices, but 
not in the sense that a particular bounded infrastructure such as the metro 
can be a space of predictability and order against a background of disorder 
and frustration, which getting around Sofia has often been associated with 
(as early as the 1970s, but especially after 1989; Capital, 1998). Instead, 
taking a longitudinal perspective offers a more nuanced view of the weaving- 
together of the experiences of metro passengers, the predictability of metro 
infrastructure (which also proved not to be universal, and sometimes enjoy-
ably so, as pointed out by Anton in the quote earlier), and the perceived 
‘chaos’ of Sofia in the 1990s and 2000s. The next section further examines 
the ways in which the city itself never stopped changing as the metro infra-
structure was constructed and expanded. Using the notion of propinquity, 
the discussion addresses the expectations metro passengers had of each 
other, and examines the way these expectations reflected ideas (both rapidly 
changing and deeply entrenched) of mobility and urban life.
Managing the proximity of others
I dislike the crowdedness of buses a lot more than I dislike the crowd-
edness of the metro  – people who are poorer, worse dressed, badly 
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smelling, often angry – all of this creates discomfort. In the metro, the 
people are different.
(Anton, 11 October 2014)
How space was shared on the metro, and with whom, was an important topic 
for the research participants. As with predictability, early interviews pointed 
to a dual exceptionality, a sense that proximate strangers are different on 
the metro compared with anywhere else and that in any case the metro was 
less crowded. The former idea is well summarized by Anton in the interview 
quote earlier, and by Maria in the following account:
Overall, I see that people interact differently in the metro. In the bus, 
no one minds talking loudly to each other. But in the metro, it seems 
less acceptable to be loud. As if there is a kind of culture setting in, the 
same you would encounter in the West – not to talk loudly, not to shout. 
Sometimes, even if someone is on the phone, people turn around to them 
and give them these looks. Something that really surprises me, because 
this is something new  – it is brand new, it never existed in Bulgaria 
before, and it is as if it is emerging all by itself. […] It’s influenced by 
the physical environment. You show the passengers some respect, they 
show respect back. By contrast, when you get people into an old Ikarus 
bus – it’s old, it’s dirty, the exhaust pipe is damaged and it’s full of fumes 
inside – well, if I am being shown this kind of attitude, how can I show 
a different one? This is maybe subconscious even.
(Maria, 13 June 2014)
For other participants, however, the heightened expectations of the metro 
as a technology with predictable behaviour, incomparable to what lies out-
side, resulted in intense frustration. Thus, Toni would have liked to see 
interactions on the metro resembling the ‘civility’ described by Maria, but 
did not. The daily evidence that Sofians could not be transformed by a 
transport infrastructure project left her upset and annoyed on multiple 
occasions:
Look at them! [Points at the people waiting at the foot of the escalator 
angrily] Especially in the morning, I can get so annoyed with people. 
They don’t stand on the right. They look like a group from kindergarten. 
I have had to argue with people so many times. When I  am running 
down the escalator and someone is standing on the left, I point it out 
that you should stand on the right. They stare at me in a weird way. Or 
they say: Well, I am standing on the right, aren’t I? Or they say: There 
are the stairs for those who are in a hurry! What kind of logic is that?! If 
you’re in a hurry, you’ll pick the thing that is moving, obviously!
(Toni, 25 March 2014)
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These kinds of observations are not unique to the metro as a transport 
mode and could in fact have been uttered by a frustrated commuter any-
where in the world. What is notable is how heightened these emotions were 
during the first months of confronting a new infrastructure. These early 
utterances of participants regarding the behaviour of proximate others 
were often intense and seemed to reflect multiple detailed observations the 
speaker had carried out in the weeks before the interview, which they were 
finally able to ‘vent’. These reactions bore an uncanny resemblance to the 
practices and discourses of road rage (Smith and King, 2013), once again 
inviting reflections on the significance of automobility to understandings 
of the metro. While social practices tend to persist as well as transform, 
former drivers and current new metro users could have carried such inten-
sities and utterances with them from a previous transport routine into a 
new one (Cass and Faulconbridge, 2016). However, not all participants who 
vocalized such intense frustrations were former car commuters. This subtle 
dynamic between new public transport infrastructure, the private car and 
managing the proximity of others warrants further examination.
In the case of the metro, initial expectations were gradually overcome by 
direct and routine experience. While Toni’s frustration with the behaviour of 
other passengers appeared to persist over time (e.g. she repeatedly referred 
to the issue of body odour, as if the metro surroundings made it more offen-
sive to her than elsewhere), for most other participants, views of metro co- 
presence and sociality became less polarized over time:
I don’t pay so much attention to other people’s behaviour these days. 
I don’t know. It just becomes routine, doesn’t it?
(Janna, 12 March 2014)
This dynamic of gradual acceptance seemed to reflect an accumulation of 
exposures: over time, the new metro commuters got used to having other 
metro commuters around them. This was not the case with the drivers 
I  interviewed as part of the project, however. Even very experienced car 
commuters continued to indulge in comments on who should and should not 
be on the roads in rush hour, with women drivers, elderly drivers, old cars 
and single- occupant cars all frequently singled out. Drivers’ comments were 
defined by a sense of the behaviour of proximate others getting worse: while 
they were separated by ‘cocoons’ (Sheller and Urry, 2000), the very nature 
of the activity of driving meant they had no choice but to remain intensely 
focused on the transgressions of other drivers. Metro commuters, by con-
trast, could allow the behaviour of others to gradually fall out of focus (e.g. 
by choosing to become another ‘smartphone zombie,’ see below). Here, the 
longitudinal view demonstrated a different narrative to the prevailing view 
that to commute by public transport means to miss out on the predictability 
and privacy epitomized by the car. The embodied and socio- technical ways 
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in which drivers and metro passengers handled propinquity demonstrated 
that experiences kept transforming over time.
This is further illustrated by the case of mobile phone usage in the context 
of metro mobility. Digital devices such as mobile phones or smartphones are 
often intuitively interpreted in terms of their capacity to ‘cocoon’ the person 
handling them from the surrounding world (Berry and Hamilton, 2010). In 
this sense, they are often framed in both popular discourse and research as 
vehicles for further urban alienation, and for carving out ‘private’ spaces 
within public ones. However, as Arnold (2003) notes, technology is rarely 
unidimensional in its uses and meanings, and can often play multiple, even 
paradoxical, roles, when considered as part of a social setting. Thus, the 
work done by the mobile phone on the Sofia Metro was interpreted not only 
as allowing individuals to remain remote but also as creating a calmer and 
more pleasant atmosphere. While some participants lamented the zombie- 
like appearance of smartphone users on the metro, others framed devices as 
pacifiers that are actually quite helpful in soothing the quarrel- prone space 
that is Sofia public transport:
In fact, it’s a positive development. People are less likely to push and 
shove, they are nicer when they are focused on their phones.
(Assya, 12 February 2014)
Lately people are so absorbed in their phones that they don’t have time 
to argue with each other! [laughs]
(Lilly, 1 July 2014)
These contributions are particularly interesting when read alongside Maria’s 
reflections above. Maria understood change in terms of passengers on the 
recently opened metro acting differently compared with people on buses 
because of the better infrastructure they had been provided with. However, 
thinking relationally about the processes of change in everyday mobility, of 
which the metro encompasses only one set of interactions, opens up additional 
possibilities for interpretation. Even if the metro was so frequently framed as 
exceptional, in fact its recent expansion has been concurrent with an acceler-
ating fleet renewal programme for ground- level public transport (Grozdanov, 
2011). As a result, many characteristics so celebrated on the metro (such as 
electronic displays, air conditioning, cleanliness, e- ticketing) and credited with 
making the proximity of others more tolerable, were becoming an increas-
ingly common feature on buses, trams and trolleybuses too. Thus, mundane 
journeys on all public transport modes were becoming less stressful. Those 
who switched to the metro post- 2012 may have interpreted this boost in 
‘civility’ as a characteristic of the metro infrastructure, standing in contrast 
to the situation elsewhere in the city, but, in practice, all kinds of technolo-
gies and experiences related with mobility and urban space were changing, 
and new types of shared spaces of transport were becoming more common.
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Conclusion
What is increasingly evident from conversations with local government and 
civil society representatives is that the Sofia Metro in its late- 2010s incar-
nation has been drawing most of its passengers from other forms of public 
transport. The number of drivers who have switched to the metro is small, 
and the total number of private vehicles in the city continues to grow at a 
rapid pace (Borisova- Tirkova, 2016). Even if the metro was briefly, near- 
universally hailed for its comfort, convenience and reliability, the domin-
ance of the car has continued asserting itself. Not least, this is due to the 
absence of concerted efforts on behalf of local authorities to constrain it. 
Another reason is the persistence of the trope that frames the metro as the 
‘only modern kind of public transport’. Despite the gradual technological 
change across all public transport modes, this discourse and its political 
incarnations have proved persistent enough to continue to promote the 
car, at least among those who have a choice. In this hierarchical view of 
embodied experiences and cultural meanings of urban transport, the metro 
is far more tolerable than other public transport but, collectively, they are 
still far less appealing than the car.
The interconnections between the Sofia Metro project and the private car, 
through narratives of substitution, complementarity, displacement and com-
petition, represent one facet of constructing a relational account of what it 
means to use and inhabit the metro and the city today. On the one hand, 
it highlights the way the original plan for the metro infrastructure dates 
back to the 1960s. On the other hand, reading the metro alongside other 
transport modes, including the private car, points to the way narratives and 
affects are layered over weeks, months and years of routine and transform-
ation. For each participant, the everyday practices of inhabiting the metro 
are entangled in the wider experiences of moving around Sofia. Finally, 
thinking about the metro as just one mode of habitually moving through 
the city is a reminder that infrastructure is not only defined by its intrinsic 
material properties but also by the sheer number of relations to multiple 
spaces and times that it is part of.
This chapter examined the way in which notions of predictability and pro-
pinquity have shaped the way everyday metro journeys have been experienced 
in Sofia over the past six years. The discussion pointed to the capacity of the 
metro to add to these notions in return, with its impact on public and indi-
vidual life spilling beyond trains, platforms and stations. At the same time, 
by examining the longitudinal and ongoing nature of the mutual shaping of 
infrastructure, city and inhabitants, I have aimed to qualify two contrasting, 
and equally problematic, ideas: first, that the Sofia Metro is an infrastructural 
counterpoint to Sofia’s messy reality and, second, that its own complicated 
history is simply a metaphor of that urban reality. Instead, I sought to use 
everyday metro mobility as a lens for reading infrastructure relationally. 
In particular, I  have demonstrated that the long- term transformations of 
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meanings and the contemporary practices of using the metro are interwoven 
with the meanings and practices associated with ground- level public trans-
port and private cars. Thus, meanings and practices around propinquity and 
predictability have both endured and continued to change. The multiple tem-
poralities of infrastructure projects, everyday experiences of commuting, and 
the long and contested history of the private car, are brought together in 
Sofia’s ongoing infrastructural transformations. Finally, I aimed to demon-
strate the wider role for ethnographic research on post- socialist urban infra-
structure, adding my voice to calls for the critical move from case study to 
contributing to broader theory- making in urban studies.
Note
 1 I use the term ‘mobility practices’ to denote mobility- relevant social practices, as 
elaborated by Shove (2003) and Shove et al. (2012). This conceptualization draws 
attention to the doings and sayings of everyday life that are partly widely shared 
and recognizable, and partly modified with every individual performance.
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12  Infrastructures as fluidities
How marshrutkas help us to overcome 
static conceptions of road- based 
mobility service provision
Tonio Weicker and Wladimir Sgibnev
Introduction
In spite of the recent reception of assemblage and actor- network theories 
into infrastructure research, public transport is still very much seen as an 
arena of negotiation between state and society – the former as a benevolent 
or neglecting provider, regulator and financier and the latter as a paying, 
enduring or protesting passenger. However, ‘informal’ or less regulated 
public transport solutions, both in the global South (dolmuş, matatu, tro tro 
and cognates) and North (Uber, Lyft, etc.) challenge this vision, exploiting 
liberal laissez- faire regimes and post- colonial state absenteeism, or filling 
the gap of state failures. Their atomistic structure, elusive definitions, 
self- employment, low market entry barriers and (at least initially) non- 
existent legal frameworks, favoured the emergence of bottom- up regulation 
arrangements and thwarted many top- down attempts to include them in nor-
matively appropriate ‘official’ and corporate frameworks. The same goes for 
the infrastructural ‘back end’ of these public transport options, which can-
nibalize on pre- existing road surfaces and stations, and largely lack depots 
and dispatchers, instead relying on customary or ad hoc solutions. Against 
this backdrop, we propose to conceptualize public transport infrastructures 
as fluidities where not only vehicles are in motion but also services, facil-
ities and regulations. Actants constantly experience a condition of liminality 
relating to the qualification of Soviet and post- Soviet life as ‘societies of 
remont’ (Gerasimova and Chuikina, 2004) – providing a stark contrast with 
the state- funded public transport services of the Soviet era.
The existing literature on road- based public transport provision in the 
post- socialist realm is greatly focused on transformation consultancy (Finn, 
2008; Grdzelishvili and Sathre, 2011; Gwilliam, 2000, 2002; Hook, 1999; 
Pucher, 1995, 1999), and uncritically operates with terms such as ‘line 
tendering’ – even if it is not clear what a ‘line’ in a post- socialist context 
exactly means. On a network map, which in our regional context is hard to 
come by anyway, a public transport line would be pretty straightforward, 
stretching out from terminus A  to terminus B. But to our understanding, 
road- based mobility is not just about the roads taken. The proposed 
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contribution will take on post- Soviet marshrutkas – the region’s ubiquitous 
minibuses – in order to empirically substantiate this argument, bringing in 
material from Tajikistan and Southern Russia. We first propose an introduc-
tory framework for placing marshrutkas on post- socialist streets; second, 
we introduce the notion of assemblage to conceptually grasp the marshrutka 
mobility phenomenon; third, we present empirical material from recent 
fieldwork stays in Volgograd and Khujand before coming to a conclusion.
Marshrutkas and post- socialist infrastructures
Drawing on the insights of the ‘infrastructural turn’, we would like to high-
light the mutual relationship between infrastructural means and their users, 
which reciprocally influence and continuously reproduce the perception, 
meaning and utility of each other (Graham and Healey, 1999; Murdoch, 
1998). Although mostly perceived as something stable in everyday life, at 
second glance, infrastructures consist of multiple layers with varying dur-
ability, changing over time and space on a material as well as a concep-
tual level (Geels, 2002; Jensen, 2009). This is also true for post- Soviet 
infrastructures in their characteristic hybrid forms, which continue to be 
heavily influenced by former Soviet techniques. At the same time, these infra-
structural remnants have blended with new forms of neoliberal narratives 
and market- driven practices (Golubchikov et al., 2013, p. 617).
Considering this, our understanding of post- socialism denies a reduc-
tionist ascription of societal determination but emphasizes the multiple, 
accentuated everyday interaction with still widespread entities claimed or 
perceived as ‘Soviet’ or ‘socialist’. In this sense, we oppose characterizing 
state behaviour, practices or infrastructures as ‘socialist’ just because they 
remained in charge after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. We also define 
post- socialism neither as a purely temporal nor as a strictly territorial cat-
egory. Instead, we conceptualize post- socialist infrastructures as situationally 
performed arrangements of contrasting and sometimes conflicting legacies, 
some of them consciously or unconsciously connected to ‘Soviet’ narratives. 
This is particularly obvious in the case of socio- technical continuities, which 
form and influence the everyday practices of urban life solely through their 
material endurance. A marshrutka ride in itself is nothing other than a half- 
formalized minibus practice similar to that in many other locations all over 
the globe. However, a marshrutka replacing a former Soviet bus line, reutil-
izing persistent infrastructure patterns and reacting to the multiplicity of 
urban change is of course related to its socio- historical environment. This 
ongoing negotiation process, not as a matter of fact but as an observable 
performance within socio- technical assemblages, we would define as ‘post- 
socialist fluidity’.
Despite remarkable and sometimes surprising socio- technical continu-
ities, the collapse of the Soviet Union has had far- reaching consequences 
for public transport, as it did on many other sectors of society. The 
 
 
 
 
 
Infrastructures as fluidities 197
   197
former regime left behind one of the world’s largest transport systems, 
which constituted a heavy burden for states in transition rather than a 
benefit (Kolik et al., 2015). Because of the ensuing economic crisis, budget 
resources of most local administrations were so low that municipalities had 
to shut down most public transport offers (Popov, 2012). In these times 
of government’s inability to act, ‘the degeneration and collapse of formal 
bus systems allowed large- scale minibus operations to become established 
in large urban areas as the dominant form of transport’ (Finn, 2008 p.119). 
Since then, the marshrutka market constitutes an ever- changing transport 
sector in almost all post- Soviet cities and regions, a hybrid mobility offer 
between formal and informal economy and, to a wide extent, an independ-
ently acting social network within old and new legacies, using and misusing 
pre- existing infrastructures in a creative and highly adaptive manner.
In this sense, the emergence and spread of marshrutka mobility must 
also be analysed in its mutual interdependencies with local municipalities. 
Therefore, it is worth mentioning that despite the crucial importance of the 
minibus system and its immense popularity in the 1990s, there was no sys-
tematic regulation of the commercial transport sector for a long time (Sanina, 
2011). Only since the late 1990s, depending on cities and regions, have local 
authorities strained to regain at least part of their ability to finance bus vehicle 
purchase and operations, and to restore at least part of their operating cap-
acity (Finn, 2008), with varying degrees of success. The procedural, very flex-
ible and unsteady character of marshrutka practices gave the impression of a 
long- term transition technology that mirrored, like all infrastructural changes, 
the societal developments in other sectors during that time (Jensen, 2011; 
Tonkiss, 2014). That is also why the marshrutka practice, which actually 
has its historical roots in early Soviet times,1 could be called a post- socialist 
phenomenon, because only then was it reconfigured as a mass transport 
system with specific social- spatial, economic and societal determinants in 
an uncertain environment, making this mode of transport worthy of inves-
tigation. Today, millions of passengers, drivers, dispatchers, vehicles and 
entrepreneurs perform and constitute marshrutka practices every day with 
a strong impact on the contemporary urban life in diverse spheres such as 
economy, politics or culture. Contrary to other post- socialist materialities 
like the recently eliminated kiosk- trading in Russian cities (Brade et al., 2007; 
Markov, 2017), the marshrutka phenomenon is surprisingly long- lasting, 
and characterized by its high adaptability towards different and changeable 
socio- spatial settings and structures. It has proven resistant to the decade- 
long societal tensions and struggles in several cities. Therefore, marshrutkas 
continue to make post- socialist infrastructure tangible in everyday urban life, 
which mainly constitutes the perception of urban space and mobility and 
co- produces the meaning of post- socialist infrastructures relating to mobility 
provision, street layouts, and connected regulations and practices.
We speak about mutual influences and ascription processes that deter-
mine what we define as a ‘post- socialist infrastructure’ or, in our precise 
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case, as a ‘post- socialist  marshrutka’. These perceptions are of course not 
stable but fluid over time and space. According to Law (2002), fluidity 
describes the flexible constitution of materiality, which allows an informed 
majority to recognize the object as such despite a wide range of deviations 
and significant differences in its individual form (Law, 2002). Even though 
marshrutkas may have no common vehicle brand, no standardized price 
regulation, a high number of individually arranged route lines, and different 
forms of ownership and company structures, the citizens are still able to 
recognize the mobility offer as such and even to know how to use it prop-
erly. Even more complex discrepancies between cities, such as common 
payment practices during the marshrutka ride, unknown route lines and 
the different traffic behaviour of drivers can be solved easily by socialized 
marshrutka users.2 Meanwhile, these perceptual deviations can only exist 
within a common understanding of the whole marshrutka assemblage as 
such. From this perspective, post- socialist infrastructures – seen here through 
the lens of mobility on urban streets – are themselves extremely fluid. This 
means that there is a huge back end of used public infrastructure (such as 
roads, bus stops and parking places), formalized and informally stabilized 
institutions such as depots, workshops and control centres, or the fluid 
nature of end/ starting points, which are temporarily linked to each other 
within urban assemblages and therefore contribute to the conceptualization 
of marshrutkas, streets and infrastructures in various ways.
Marshrutkas as assemblages
An assemblage could be defined as ‘a kind of chaotic network of habitual and 
non- habitual connections, always in flux, always reassembling in different 
ways’ (Potts, 2004, p.19). Following Latour, one could further argue that the 
setting of a phenomenon, thing or actor is as important as the actor itself. 
Therefore, actors can only be defined in the way they relate to other actors 
(Latour, 2005). A marshrutka, in this sense, is not sufficiently defined by its 
specific design or characteristic equipment but by the way it constitutes related 
practices and allows people/ objects/ techniques to perform the marshrutka 
ride in a specific location on a regular basis. Thus, a marshrutka without 
passengers, drivers and engines, but also without specific behaviour norms like 
payment practices, stop requests or communication styles, is hardly imagin-
able. Summarizing, if the network changes, the actor itself changes. Therefore, 
one aim of this chapter is to focus on the significant mutual relation between 
the marshrutka phenomenon and post- socialist infrastructures by referring to 
local interdependencies and practices within the heterogeneous networks of 
the southern Russian city of Volgograd and the city of Khujand in Tajikistan.
Using assemblage approaches to describe the post- socialist marshrutka 
phenomenon sensitizes for the emergence of upcoming or gradually adapting 
orders without falling into the trap of simplified transition explanations, 
which often co- produce intended or unintended power asymmetries and 
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should therefore be stated very carefully. Deleuze’s concept of affects and 
affective flows would help to point out that agency is realized through 
affects and not possessed by actors or agents (Deleuze, 1988, p. 101). The 
multi- layered power struggle within assemblages is one of the key points to 
explore in this approach:
When you simply have power – in potential – nothing happens and you 
are powerless; when you exert power – in actu – others are performing 
the action and not you. [Power] as an effect, but never as a cause.
(Latour, 1986, p. 265)
Thus, rather than determined by the powerful actors involved, assemblages 
are governed by affective flows, which work like ‘affect economies’ trying 
to guide the network ‘from one mode to another in terms of attention, 
arousal, interest, receptivity, stimulation, attentiveness, action, reaction, 
and inaction’ (Clough, 2004, p. 15). Affects are bounded in a space- time 
determination. Just like materials, affects are fluid in their performance and 
efficacy. Subsequently, fluidity is the focal point of this study. As Law and 
Callon argued: ‘…we are not primarily concerned with mapping interactions 
between individuals […] but we are concerned with mapping the way in 
which they define and distribute roles, and mobilize or invent others to play 
these roles’ (Law and Callon, 1988).
In conclusion, assemblage approaches give us a specific perspective 
about the difficulties within the social settings, such as the flexibility of 
infrastructures and their institutions and organizations, and the fluidity of 
space and meaning that ‘emphasizes emergence, multiplicity and indeter-
minacy, and connects to a wider redefinition of the socio- spatial in terms of 
the composition of diverse elements into some form of provisional socio- 
spatial formation’ (Anderson and McFarlane, 2011).
Insights from Khujand and Volgograd
The southern Russian city of Volgograd and Tajikistan’s second largest city, 
Khujand, share a common Soviet heritage but are clearly two distinct cities 
with varying patterns of development, different historical influences and 
current geopolitical preconditions. However, they have in common a pre-
dominant public transport mode that lies in private hands – the marshrutkas. 
We offer a comparison of the mobility performances within these two cities 
to illustrate that post- socialist developments are less bounded by former 
borders or socio- historical conditions, and that they become beneficial and 
empirically rich in their inter- individual reactions to structural deficiencies 
and in their flexible solutions and adaptation processes. Therefore, we will 
substantiate the fluidity of post- socialist infrastructures by referring to two 
particular lines – marshrutka routes No. 3 in Khujand (Figure 12.1) and No. 
36 in Volgograd (Figure 12.2).
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Figure 12.1  Marshrutka line 3 in relation to the Khujand agglomeration and line 
deviations in Chkalovsk
Source: W. Sgibnev, design by B. Hölzel and R. Schwarz (© IfL)
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Figure 12.2  Marshrutka line 36 in relation to the Volgograd agglomeration and 
route alternatives in the Tulaka area
Source: T. Weicker, design by B. Hölzel and R. Schwarz, R (© IfL)
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Volgograd’s marshrutka line 36 is one of the city’s main routes, connecting 
the northern districts with the city centre and the Sovetsky district in the 
south. There are nearly 60 official bus stops on the route, although in prac-
tice the bus driver will stop anywhere requested. The distance from the 
starting point to the end point is about 30 km, which is approximately the 
average of Volgograd’s marshrutka lines. Comparably to Volgograd’s line 
36, Khujand’s marshrutka line 3 is one of the oldest, longest and most fre-
quent lines in the agglomeration, stretching for 30 km from the outlying 
third microrayon (a separated large housing estate), through the housing 
estates on the uphill road, turning southwards on the city’s main street, 
passing the central stops at Univermag and Panjshanbe, then continuing 
towards the Somon and Atush bazaars, before turning into the satellite city 
of Chkalovsk (renamed Buston in early 2016) and assuming a serpentine 
local service in this area.
The enormous distances in Volgograd result from the overall length of 
the city, which is some 85 km long north to south on the left bank of the 
Volga River, not including the suburban areas. Volgograd, formerly known 
as Stalingrad, went through a fundamental reconstruction and industrial-
ization period after World War II, which had left the city almost completely 
destroyed. Because of limited resources and time pressure during the war 
and in its aftermath, engineers prioritized industrial plant construction that 
resulted in a stripe- like city structure where urbanization took place around 
and in between the industrial plants (Pruglo, 2013). This is why the max-
imum width of the city centre of contemporary Volgograd is fewer than 10 
km. The geographic location of the city, its particular historical and socio- 
political roots, and the interesting mixture of pragmatic and ideology- driven 
urban planning in post- war Stalin- / Volgograd have fundamentally influenced 
the shape of the present city. From a transport logistics point of view, the 
concept of a linear city collapsed, at the latest, with the economic decrease 
and transition process following the demise of the Soviet Union and the shut-
down of the main industrial plants (Krasilnikova, 2014). Today, Volgograd 
is a city with more than 1 million inhabitants with an economic agglomer-
ation area within the city centre but also an infrastructure that still provides 
for microrayons (separated large housing estates near industrial sites) – and 
only one road connecting all estates with the city centre (Trubina, 2010). 
In this sense, the post- socialist streets of Volgograd determine the emerged, 
developed and adapted marshrutka practices very significantly, because they 
mainly rely on the remaining local infrastructure. Similarly, there is a mutual 
relationship between being structured by infrastructure on the one hand and 
giving sense to it by performing urban space on the other.
Until recently, marshrutkas were the main transport mode in the city. The 
privately organized mobility offer was provisioned by 60 operators running 
102 different marshrutka lines and served by 2,258 officially registered 
vehicles per day. According to official statistics of the local administra-
tion, approximately 5,000 marshrutka drivers (two drivers usually share a 
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common vehicle) carry 64 per cent of the general volume of passengers in the 
city (Karasev and Sudarčikov, 2016). However, the marshrutka business has 
been put under pressure since an announcement by Volgograd’s governor in 
June 2016 to phase out 85 per cent of marshrutka lines and to re- establish 
a municipally controlled public transport network consisting mainly of 
tramways and buses. In spring 2017, the local administration began closing 
down several marshrutka lines, while keeping others untouched. The gov-
ernment tried to gradually introduce a new bus fleet, as well as a refurbished 
tramline network. However, the transition process has just begun and it 
is too early to estimate its long- term consequences in the city. In any case, 
the current developments, once again, underline the fluidity of infrastruc-
ture and mobility offers, pointing to their temporality but also to the mani-
fold societal consequences that a top- down reform of established mobility 
practices implies.
Khujand may be 3,000 km away from Volgograd, and in an entirely 
different country, but the development of the marshrutka phenomenon there 
shares many similarities with the Russian case. In spite of Tajikistan’s lower 
socio- economic indicators, less stable institutions, a distinct historical and 
cultural background, and the civil war experience of the 1990s, the simi-
larities in marshrutka- related trajectories, practices, policies and material-
ities provide convincing arguments for speaking of a common, post- Soviet, 
if not post- socialist, marshrutka mobility phenomenon. Most marshrutka 
lines extend beyond the city limits of Khujand proper (around 200,000 
inhabitants) and stretch out to the densely inhabited suburbs of Ghafurov 
and Jabbor Rasulov districts in the Tajikistani part of the Ferghana Valley, 
with some lines even reaching out to villages on the Kyrgyzstani side of the 
border. After the early Soviet era, main employment centres and points of 
interest in the region were placed outside the inner city of Khujand – which 
still mostly consisted of an ‘Islamic- oriental’ old town, such as the large silk 
plant which employed up to 20,000 people. Thus, the ore enrichment plant, 
Vostokredmet, was built a dozen kilometres to the south of the city, close 
to the railway line, with the satellite city of Chkalovsk being established 
to provide housing for its employees. The neighbouring city of Ghafurov 
housed the mainline railway station for the metropolitan region. To alleviate 
housing shortages, construction of mass housing estates began on the then 
uninhabited right bank of the Syrdarya River. The aforementioned employ-
ment centres, however, were mostly located on the opposite bank, which 
led to a concentration of passenger flows along the main street crossing the 
river in Khujand’s city centre, which in turn led, albeit for different reasons, 
to a similar outcome of a factually ‘linear’ city. Bus and trolleybus lines 
followed this linear layout from the microrayons on the right bank, along 
Lenin Prospekt (later renamed in honour of Ismoil Somoni, the presumed 
founder of medieval Tajik statehood) towards Chkalovsk and Ghafurov.
Thus, the main axis is at the same time the most profitable route, serving 
most passengers, and the most contested one, with some 450 marshrutkas 
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per hour on the central stretch. Also, longer lines are deemed more profit-
able because they allow not only for terminus to terminus passengers, as 
on most overland routes, but also for many intermediate boardings, thus 
levelling out passenger flows and increasing profitability. The route length 
also accounts for a multi- tiered price scheme (i.e. 1 Tajikistani somoni [TJS], 
or approximately 0.15€ as of late 2016, inside Khujand proper, 1.50 TJS 
to the outlying bazaar, 2 TJS all the way to Chkalovsk or 0.90 TJS for the 
Chkalovsk urban service – generally rounded up).
Because of the overlapping services on the main street, the competi-
tion among different lines is severe. Many marshrutka drivers employ 
conductors – mostly schoolboys – in order to collect fares, announce stops 
and process requests, as well as to lure potential passengers at the most 
frequented stations. This practice does not exist in Volgograd, but is fairly 
widespread in Central Asia because of lower labour costs and weaker labour 
rights enforcement. On line 3, there are also ‘stationary’ conductors working 
on the Panjshanbe bazaar station’s southbound platform, as well as on 
Somon bazaar’s northbound platform, calling out to potential passengers 
in order to gain a competitive advantage on one of the city’s most contested 
stretches.
In the following section, we further analyse the unique design of marshrutka 
practices in each city along their gradual interplay of structuralization 
attempts, from ordering actors like operators or the municipality on the one 
hand to flexible adaptations and individual implementation strategies by 
drivers or passengers on the other. Within this field of tension, we observe 
the notion of fluid routes, fluid depots and rolling stocks as empirical evi-
dence for a negotiated existence of post- socialist infrastructure.
Fluid routes
We will now take a closer look at the fluid character of line termini – that 
is, the start and end points of lines 3 and 36. The first station in the north of 
Volgograd is at the maternity hospital in the Traktorsavodsky Rayon. The 
route is not very precise here. Drivers use the parking facilities of the mater-
nity hospital on Zholudeva Street for breaks and layovers. Here, the drivers 
may coordinate their routes and schedules, have a rest or use the little kiosks 
next door to have lunch or just a little chat. The same applies to the offi-
cial starting/ end point in the south near the cardiology centre. The former 
parking place for visitors and patients is today a huge marshrutka meeting 
point. It accommodates seven different marshrutka lines and one bus line. 
You can hardly find private cars in this area, only drivers or dispatchers 
who control vehicle intervals and coordinate the departure times. Down 
the road, just two minutes’ walk from the cardiology centre, one can see 
the main building of the Volgograd State University. As a result, a large 
percentage of the passengers driving to the southern districts are students. 
However, to accommodate for the high demand on the part of the students, 
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the drivers extended the route by informally stretching it towards the uni-
versity. In 2013, a huge shopping mall complex called Akvarium opened 
just next to the Volga River not far from the university. Thus, some drivers 
started extending their routes once again, from the university down the hill 
to the shopping mall. These (at least initially) informal extensions – the offi-
cial last stop of line 36 is still the cardiology centre  – are common, and 
become widely accepted after consultation with local competitors.
As for Khujand’s line 3, apart from incidents (such as police stopping 
drivers for traffic violations), vehicles proceed from the third microrayon 
all the way to Chkalovsk. As mentioned before, drivers have a financial 
interest in driving a service along the longest possible line, thus catering to 
more passengers. Furthermore, there is strict social control and dispatching 
oversight for vehicles to take turns for entering into service at the respective 
termini. However, the line 3 layout has seen some modifications at both 
ends of the line – the latest being the extension from the 8/ 12 microrayon to 
the third microrayon in 2002. All extensions have gone through the formal 
authorization process. However, innovations outside the legal framework 
did take place en route: at the southern end, there is a slight modification to 
serve Novyj Kvartal more densely than the route documentation provides 
for, thus driving the route through housing estate courtyards. Yet another 
modification concerns the Zaozernyj service, where the official one- way 
loop is transformed into a two- way operation on a rather narrow street.
Until recently in Volgograd, a complex line alteration arrangement was in 
place: once the marshrutka leaves the central district, the drivers meet new 
challenges concerning the traffic situation. Line 36 follows Lenin Prospekt to 
Tulaka, a popular residential district, just next to the river, that is quiet but 
still close to the centre. There are only a few marshrutkas passing by because 
Tulaka is beside the main streets and surrounded by railways. In spring 
2016, the government built and opened a tunnel to give an alternative to 
the manually operated railroad crossings. The highly trafficked railway was 
a risk for both passengers and drivers. During peak hours, passengers could 
decide to take their chance of reaching the city centre faster by avoiding the 
main road traffic jam, in the event of open railway gates. Otherwise they 
would be stuck in an even longer queue. The new tunnel gives drivers the 
opportunity to bypass the crossroad. Yet, it takes some minutes to reach the 
entrance of the tunnel.
For a couple of months after the opening of the tunnel, drivers had to 
argue with passengers over which direction to go. The decision was gen-
erally met with vehement protests from those passengers missing their 
expected destinations. In practice, drivers looked out for the gates and 
communicated with the passengers concerning which direction to follow. 
Only after some months, when all participants got used to the daily infra-
structural challenge, did the administration change the official routes 
and oblige the drivers to take the tunnel no matter whether the railway 
gates were open or not. Marshrutka routes are thus not just precise lines 
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connecting A to B, but subject to negotiation, which vividly underlines the 
fluid nature of infrastructure.
Hybrid depots
The depot of the vehicle fleet is not located next to the route but placed in 
another southern suburban district called Kirovsky. Leased marshrutkas must 
stand at the depot overnight because of insurance restrictions. However, the 
great majority of the cars are privately owned by the drivers and are therefore 
largely used as private cars after work. It is a common sight in the suburbs of 
Volgograd to see a driver in front of his home trying to fix his often outdated 
car on his own, usually under time pressure to be on the road again as fast 
as possible. However, all marshrutkas and the responsible drivers have to be 
in the depots before starting work to go through a technical inspection and a 
health check in the morning. This means that the drivers must be present early 
in the morning at Khimzavodskaya Street, just next to the local chemical plant, 
where the so- called depot is placed (which does not perform other functions 
apart from providing health checks). From this depot it’s a 15- minute ride to 
the southern start point of route 36. The owner of marshrutka line 36 cur-
rently manages three marshrutka routes (36, 71 and 71k), all of which have 
been registered at Khimzavodskaya for years. At the same place, he runs a car 
workshop where he works as a mechanical engineer.
Khujand’s line 3 is officially managed by Sorbon, which is the largest 
marshrutka licensee in Khujand, holding 48 out of Khujand’s 92 routes 
as of 2014. The company is the heir to Khujand’s (formerly Leninabad’s) 
taxi operating enterprise of Soviet times, which managed to survive as a 
marshrutka holding company (Sgibnev and Vozyanov, 2016). However, 
Sorbon directly owns and operates only a fraction of the 60- plus vehicles in 
service on the line. The vast majority of them are privately owned, driven 
and maintained. Therefore, the large Sorbon depot (rather known by its 
old name, Taksopark) is nearly empty and only performs administrative 
functions for the holding and provides space for car repair workshops that 
are not part of the marshrutka operating business.
The vehicles stay overnight close to their drivers’ homes, meaning that 
the entire city becomes a dispersed marshrutka depot. The same goes for 
vehicle maintenance, because all drivers refer to workshops they trust all 
over the city. However, two main clusters stand out – a former neighbour-
hood garage area in the 35th microrayon and a flock of repair shops in the 
village of Ghoziyon. On a daily basis, in theory, the drivers have to check 
in at the technical and medical inspection in the 8/ 12 microrayon, where a 
basic check- up of the vehicle is performed along with a breath alcohol test 
and a blood pressure check. The respective route sheet is often signed retro-
actively, but this does not invalidate the fact that this ‘official’ function of 
the depot, here as well, is detached from some presumed organizational and 
technical centre.
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Termini perform a couple of other depot functions such as social inter-
action among drivers, who naturally spend their breaks there. It is a place 
where younger drivers are educated in road safety and technical questions, 
as well as in proper ‘civic’ behaviour both by the dispatcher and the older 
drivers. Furthermore, petty maintenance work may be performed there. 
Conductors use this time for cleaning the vehicles and are generally not 
allowed to socialize with the drivers. Dispatching is also essential in creating 
a sense of community among drivers in that it prevents encroaching on each 
other’s passengers. Line 3 is one of the rare examples where the dispatcher 
can absent himself for a couple of hours while the drivers take turns in 
taking scrupulous care of the four- minute interval. In the absence of a con-
trol centre, drivers are constantly on the phone informing following vehicles 
about obstacles, passenger flow and police controls.3
Rolling stock innovations
Volgograd’s marshrutka line 36 is mostly served by old yellow Gazel’ vehicles. 
But there are some newer vehicles as well, in general privately owned by the 
drivers (GazelNext, Mercedes- Benz Sprinter, Citroën Jumper). Each driver 
has their own philosophy about the right choice for a car. Many appre-
ciate the old Gazel’ for its low price, robust design and comparably cheap 
maintenance costs. However, they have a poor reputation among passengers 
for being uncomfortable and less safe. That is why intercity marshrutka 
lines started to modernize their fleet years ago in order to get a competitive 
advantage. These lines also mostly stick to the rule of not carrying standing 
passengers, and have therefore established an image of being safer, or at least 
more comfortable. However, the inner- city marshrutkas never entered into 
the ‘comfort’ competition, which is curious because some of the inner- city 
lines in Volgograd do cover longer distances than intercity lines. In addition, 
some of the line owners introduced specific measures to increase their status 
on the road and on an administrative level. Only recently, because of the 
reform attempts of the local authorities, the official requirements for the pri-
vate mobility providers have also increased. In summary, there are currently 
two parallel but antagonistic developments concerning the rolling stock. On 
the one hand, there is an increasing number of relatively new vehicles in 
good condition, while on the other hand, ‘new’ non- confirmed minibuses 
keep appearing, often in bad technical condition and under no adminis-
trative control. Once again, a reform attempt to unify the public transport 
schedule leads at least in the short run towards an increasing diversity of 
vehicles, business models and practices as such.
As for Khujand’s marshrutka fleet, throughout the city, Mercedes- Benz 
Sprinter vehicles prevail, while Russian- built Gazel’ cars may amount to 
one fourth of the overall fleet. A  tiny fraction consists of surviving RAF 
minibuses serving less profitable routes, most of them without standing 
passengers.
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The comfort argument has gained importance with regard to the afore-
mentioned massive competition on the main street. Passengers may wait 
for a marshrutka with available seats. If standing is the only option – say, 
when university classes start or end – a Mercedes Sprinter is the preferred 
choice. Line 3 has a reputation for being a cutting- edge line in terms of com-
fort, cleanliness and safety. Therefore, the drivers quite quickly passed on 
to Sprinter vehicles, all the while abandoning Gazel’ minibuses. Back in the 
mid- 1990s, line 3 was the first to pass from RAF to Gazel’ vehicles, which 
started a wave of Gazel’ imports into Khujand because of the presence of 
one, and later many, usto (masters) capable of transforming cargo minibuses 
for passenger service. A similar retrofitting takes place today for imported 
Sprinter vehicles.
Conclusion
In early 2017, Volgograd’s city government abolished a large number of 
marshrutka lines. Affected were, above all, those running through the city 
centre. However, line 36 is still in operation, although the route owner 
lost two other marshrutka lines. The government’s decision- making pro-
cess concerning which marshrutka line was going to be shut down was 
characterized by a lack of transparency. The competitor lines like 15с, 1с, 
2c and 57 have all been closed, as stated in the city council plan – while line 
36 seems likely to stay with us in the middle term. Today, the lucky drivers 
of route 36 enjoy their monopoly, with their only competition being large 
buses that are twice as slow. As already mentioned, marshrutka practices 
are characterized by high adaptability, which is once again demonstrated by 
the fact that, only days after the abolishment of several marshrutka lines, 
drivers began offering illegal trips, claiming the ride as ‘appointed’ while 
actually following former routes (Babanova, 2017). Therefore, it seems too 
early to confirm the end of marshrutkas as long as the local government is 
either unwilling or unable to establish usable alternatives. Rather, one can 
observe a recurring shift of the status of marshrutka practices in the city, 
dismissing formerly legalized practices as dangerous, corrupt, criminal and 
therefore illegal.
The reaction to the shutdown of two thirds of Volgograd’s marshrutka 
fleet has been highly diverse. While certain line owners brought legal action, 
others just accepted the new regulations, and still others supported the 
drivers in offering illegal trips despite high penalties for both drivers and 
operators. Currently, the transport mode of illegal trips depends highly 
on the creativity of the driver:  some oblige the passengers to personally 
sign a contract after entering the marshrutka, others ask for ‘compulsory 
donations’ and some drivers just change line numbers during the rides to 
avoid police controls.
In Khujand, too, the discussion about line closures has been going on for 
years. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has pledged 
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to provide a credit of US$61.5 million for 600 new buses and trolleybuses. 
The first hundred Chinese- built buses were due to arrive towards the end 
of 2011 but these buses never materialized, as of 2018. One reason for 
this might lie in the personal involvement of bureaucrats who themselves 
employ marshrutka drivers and fear losing their income, while yet another 
reason is a discussion between the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the city administration on whether to provide the 
credit in cash or in kind – that is, if buses are to be tendered and ordered dir-
ectly by the EBRD or if the cash flow should run through the city adminis-
tration accounts. In 2014, the buses were due to arrive ‘this winter’, while in 
mid- 2016 they were meant to arrive ‘by the end of the year’. This would mean 
the disappearance of marshrutka line 3, alongside all other marshrutkas 
running on the main street (i.e. Lenin/ Somoni Prospekt). Surprisingly or not, 
neither drivers nor operators seem to worry. Many drivers have applied for 
bus driving licences and registered with the city transport administration, 
while others plan to switch to suburban routes. Operators such as Sorbon 
or Gazel’passtrans plan to work with the planned City Unitary Enterprise 
responsible for the upcoming bus system for depot service provisions, while 
the city administration is sure to get its proper share of the new system. 
Fluid practices can therefore be observed in the break- up phase as well, 
and even the disappearance of marshrutkas as we know them is first of all 
characterized by fluidity.
This chapter has shown that fluid mobility offers co- produce, as a side 
effect, very fluid forms of urban space. Not only do they configure the assem-
blage itself but they also reconceptualize the outside environment, such as 
streets, barriers, stops and (enforced) traffic rules, buildings and institutions, 
as a result of the challenge of individual preferences and intersubjective 
negotiation processes in the collective setting of marshrutkas. Within this 
assemblage, we must acknowledge the structuring role of regulations that 
reconfigure the marshrutka market with a different pace and intensity over 
time – from a waning Soviet- era framework and weak oversight in the early 
1990s to the ever- hardening regulatory pressure of the 2010s, and the ever- 
increasing palpable threat of a shutdown of marshrutka services. The diver-
sity of local policies highlights the role of municipal authorities in holding 
together the ‘marshrutka assemblage’. Therefore, there is much interest in 
producing in- depth case studies of the marshrutka sector at a micro- level in 
order to grasp and map out the various actor constellations, power asym-
metries and affective flows. This approach also helps in not losing sight of 
subversive, or unintended, tactics of drivers and passengers, and in taking 
note of the agency of objects, such as vehicles, stops or maintenance facil-
ities, which, in turn, may also be seen as assemblages in their own right. 
Assemblage thinking also accommodates a longitudinal perspective that 
takes a ‘situationally performed’ post- socialism into account – with regard 
to both obduracies and innovations of norms, objects or individuals. In sum-
mary, we observed the phenomenon ‘marshrutka’ in different local settings, 
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and pointed out overlapping similarities and locally adjusted differences. 
However, multiple post- Soviet mobility practices are here jointly interpreted 
as an outcome of conflicting negotiations in an assemblage determined 
by more or less durable infrastructures, legacies and horizons of meaning 
embedded in hierarchies of social order and spatial distribution, as well as 
in global discourses of modernity and development. The continuing friction, 
observed likewise in marshrutka practices in Khujand and Volgograd, might 
on the one hand be interpreted as the ongoing clash of infrastructural entities 
and enduring Soviet legacies, but at the same time influenced by neoliberal 
settings of marketization. On the other hand, marshrutka mobility could 
be seen as an assemblage of short- term reactive micro- practices heading 
for flexible solutions, always in flux, always negotiating the liminality of 
possibilities.
Indeed, marshrutkas create a different consciousness of place- space 
relations determined by the multiple layers of urban infrastructure but 
fluid enough to perform flexibility. Maybe it is the omnipresence of broken 
infrastructures and the collective experience of their maturity (closed plants, 
unfinished construction sites and insufficient urban supply systems) that 
most obviously uncover the fluid character of post- socialist infrastructures. 
However, the way marshrutkas are performing and re- creating post- socialist 
infrastructures also demonstrates the individual agency within the interplay 
of structural attribution processes. In this sense, we have tried to contribute 
to the description of post- socialist infrastructures by following everyday 
practices of motion through their fluid realizations of space- making.
Notes
 1 The first marshrutkas emerged already in the 1930s in the main centres of the 
USSR. They provided a rather expensive shuttle or express service and connected 
urban centres to various places of interest (airports, railway stations, tourist 
attractions, etc.). During Soviet times, marshrutkas always played a marginal role 
within the transportation system. In contrast to present times, they were highly 
regarded and represented as an ‘upscale’ and contemporary mode of transport 
(Kuznetzov, 2012).
 2 Behaviour expectations and action practices indeed differ widely from city to 
city. In some cities, passengers are encouraged to pay after boarding the minibus. 
In others, it is common to pay when leaving. Some cities have fixed prices for 
all marshrutka lines, while others have flexible price systems depending on dis-
tance and route line. Car brands, external and internal design, as well as security 
standards, may differ significantly between two cities and sometimes even among 
enterprises.
 3 The drivers know by heart the four- digit licence plate numbers of their colleagues 
rather than their names. It is also this very number that is saved on the drivers’ 
smartphones instead of the name of the individual driver, who might at times be 
replaced by some other person.
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13  Conclusion
Infrastructure and post- socialism in 
theory and practice
Carola S. Neugebauer, Wladimir Sgibnev  
and Tauri Tuvikene
The chapters of this book have delved into urban infrastructures in the 
post- socialist world and beyond with the aim of grasping the specificities 
of the region’s infrastructures and to explore the interrelations between 
infrastructures and post- socialism. The authors have not only addressed 
post- socialism through infrastructures, but also infrastructures through 
post- socialism. The intersection of both deepens ‘thinking’ and enables a 
more informed ‘doing’ of (urban) transition and transformation.
This book is among the first to overcome the lack of socio- political 
perspectives on infrastructures in post- socialist urban development 
and to approach post- socialism through an infrastructural lens. So far, 
infrastructures are either hidden in scholarly literature on post- socialism or 
form part of mainly grey, efficiency- driven economistic readings. The poten-
tial for infrastructural thinking to conceptualize cities in the post-socialist 
realm, and to provide links between academia and practice, has not yet been 
explored. Moreover, we share the hope to contribute to infrastructure schol-
arship more generally, showing the value of post- socialist experiences and 
debates that have been neglected in infrastructure literature so far. This book 
is thus for everyone who is interested in processes and outcomes of societal 
change, and its social, material and spatial complexities.
Thinking infrastructures through post- socialism
Recent studies have discussed infrastructures as linking technologies, as 
multi- scalar, multi- sectoral and socio- material means and products of soci-
etal and spatial change, reflecting and producing incremental and strategic 
practices as well as norms and symbolisms that shape the daily lives of indi-
viduals and society in turn. The contributions of this book test this concep-
tual thinking. Dealing with linkages across scales and places, Liubimau’s 
chapter on the nuclear city of Visaginas in Lithuania, for example, focuses 
on symbolisms and practices attached to the nuclear power plant, which 
in itself is the infrastructure that brought the city of Visaginas to life. The 
author traces the multi- scalar relations between local people, the Soviet 
Union and independent Lithuania, the international community and today’s 
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European Union (EU), and the former Cold War blocks. In doing so, he 
points to connections between the post- Soviet story of Visaginas and other 
parts of the world, like US company towns and post- colonial cities. The dis-
cussion of post- socialist urban transformation through infrastructures in this 
chapter and elsewhere in the book thus enriches and revises existing global 
North- and global South- oriented theories and concepts on infrastructures, 
as well as the conceptualizations of post- socialism.
The research compiled in this book shows the potential to contribute 
to current debates on infrastructure, and we wish to revisit two of its key 
arguments in particular:  the equation of urban infrastructure’s material 
obduracy and invisibility, and its normativity in terms of (un- )changing 
values, interests and power.
Obduracy and (in)visibility
Infrastructural literature tends to focus on the dichotomy between the exist-
ence and function of infrastructures versus the collapse and lack of such 
materialities, which make the otherwise invisible visible in people’s daily 
lives. Post- socialist experiences clearly oppose this simplification and call for 
nuanced conceptualizations instead. Indeed, material obduracy is essential, 
yet the continuity and change of individual and institutional (local) practices 
are of utmost importance as well: immaterial obduracy and change emerge 
as a key driver for infrastructural invisibility and visibility respectively.
There is a lot to be found on material obduracy in the chapters of this 
book. There is obduracy of housing infrastructures, of greenery and of trans-
port systems. Perhaps the strongest experience of material collapse emerged 
in the case of public transport infrastructures in South Russia and Central 
Asia as reported by Weicker and Sgibnev. Nevertheless, they put emphasis on 
fluidity and adaptability of infrastructures thanks to informal local activities 
stepping in to mitigate the consequences of neoliberalization. Their study 
contrasts with the Brno case (Mulíček and Seidenglanz), where the urban 
public transport system – developed across more than a century – has kept 
its socialist- era material layout almost unchanged. At the same time, the 
chapter reveals the harsh breaks in daily mobility practices and needs that 
have emerged through the abrupt and deep de- industrialization processes 
and the parallel growth of service industries, triggered by neoliberal reforms 
after socialism. Rhythms of daily mobility, transport planning and construc-
tion have changed considerably, while the materiality of the public transport 
system has remained unchanged. Thus, it becomes apparent that material 
modifications or even a breakdown of transport infrastructures matter less 
than shifts in institutional and individual practices.
The chapters by Roth and by Salukvadze and Sichinava, which discuss 
housing as ‘intimate infrastructure’ in the South Caucasus, as well as the 
chapters by Jovanović, and Bouzarovski and Tirado Herrero, which focus 
on heating infrastructure in Central and Eastern European (CEE) cities, 
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take on the material obduracy of infrastructures. This rests embedded in 
institutions and practices that seek to change, modify or ‘safeguard’ the 
socialist legacy of tightly bundled infrastructure. While local and national 
state stakeholders may follow neoliberal values and logics of privatization, 
decentralization, state withdrawal from welfare and thus an ‘unbundling’ 
of infrastructure provision, residents’ practices are driven by a continuous 
interest in receiving housing and heat provision in a quality and quantity 
they need and are ‘used to’. Neither the material collapse nor non- existence 
of heating or housing infrastructure, but changing institutional and indi-
vidual practices turn material and otherwise obdurate infrastructure visible. 
They turn the formerly ‘ordinary’ infrastructure ‘a privilege’ and space for 
production of inequality (Jovanović).
Jovanović reports in her ethnographic study on district heating the 
residents’ ‘disenchantment’ on feeling the ‘social contract’ between them 
and the state cancelled: the socialist state promised a bundled package of 
infrastructural services including heating (in particular, for all new housing, 
e.g. in the large housing estates), but after 1990 neoliberal reforms made 
these services less accessible. The ‘shell- and- core form’ of new multi- storey 
housing construction and marketization is a further example of infrastruc-
ture unbundling in the cities in the post-socialist realm, as discussed in 
chapters by Roth, and Salukvadze and Sichinava. Private investors backed 
up by revised building codes transfer the responsibility for housing- related 
utilities to new flat owners. The residents, thrown back on their individual 
or collective agency, feel infrastructure more heavily in their daily lives than 
was the case under socialism.
Post- socialist experience thus reminds us to be sceptical of simplifications 
of the infrastructure’s material obduracy and visibility. Infrastructure turns 
visible to users, planners and researchers not only when it is non- existent 
or has gone through (material or functional) collapse, but also because of 
institutional and everyday practices that co- create perceptions of service 
quantity and quality, and relate to the expectations of users based on pre-
vious experiences. Similarly, institutional reforms that adapt infrastructural 
services to new normative settings, such as the privatization of public goods 
and harsh economic reforms, have resulted in an unbundling of urban infra-
structure and produced spaces of ‘exacerbated inequalities’ (Salukvadze and 
Sichinava), and thus an intense visibility of infrastructure.
Values and power reconsidered
The contributions in the book emphasize that urban infrastructures are 
not solely material components of an urban fabric but political projects 
reflecting and (re- )producing values and interests. Infrastructural literature 
has acknowledged the normative- symbolic significance of infrastructure (see 
the Introduction for more details). The imagery of modernity and modern-
ization of space and society has dominated these debates, referring to the 
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‘public sentiments of progress and […] well- being’ (Amin, 2014), and ubi-
quitous access to infrastructure provision. The contributions in this book 
call for more attention and nuanced thinking about the normative- symbolic 
significance of infrastructure in terms of values and interests and power 
relations and techniques (re- )produced by infrastructures.
The authors show that in CEE and the former Soviet Union (FSU) 
infrastructures served and serve ‘big’ normative imageries, particularly in 
terms of modernity and modernization. Plyushteva traces, for instance, 
the continuity of this idea throughout socialist and post- socialist periods. 
In doing so, however, she discloses a prompt and fundamental shift in the 
values that are communicated and transported by the imagery of mod-
ernity in the Sofia Metro. Concordantly, Roth shares a similar observation 
when analyzing housing in socialist and post- socialist Baku, and the shifted 
meanings of modernization. These chapters thus lay down, on the one hand, 
the importance of modernity as a (still) dominating normative imagery of 
urban infrastructure, and provide links to comparable conceptual frames 
throughout other urban contexts in the world. On the other hand, they sen-
sitize for changing value and interest settings embraced in ‘big’ imageries 
and disclosing (new) power relations in space and society.
Jovanović shows finally the deep penetration of socialist values linked 
to infrastructure into current thoughts and practices. She makes clear that 
values of a bygone era imprint on and constitute an inherent part of current 
value systems, and form a major reference point for current and future 
agency. With regard to local heating systems, she highlights the residents’ 
interest in receiving heat, and shows that  – contrary to socialism  – the 
residents widely adopt and ‘insist on a more liberal doctrine of individual 
choice’ (Jovanović, p.  49). This ‘new’ value hybridizes and intermingles, 
however, with the residents’ ambivalent fundamental convictions about the 
way to get access to familiar socialist- era infrastructure services:  they are 
simultaneously ‘yearning for both the (welfare) state, which ought to pro-
vide and for a “proper” capitalist state’ that would provide what people pay 
for (Jovanović, p. 48).
Apart from calling for a distinction between fundamental values and 
situational interests, the authors draw attention to power relations. In this 
vein, Zupan and Büdenbender’s chapter departs from a seemingly common 
interest in a greener city, but then reveals how these shared concerns serve 
economic interests and neoliberal logics to the detriment of ideals of wel-
fare and equality. Similarly, Haase et al. show how green space provision 
has been on the agenda of urban planning during socialism and there-
after, but has been captivated and sacrificed by economic- political power 
arrangements driven by predominantly economic interests. With this critical 
analysis of power relations and techniques, the authors show the vitality 
and resilience of neoliberal ideology in CEE and the FSU that produces and 
exacerbates socio- spatial inequality. Conceptually, they point out the neces-
sity to deeply understand the role of infrastructure, infrastructural research 
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and practice for the pursuit and realization of values and power balances in 
society and space.
This book thus reminds us of infrastructure’s relevance for critical urban 
research and planning practices oriented towards justice and sustainability. It 
draws attention to the contents and the interplay of values and interests with 
power relations and techniques, highlighting the normative- symbolic signifi-
cance of infrastructure. Infrastructural research in the post- socialist realm 
seems to be of particular appeal, given the clash of diametrically opposite 
value systems and power arrangements that mark(ed) socialism and capit-
alism, and the deep penetration and processing of these experiences at all 
levels of space and society.
Thinking post- socialism through infrastructures
Approaching cities in CEE and the FSU through infrastructural thinking 
helps to sharpen conceptual perspectives on post- socialist (urban) change. 
Recent debates have questioned the use of the term ‘post- socialism’ itself, 
as well as the positioning of cities in CEE and the FSU within a global 
scholarship on cities. Drawing on these debates and the book’s empirical 
and conceptual contributions, we argue for a relational understanding of 
post- socialism.
Relationality refers to the multi- scalar and multi- rhythmic inter-
dependencies between all dimensions of social, material and spatial pro-
duction (i.e. social practices and normativity, materialities and space) that 
are neither static nor predictably changing over time. Rather, all aspects 
are interlinked, ever- transforming and re- adjusting at different intensities 
and paces, resulting in various socio- material, time- and space- dependent 
hybridities. These transformation processes do not follow predefined tra-
jectories. Nevertheless, in CEE and the FSU today, they are greatly driven 
by neoliberal ideology and regimes. Looking at urban change through the 
lens of relationality as an interlinkage between the material and immaterial 
(i.e. ideologies, normative positions, practices and power arrangements) 
of different times and orders is thus the central merit that infrastructural 
thinking brings to current debates on post- socialism, and, eventually, to 
urban transition theories more generally.
The contributions in this book are insightful and structured attempts to 
capture post- socialist urban change as relational stories. Looking at urban 
change through infrastructure as linking technology, authors clearly out-
line the multi- scalar and multi- dimensional character of urban change. 
Liubimau on the nuclear city of Visaginas, and Jovanović on the contested 
and changing ‘social contract’ between individual residents and the state 
embodied in the materiality of heating infrastructure, are two cases in 
point. The hybridities of urban change result from overlapping, sometimes 
mismatching socio- material rhythms as Mulíček and Seidenglanz suggest. 
Juxtaposing rhythms of daily mobility with the differently paced rhythms 
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of infrastructural planning, construction and management, as well as eco-
nomic dynamics of industrialization and de- industrialization, they argue for 
rhythms that are not cyclic and linear per se but include the inherent changes 
in relations and dimensions occurring with different speeds. Several chapters 
in this book highlight the continuity or, rather, the longue durée within 
relations and dimensions of socio- material order. Weicker and Sgibnev trace, 
for example, the marshrutka phenomenon as a tactic in many ways inspired 
by socialist practice and normativity, and, conceptually, argue for looking at 
infrastructures as fluidities in their own right. The two chapters on housing 
discuss inequality as a longue durée trait of urban development and residen-
tial patterns: they show the similarity and continuity in state and residents’ 
practices (i.e. the governance of access to housing), thus (re- )producing this 
inequality over decades. Simultaneously, the authors make clear that these 
patterns and practices have been changing in some content and relevance 
because they are struggling with or serving the norms and values of today’s 
socio- economic orders.
Relational thinking and the awareness of multiple interdependencies 
emerge as useful tools for capturing any process of urban change globally. 
Yet, post- socialist urban change offers a particular window of opportunity 
for conceptual and practical learning. Post- socialist change is marked by 
the experiences that the pretentious ideologies of socialism and capitalism 
and the clash of both brought about. These experiences are embodied and 
lived in various socio- material patterns. All chapters in this book show how 
these legacies may be traced throughout people’s norms and feelings (e.g. 
Jovanović), in institutional and individual practices (e.g. Roth, Salukvadze 
and Sichinava) and materialities of urban infrastructures (e.g. Mulíček and 
Seidenglanz). The great diversity of post- socialist socio- material urban 
patterns is maybe best shown in the book by the comparative and border- 
straddling chapters of Bouzarovski and Tirado Herrero, Haase et al., and 
Mukhopadhyay and Tuvikene.
The empirical and conceptual inputs of the book’s contributions thus 
point to the evolving character of experiences that were gathered under 
socialism and during the harsh, abrupt shift towards capitalism. In doing so, 
the contributions decode and re- trace the socialist legacies and the heritage 
of the ideological, systemic break that have been inherently changing (and 
still do change). Socialist legacy is not ‘an independent carrier of history’ 
that is ‘alienated from history’ (Golubchikov et al., 2014, p. 617) to serve 
and/ or oppose the processes and values of the actually dominating capitalist 
order. Instead, logics of socialist production and practices are being carried 
on. Thus, the socio- material experiences and memories of socialism and its 
clash with capitalism have hybridized and enriched in meaning.
In these hybridizing and even polarizing forms, the evolving legacies 
of post- socialism still act as a frame of reference for actual and future 
urban change, as the chapters of the book show. Post- socialist legacies 
are imprinting on urban change, be it in the form of materially obdurate 
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heating infrastructures resisting neoliberalization or in the form of evolving 
value systems of residents (see also Bouzarovski and Tirado Herrero, and 
Jovanović in this book), or the combination of both. They contribute to 
urban developments in CEE and the FSU that Bouzarovski et  al. (2016) 
propose to capture as ‘rolling path dependencies’ – paths of urban change 
that are not yet finally defined, even though neoliberal regimes may indeed 
prefigure future trajectories.
Thus, infrastructural thinking brings some important contributions to 
post- socialist urban studies: the concept of post- socialism is (still) valuable 
and is much more than a simple statement about (urban) hybridities. We 
argue for a consequent relational understanding of post- socialism as non- 
directional, multi- scalar processes of interdependent social, material and 
spatial change of varying paces and intensities that draw on and contribute 
to experiences of socialism and capitalism – processes of urban transition 
that thus open a particular window of opportunity for conceptual and prac-
tical learning.
With such a relational perspective, post- socialism shares a lot with urban 
transitions in other parts of the world, linking up to theories of urban 
and infrastructural change in the global North and South. This is particu-
larly true when thinking of ‘splintering urbanism’ under neoliberalism. 
Moreover, the post- socialist conditions in CEE and the FSU link to coun-
tries like China, Vietnam, Cuba or North Korea. These share – at least to a 
certain degree – socio- material legacies of state socialism, and its imprints 
on and modifications to space and society. The chapter by Mukhopadhyay 
and Tuvikene explores the use of ‘post- socialism’ beyond its usual borders, 
and elaborates on its analytical potential in capturing the influence of post- 
central state individualizing and splintered infrastructural practices. In the 
context of a shrinking state without a shrinking population but rapid urban-
ization, informal practices become crucial in infrastructure provision. The 
case highlights the post- collective nature of infrastructure governing in India, 
which, following post- socialist conceptualizations, shows the ways in which 
privatized developments are both cause and result of unequal circumstances.
From theory to practice
The added value that studies of post- socialist urban infrastructure can bring 
to transition theories and practice are twofold: first, analytically asking how 
transitions are unfolding and, second, normatively asking where transition 
should go (see also Bouzarovski et al., 2017). These questions bear consid-
erable relevance for both critical scholars and (planning) practitioners, and 
various stakeholders beyond academia.
Studies on post- socialist urban infrastructure add to the question of 
how urban transition occurs by its emphasis of and sensitivity towards 
relationality. We refer here to our arguments when discussing post- socialism 
and describing the new nuances that post- socialist urban experiences can bring 
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to infrastructural thinking. They resonate with discussions of transitions in 
CEE and the FSU, and more generally. In the case of post- socialist transition 
debates, early commentators were concerned with social, cultural and polit-
ical barriers to those shifts, whereas anthropologists as well as many other 
later observers noted the inherent complexity of any large- scale societal 
change and shied away from simple understandings of ‘barriers’ to complex 
transformations. Similarly, literature attending to transitions more generally 
notes ‘the limited space for changes’ resulting from ‘the huge investments 
and sunk cost and the dominance of certain paradigms’ (Loorbach et al., 
2010, p. 1200), despite the preference for radical innovations among many 
proponents of sustainable development. Nevertheless, the book has shown 
how an innovation might actually turn out to be a neoliberal city marketing 
tool (Zupan and Büdenbender), how it might challenge the livelihoods of 
residents expecting cheaper provision of heat (Jovanović), or how it might 
challenge the livelihoods of those employed in informal transport systems 
when a new mass transport system is looming at the horizon (Weicker and 
Sgibnev).
Our conceptual conclusion postulates that post- socialism is neither 
a particular problem of infrastructure transition nor a specific case of 
such transition, but a mix of changes and continuities that do not neces-
sarily have to be tied to a certain territorial region and temporal moment. 
Post- socialism denotes a perspective of attending to large socio- technical 
changes as relational infrastructuring with multiple hybridities. With 
regard to the practice of planning and governing (infrastructural) change, 
post- socialist experiences recall and emphasize the necessity of compre-
hensive and coordinated approaches. The approaches should relate the 
material and social, eventually conflicting sectors (e.g. civil engineering, 
economy and  social policy), in addition to actors in the state, business 
and civil society, as well as attend to different scales and rhythms. Such 
nuanced assemblages of policies and planning instruments need to achieve 
a lot: to stimulate and steer changes, to use (local) capacities of adaptation 
and modification, and to cope with socio- material continuities, no matter 
if assessed as ‘beneficial’ or ‘hindering’. Infrastructure planning and gov-
ernance are thus highly demanding in today’s socio- political and economic 
orders in the FSU and CEE, as well as elsewhere.
Moreover, post- socialist urban infrastructure studies call insistently for 
exploring where urban transitions occur, to whose benefits and costs, and 
through which power arrangements they are backed and implemented. 
Again, this question is relevant for critical transition studies as well as for 
practitioners of infrastructure and urban planning, since planning is per se a 
political project pursuing selected values.
In many critical fields, there is an outspoken assumption that transi-
tion is desirable. Surely, radical change may be normatively advisable and 
utterly needed. Transitions literature, for instance, defines a sustainable and 
 
Conclusion 221
   21
low- carbon society as an aim. Early post- socialist sentiment and literature 
had diverse ambitions for generating a society different from the past, more 
open to business and private ownership, less state- oriented and more demo-
cratic. Yet, this transition may not be desirable and acceptable to everyone. 
The desirability and acceptability depends on the ways in which transition 
is brought about, and on the particular constellation of changes and con-
tinuities, costs and benefits (Roch et  al., 2016). The post- socialist realm 
witnesses a rich diversity of spatial transitions, as we know from many 
studies (e.g. Haase et al., Bouzarovski and Tirado Herrero from this issue; 
Brade and Neugebauer, 2017). However, often missing among practitioners 
and stakeholders with power are the intentions and courage to critically 
(self- )reflect and transparently (re- )assess transitory outcomes, and thus to 
learn from these findings for present and future political agenda- setting and 
planning practices (Roch et  al., 2016). The experiences of deep systemic 
transitions in post- socialist countries, which ‘may allow for path creation to 
be seen beyond the tropes of technological innovation and economic devel-
opment that presently dominate much of the literature’ (Bouzarovski et al., 
2016, p. 639), have often not been fully explored, discussed and – particu-
larly – used in (political) practices.
Nevertheless, we need to be very attentive to the effects of transition and 
the mechanisms at work: Who is affected and at what cost? Do (infrastruc-
tural) investments serve wider societal goals, or contribute to ‘splintering 
urbanism’ and deepen social and spatial polarization and one- sided power 
arrangements? Indeed, cost- benefit questions, and thus the issue of desir-
ability and acceptability of transition, remain relative. Here is where political 
debates, policies and planning that consider the relationality of (infrastruc-
tural) change are urgently needed, and where participative processes (with 
all the problems they entail) appear as crucial components. And here again, 
post- socialist experiences in the form of evolving, even polarizing value 
systems come into play, since they (still) constitute the frame of reference 
for assessing (i.e. contesting, welcoming or mitigating) the effects, costs and 
benefits of ‘urban transition’.
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